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AMERICA’S PAPER PRISONS:
THE SECOND CHANCE GAP
Colleen Chien*
Over the last decade, all fifty states and the federal government have enacted
“second chance” reforms that increase the eligibility of individuals arrested,
charged, or convicted of crimes to shorten their sentences, clear their criminal
records, and/or regain the right to vote. While much fanfare has accompanied the increasing availability of “second chances,” little attention has been
paid to their delivery. This study introduces the concept of the “second chance
gap,” which it defines as the difference between eligibility and delivery of second chance relief; explores its causes; and approximates the size of the gap in
connection with several second chance laws and initiatives. Using administrative and other data, it finds that among a host of petition-based second
chance opportunities, to shorten sentences, restore one’s vote, and clear one’s
criminal convictions, only a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of those eligible for relief actually received it. Extrapolating based on a novel analysis of
around sixty thousand criminal histories of persons primarily seeking gigeconomy work and of the expungement laws governing nonconvictions of all
fifty states, this study estimates that at least twenty to thirty million American adults, or 30–40 percent of those with criminal records, fall into the “sec-
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ond chance expungement gap,” living burdened with criminal records that
persist despite appearing to be partially or fully clearable under existing law.
These findings suggest that tens of millions of American are stuck in a paper
prison, held back by deficiencies in the administration of second chances that
have left them incarcerated, disenfranchised, or burdened by convictions beyond what the law requires. Some of the barriers to relief are structural and
related to debt, overburdened bureaucracies, and the contested nature of second chance rules that unwind past judgments and policies. But others are
harder to see and stem from administrative failures like unworkable standards, missing and incomplete criminal justice information (“dirty data”), a
lack of awareness of second chance opportunities, and costly and complex
processes. Addressing them—by moving administrative burdens from the defendant and onto the state and algorithms through automation, standardization, and ruthless iteration—can narrow the second chance relief gap.
Leveraging them, “Clean Slate” initiatives to automatically clear eligible
criminal records can have the potential to help the millions of Americans in
the second chance expungement gap. However, the ability of such second
chance initiatives to improve outcomes depends on how they are implemented. Debt-related barriers and dirty data can contribute to incomplete automation, leading to “second second chance gaps.” In the realm of
expungement, application of the expungement criteria to minor but not major offenses can also have the effect of exacerbating, not narrowing, existing
racial disparities within the population of people with records, while improving them within the general population. Further research is needed to understand the impact of automated clearance under different scenarios, such as
when the defendant is not notified of the relief received or there is a risk of
statistical discrimination making things worse, not better. Overall, however,
though other hurdles may remain, automation can remove the unfair collateral punishments, not steel bars, holding back tens of millions of Americans.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2019, the Louisiana Times-Picayune reported that the
state of Louisiana routinely keeps people incarcerated, “[w]eeks, months,
years after their release dates.”1 According to a state auditor’s report, the
main culprit was inconsistencies in the application of credits for certified
treatment and rehabilitation programs to the calculation of release dates.2
Similar miscalculations have been reported in California, where taxpayers
have paid tens of millions of dollars in overstays because some inmates were
given 15 percent rather than 50 percent good-behavior credit. 3 Overincarceration in Hawaii,4 D.C.,5 and the federal criminal justice system6 has also
been documented.
Also in February 2019, the New York Times reported the death of Steve
Cheatham while he was in prison waiting for a court to rule on his compassionate-release application.7 Created in the 1980s, compassionate-release
programs allow federal inmates who no longer pose a threat to be sent home,
usually when nearing death.8 But since 2014, scores of elderly and terminally

1. Richard A. Webster & Emily Lane, Louisiana Routinely Jails People Weeks, Months,
Years After Their Release Dates, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 21, 2019, 9:24 PM), https://www
.nola.com/news/article_988818dd-2971-51c8-82d5-096eef5ffba5.html [https://perma.cc/L9YXXYQ9].
2. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, DEP’T OF CORR., MANAGEMENT OF OFFENDER DATA:
PROCESSES FOR ENSURING ACCURACY 9 (2017), https://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf
/1284612EDBDB25E5862581C40056189F/$FILE/0001674C.pdf [https://perma.cc/428L-4RJC]
(describing the need to factor into release-date calculations credit for time served, good timerelease ratio, credit earned for certified treatment or rehabilitation programs, good-time credit
lost due to behavior, and parole-revocation recalculations).
3. Michael Rothfeld, Inmates Serve Overtime, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-feb-17-me-prisons17-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6QCS-CFBJ].
4. Manolo Morales, Inmates Forced to Stay in Prison Past Their Release Date Cost Taxpayers, KHON2 (Jan. 5, 2019, 3:35 AM), https://www.khon2.com/local-news/inmates-forced-tostay-in-prison-past-their-release-date-cost-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/ENT8-GGS9].
5. Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Jail Held Man for 77 Days After His Case Was Dropped Until
Another Inmate Flagged an Attorney, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2017, 6:38 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-jail-held-man-for-77-days-after-hiscase-was-dropped-until-another-inmate-flagged-an-attorney/2017/10/01/61235af2-9f0a-11e78ea1-ed975285475e_story.html [https://perma.cc/W8GE-UAUE] (describing the payment by
Washington beginning in 2017 of $6 million in connection with a detention settlement).
6. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2 (discussing the shortcomings of the federal Clemency Initiative and compassionate-release policy).
7. Mitch Smith, A New Law Made Him a ‘Free Man on Paper,’ but He Died Behind
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/criminal-justicereform-steve-cheatham.html [https://perma.cc/49PZ-Z9DL].
8. See HUM. RTS. WATCH & FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE ANSWER IS
NO: TOO LITTLE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN US FEDERAL PRISONS 2, 26–27 (2012),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1112ForUploadSm.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/48F2-4QJG].
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ill federal prisoners have died while waiting for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
to rule on their applications.9 A Department of Justice Office of the Inspector
General report found that less than 4 percent of federal inmates who submitted compassionate-release requests were released, in part because of eligibility provisions that were unclear and difficult to apply.10 The same report
estimated that 19 percent of the federal-prison budget was spent to incarcerate aging inmates.11
Over the summer of 2020, tens of millions of Americans joined demonstrations to protest the killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor by police officers.12 Over ten thousand people were arrested,13 including eightyseven unarmed demonstrators who were each charged with a felony and two
misdemeanors for sitting on the lawn of the Kentucky attorney general to
protest the lack of charges following Breonna Taylor’s death.14 Even if ultimately dismissed without prejudice,15 the charges will remain on each person’s record unless and until the person, after a waiting period of one to
three years, petitions for expungement and the court grants the petition.16

9. New Data Reveals BOP Still Neglecting Compassionate Release, FAMS. AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://famm.org/new-data-reveals-bop-stillneglecting-compassionate-release/ [https://perma.cc/45HG-4AFV] (describing Bureau of Prisons letter indicating that eighty-one prisoners died while awaiting review of their petitions between 2014 and 2018).
10. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS
DIV. 15-05, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS 45 (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5CBRW9G].
11. Id. at 48 (“Based on BOP cost data, we estimate that the BOP spent approximately
$881 million, or 19 percent of its total budget, to incarcerate aging inmates in FY 2013.”).
12. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[https://perma.cc/RR2QRZQZ] (reviewing estimates of how many Americans participated in the protests, proposing
an aggregate range from fifteen to twenty-six million).
13. Anita Snow, Arrests at Widespread U.S. Protests Hit 10,000, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(June 4, 2020, 7:16 AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20200604/arrests-at-widespreadus-protests-hit-10000 [https://perma.cc/EBG9-ZLK4].
14. Jacey Fortin & Allyson Waller, 87 Face Felony Charges After Protesting Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/protestersarrested-breonna-taylor-kentucky.html [https://perma.cc/SV37-92TG].
15. This is typical; however, if the charges are dismissed with prejudice, the charges will
be automatically removed following a law change in 2020. Kentucky Restoration of Rights &
Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/staterestoration-profiles/kentucky-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/
[https://perma.cc/5Y8E-NLMB] (“For cases disposed after March 27, 2020, expungement of
misdemeanor or felony charges resulting in acquittal or dismissal with prejudice (‘and not in
exchange for a guilty plea to another offense’) is automatic upon disposition (‘The order expunging the records shall not require any action by the person.’).”).
16. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.076(1)(a) (2020).
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Many people do not take advantage of this option. As reported in this Article, I find, applying the records-clearance policies of fifty states to criminal
histories from each state, that an estimated 30–40 percent of people with
records, or twenty to thirty million of the eighty million adult Americans
with records,17 are eligible to clear their criminal records partially or fully on
the basis of nonconvictions expungement policies but have not done so.
For individuals that are convicted, formal sentences are only part of the
punishment. According to the National Institute of Justice, forty-four thousand private- and civil-sector limitations on employment, housing, civic participation, and many other realms continue to burden those with criminal
records long after they have served their time.18 But while every state offers
ways to “expunge” or otherwise improve one’s record of criminal convictions to avoid such “collateral consequences,”19 only a small fraction of those
eligible for relief get it. Among the dozen or so states analyzed or reported in
this study, uptake rates of convictions relief below 10–20 percent were the
norm.20

17. STAT. TRENDING, ANALYSIS, & REPORTING GRP., FBI, SEPTEMBER 2020 NEXT
GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) SYSTEM FACT SHEET 1 (2020), https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/view [https://perma.cc/4G9V-V4H7] (reporting 78.3 million records pertaining to unique individuals based on fingerprints); QuickFacts United States,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US
/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/2QBN-Z3Y6] (reporting that as of July 2019, there were 328
million people living in the US, 77.5 percent of whom were 18 years or older, or 254 million
adults); see also BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2012, at 14 tbl.1, 83 tbl.25 (2014),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD6S-DG8P] (reporting 100 million criminal records based on a summation of the amount of records each
state keeps, which does not account for those with multiple records in multiple states, and seventy-nine million unique criminal records based on the Interstate Identification Index).
18. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 1–2 (2019), https://www
.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QA8H-92CZ]
(“[I]ndividuals with criminal histories can face barriers to voting, serving on a jury, holding
public office, securing employment, obtaining housing, receiving public assistance, owning a
firearm, getting a driver’s license, qualifying for financial aid and college admission, qualifying
for military service, and deportation (for noncitizens).” (footnotes omitted)).
19. Through expungement, sealing, vacatur, set-aside, or related records-rehabilitation
remedy, interchangeably referred to in this Article as “expungement” or records “clearing.” See
Margaret Colgate Love, 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief,
RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Dec. 2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restorationprofiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/
[https://perma.cc
/6XR3-RRZR] (showing that while relief varies considerably by state, all states offer pathways
to some type of records rehabilitation, but also showing that at the federal level there remains,
as of December 2019, no general statutory authority to seal or expunge even nonconviction
records).
20. See infra Table 4-1
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“Second chance” laws, passed by nearly every state over the last decade,21
are an important pillar of what the late Joan Petersilia has called the current
“transformative moment in criminal justice reform . . . away from . . . harsh
punishment policies” and toward rehabilitation.22 These laws allow individuals charged with or convicted of crimes to have their sentences shortened,
crimes downgraded (e.g., from a felony to a misdemeanor), criminal records
cleared, licenses restored, and/or voting rights reinstated, but often only on
petition. They reflect the sentiment—behind Kim Kardashian West’s successful bid for presidential clemency for Alice Johnson (a sixty-three-yearold grandma given a life sentence for a drug-related crime),23 the 2018 midterm passage of Florida’s “Amendment 4” to restore the vote to over a million persons with felony convictions, 24 and the surprise enactment of the
bipartisan First Step Act in 2019, which grants early release to qualifying federal prisoners25—that everyone deserves a second chance, and many punishments deserve a second look.
But while much fanfare has accompanied the increasing availability of
second chances, little attention has been paid to their delivery. 26 For example, in the fall of 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, to allow indi-

21. See infra Section I.A.
22. Joan Petersilia, Preface, Realigning Corrections, California Style, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI., March 2016, at 8, 8. See also, for example, the formation of the Law Enforcement Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration group, comprised of nearly 200 police chiefs,
prosecutors, sheriffs, and attorneys general committed to “changes to laws and practices that
more effectively fight crime while reducing unnecessary imprisonment.” LAW ENF’T LEADERS,
http://lawenforcementleaders.org/ [https://perma.cc/7KBV-NVWZ].
23. Peter Baker, Alice Marie Johnson Is Granted Clemency by Trump After Push by Kim
Kardashian West, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us
/politics/trump-alice-johnson-sentence-commuted-kim-kardashian-west.html
[https://perma.cc/W4M7-A8TF].
24. Though whether it will remains to be seen. See Lori Rozsa, ‘A Joyous Day’ Ahead as
1.4 Million Florida Ex-Felons Have Voting Rights Restored, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2019, 6:40
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-joyous-day-ahead-as-14-million-florida-exfelons-have-voting-rights-restored/2019/01/05/58650ee2-106f-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2
_story.html [https://perma.cc/9LRK-E8F2] (citing as one of the barriers to restoration the requirement that all fines first be paid, including that of one individual who owed $52 million in
restitution).
25. Through, for example, the retroactive application of good time credits and the Fair
Sentencing Act. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 101(a), §§ 3631–3635, sec. 404,
132 Stat. 5194, 5195–208, 5222.
26. But see Tony Calero, Open Juvenile Records in Washington State: Process, Effects,
and Costs of Protective Mechanisms (2013) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, University of Washington),
http://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/ckfinder/files/Examining%20Open
%20Juvenile%20Records%20in%20Washington%20State.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7JY-RFTZ]
(considering the uptake of clearance remedies among eligible juveniles in Washington State).
See also J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical
Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2467 (2020).
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viduals with felony records to regain their vote without a petition.27 But confusion about who had outstanding fines and fees, which the Florida legislature ruled would disqualify potential voters, created an “administrative
nightmare” that added “confusion and anxiety to people . . . trying to exercise their first amendment right.”28 Estimates of the number of people registering and voting pursuant to the measure were “well below what was
anticipated when Amendment 4 passed.”29 This Article discusses how, in
“second chance” contexts like the ones described—resentencing, compassionate release, reenfranchisement, and expungement—millions of American are stuck in a paper prison, held back by deficiencies in the
administration of second chances that have left them unable to vote, drive,
serve on a jury, or do one of the tens of thousands of other activities restricted for those with criminal records.30 Some of the barriers to relief are structural, and related to debt and overburdened bureaucracies. But others are
harder to see and stem from administrative factors like unworkable standards, missing and incomplete criminal justice information (“dirty data”), a
lack of awareness of second chance opportunities, and the nature of second
chance rules that unwind past judgments and policies and reflect contested
renegotiations about how to best strike the balance between public safety and
equity.
This Article introduces the concept of the “second chance gap”—the difference between eligibility and delivery of second chances—to draw attention to and quantify the impact of these largely invisible and
underappreciated structural and red-tape barriers, not steel bars, holding
Americans back. As states continue to pass and administer second chance
laws, it is worth taking stock of the gaps between eligibility and delivery, the
reasons they exist, various options for narrowing them, and the open research questions that surround the administration of effective and impactful
second chance relief. This Article is an initial effort to do so, drawing upon
and extending several literatures.
First, in its focus on the administrative, rather than substantive, aspects
of second chance relief, such as who carries the information burden, it builds
upon the awareness in law and policy circles that, as Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein have observed, “small and apparently insignificant details can have

27. Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, Florida Ruled Felons Must Pay to Vote. Now, It
Doesn’t Know How Many Can, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com
/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/10/07/florida-ruled-felons-must-pay-to-vote-now-itdoesnt-know-how-many-can/ [https://perma.cc/T83E-NBUR] (describing the requirement
that fines and fees be repaid, in combination with a lack of a central database of court fees or
fines, as causing an “administrative nightmare,” in the words of U.S. District Judge Robert
Hinkle).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 18, at 1–2
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major impacts . . . . ‘[E]verything matters.’ ” 31 Joining other studies that consider mechanisms for influencing the impact of the law other than by changing its substance,32 it finds small design choices—for example, those
regarding how eligibility criteria are articulated33—to have outsized impacts
when laws are applied at scale.
Next, by discussing and modeling uptake gaps in second chances across
a number of domains and ways for narrowing them, this Article makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing literature on what has
been called the “nonparticipation problem,” or the failure or inability of individuals eligible for government benefits to access them.34 Although “second
chances” that remove government punishments are analytically distinct
from programs that provide government benefits (like food stamps), cumbersome administrative processes are common to both. By considering the
use of government-initiated automation, not applicant-based petitions, to
award second chance relief, this Article confronts some of the novel issues
being raised by automated and algorithmic decisionmaking systems (ADS),
like notification, (the lack of an) explanation, and the reliance on incomplete
and imperfect data.35
Finally, this Article contributes to the ongoing discourse about the use of
data and high-tech tools to sort individuals in a number of contexts, including pretrial detention,36 loan qualification,37 and recruitment,38 and the at-

31. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (describing how using defaults, prompts, and other “nudges” can change public policy outcomes).
32. For a brief overview of the related literatures of behavioral economics, regulatory
design, and administrative mechanisms, see Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 773 (2014).
33. For an explanation of why, for example, it is far easier to automate eligibility measured from “disposition date” plus a waiting period, instead of “sentence completion” and other
examples, see infra Table 5 and associated discussion.
34. See, e.g., Francisca Alba, The Nonparticipation Problem: Behavioral Economics and
the Take-Up of Social Benefits, POL’Y PERSPS., Spring 2018, at 1 (discussing uptake issues in the
context of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) programs). For a review of the long literature on take-up, see Janet Currie, The
Take Up of Social Benefits, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 80 (Alan J. Auerbach, David Card & John M. Quigley eds., 2006).
35. As discussed in RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M.
SOUTHERLAND, AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES
TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS (2019), https://ainowinstitute
.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/47TV-EDLF].
36. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/BM4E-AEXE] (finding that pretrial
risk-assessment tools are biased against Black people).
37. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 679 (2016).
38. See, e.g., id. at 685.
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tendant risk that existing biases against the poor and disenfranchised will be
reinforced or amplified through the use of algorithmic processes. Though
second chances automation presents the potential for algorithms to reduce,
rather than exacerbate, existing disparities for at least the reasons described
in this Article, much depends on how it is implemented.
Part I introduces the concept of a “second chance gap” (the difference
between eligibility for and receipt of a given second chance), theorizes why it
exists, and describes empirical approaches to estimating the gap. After tracing the remarkable growth in second chance eligibility and its potential to
break the cycle of mass criminalization and mass incarceration by reducing
recidivism, it considers the substantive, administrative, and structural barriers to second chance delivery. Distinguishing between them is important because it highlights the importance of transsubstantive administrative and
design considerations in the development and implementation of second
chance law. This Part describes two analytically distinct types of gaps: “the
uptake gap,” or share or number of those eligible for relief over time who
have not applied for or received it; and the “current gap,” or share or number
of impacted individuals who, at a given point in time, appear eligible for but
have not received relief. While the “uptake gap” measures take-up over time,
and therefore requires comprehensive data, the “current gap” uses available
data to estimate the share and number of people that appear to be currently
in the gap.
Part II applies the concepts and methods outlined in Part I to several
novel data sources to roughly size several second chance gaps. In the first
Section, drawing upon administrative data, it reports on novel analyses of
the “second chance gaps” associated with several resentencing and expungement contexts, including the Obama Clemency Initiative, California’s
Propositions 47 and 64 (Prop 47 and Prop 64), and the laws governing the
expungement of criminal convictions in several states. It also reviews the
track record of “compassionate release” laws that allow prisoners to serve
shorter sentences for humanitarian or medical reasons. Part II also uses data
collected by the Sentencing Project to offer estimates of the “felony reenfranchisement gap”—the estimated share and number of people with felony records that remain disenfranchised—in thirteen states. Finally, Part II reports
on the analyses of convictions-clearance laws, both juvenile and adult, of
about ten states and their uptake. Among the majority of these programs,
chosen due to the availability of administrative or primary data, uptake rates
by eligible individuals are low, in most cases less than 10 percent, leaving 90
percent or more of those eligible for relief in the second chance gap.
The second Section of Part II uses the “current gap” methodology laid
out in Part I to estimate the number of American adults with criminal records that could clear them under the laws governing the expungement of
nonconviction records. Applying the laws of all fifty states to around sixty
thousand criminal histories from across the country and balancing the results nationally, it estimates that around 30–40 percent of adults with rec-
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ords, or twenty to thirty million individuals, could clear their criminal records, partially or fully, but have not done so.
Do second chance gaps hurt or advance social welfare? Part III addresses
this question and the case for allowing second chance gaps to persist before
ultimately arguing in favor of narrowing second chance gaps on moral, policy, and economic grounds. Based on comparing programs with relatively
larger and relatively smaller gaps, it identifies three ways to do so, taking into
account the high informational and evaluation costs and high volume of eligible individuals implicated by second chances. Currently, in the majority of
cases, second chance rights (to a cleaned record, to vote) are provided only
after individuals petitions are filed, evaluated case by case, and approved—
processes that cannot readily scale to meet the enormous volume of eligible
individuals. Ruthless iteration and, where possible, simplification are needed
to develop workable standards that can be applied and administered in imperfect data environments. Burden shifting, from the individual to the state,
and from decentralized to coordinated processes for identifying and administering relief, can also dramatically reduce the gap. Finally, using automation (as in Clean Slate), rather than petitions, can avoid the need for
applicant awareness and wherewithal to determine eligibility and apply for
relief—however, what is lost when processes become automatic deserves
greater study.
Part IV concludes by discussing open research and policy questions in
the broader context of second chance relief, with a focus on expungement. It
starts by acknowledging that automating existing laws, without more, is no
panacea, as many statutory criteria were not written to be implemented at
scale, and certain policies themselves embed biases against those who may
most need a second chance—for example, poor people whose outstanding
fines and fees make them ineligible, or individuals whose more severe records disqualify them from relief. First, even when persons are likely eligible,
missing or “dirty” (incomplete or ambiguous) data on grades, sentence completion, or dispositions, for example, may make it impossible to confirm
their eligibility, leaving them in the “second second chance gap,” unreachable through automation. Second, even when official versions of criminal records are expunged, the risk of outdated records remains, due to the
persistence of digital criminal records (the “Google problem”) and growth of
the largely unregulated “people search” industry.39 Finally, even when effective clearance is accomplished through automation, there is a risk that other,
non-red-tape factors including statistical discrimination and within-group
disparities stemming from the selective application of the law will result in
mixed or even negative outcomes. All of these factors underscore the need
for studies about the impact of second chance policies. While automated delivery of second chances can remove the bureaucratic hurdles, not steel bars,

39. SARAH ESTHER LAGESON, DIGITAL PUNISHMENT: PRIVACY, STIGMA, AND THE
HARMS OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74, 149–55 (2020).
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that prevent individuals from getting their second chance, other hurdles may
remain.
I.

DEFINING THE SECOND CHANCE GAP

A staggering number of Americans live with curtailed freedoms due to
contact with the criminal justice system: 2.3 million Americans are currently
incarcerated,40 5.2 million Americans are barred from voting due to felony
disenfranchisement,41 and close to 80 million people—or one in three
adults—live with criminal records.42 An additional 11 million Americans are
estimated to have had their license suspended for reasons unrelated to driving.43 The burdens of mass incarceration and criminalization are not evenly
distributed: African Americans, for example, are 5 times more likely to be
incarcerated than whites;44 a substantial share of the variance, studies have

40. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, How Many People Are Locked Up in the United
States?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2020), www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/pie2020.html [https://
perma.cc/2V6J-ZXKM].
41. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON, SARAH SHANNON & ARLETH PULIDO-NAVA,
SENT’G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A
FELONY CONVICTION (2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/locked-out2020-estimates-of-people-denied-voting-rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/ [https://perma.cc
/7KLC-ZJLB]; see also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, SENT’G
PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3 (2016) [hereinafter UGGEN 2016], https://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7D3MG52] (providing 2016 estimates).
42. STAT. TRENDING, ANALYSIS, & REPORTING GRP., FBI, supra note 17.
43. Meghan Keneally, ‘It’s Not America’: 11 Million Go Without a License Because of
Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:11 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/vicious-cycle11-million-live-driverslicense-unpaid/story?id=66504966
[https://perma.cc/DT6G-JYRV].
Other research supports the proposition that at least ten million licenses have been suspended
for debt nationwide. See CARSON WHITELEMONS, ASHLEY THOMAS & SARAH COUTURE, FINES
& FEES JUST. CTR., DRIVING ON EMPTY: FLORIDA’S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND COSTLY
DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION PRACTICES 4 (2019), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org
/content/uploads/2019/11/florida-fines-fees-drivers-license-suspension-driving-on-empty.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5F5J-YQMQ] (finding two million Floridian licenses suspended for debts);
Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees,
in NAT’L CTR. ON STATE CTS., TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 20, 21 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F.
Campbell & Blake P. Campbell eds., 2017) (finding over four million Californians’ licenses
suspended for debts); MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVEN BY
DOLLARS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR FAILURE
TO
PAY COURT DEBT 1 (2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN92-QEG6] (stating that over 4.2 million
licenses have been suspended for debts between Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee,
and Michigan); see also Peter Edelman, The Criminalization of Poverty and the People Who
Fight Back, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 213, 218 (2019) (stating at least ten million individuals owe fines and fees debts nationwide, with at least seven million licenses suspended).
44. See ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-
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independently found, cannot be explained by differences in levels of criminal
offending,45 which itself can reflect biased decisionmaking.46 Hispanic Americans are 1.4 times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.47 As a result,
not only do the collateral consequences of contact with the criminal justice
system disproportionately fall on Black and brown people, but because of
historically determined levels of poverty and imprisonment in particular jurisdictions, “it is now the case that entire communities experience these negative effects.”48
Over the last few decades, states and the federal government have passed
“second chance” laws that—by allowing for sentences to be shortened, voting
rights to be restored, and records to be cleared—have the potential to alleviate some of the excesses and disparities of the American criminal justice system. In theory, second chance laws restore human dignity and personal
liberty, save incarceration costs, lower recidivism rates, and lead to the more
efficient allocation of talent through society. But only to the extent they are
successfully implemented.
This Article defines the “second chance gap” for any particular second
chance initiative or law as the difference between eligibility and delivery of a
given second chance and describes and applies ways of measuring the gap
over a variety of second chance initiatives. It offers two measures of the second chance gap: “the uptake gap,” or share or number of those eligible for
relief over time who have not applied for or received it; and the “current
gap,” or share or number of impacted individuals who, at a given point in
time, are presently apparently eligible for but have not received relief. While
the “uptake gap” measures take-up over time, and therefore requires comprehensive data that includes, for example, counts of people whose expunged
records are no longer available to the public, the “current gap” can be calculated using available data to estimate the second chance gap at a particular
point in time and the policy opportunity presented by it.
A. The Expansion and Promise of Second Chances
Since 2007, at least twenty-seven states have made it easier to qualify for
early release or parole,49 at least thirty states have passed laws to reclassify or

justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/J564-PAM4] (providing
data about state prisons).
45. See id. at 9 (literature review).
46. See infra Section I.A (discussing the Black-white drug sentencing disparities that led
to the Fair Sentencing Act).
47. NELLIS, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. 35 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (July 2018) [hereinafter 35 States], https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets
/2018/07/pspp_reform_matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XA2-HEKS]. According to the Collateral Consequences Research Center, in 2018 alone, thirty-one states enacted “restoration” laws
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downgrade charges associated with nonviolent property or drug crimes,50
and all fifty states and the District of Columbia have passed laws to reduce
the collateral consequences of criminal records and convictions.51 Since
2013, over forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that
increase the scope of expungement and sealing remedies.52 During this period, several federal initiatives including the Fair Sentencing Act Guideline
Amendment (Amendment 750),53 “Drugs Minus 2” (Amendment 782),54 the
Obama Administration Clemency Initiative,55 the Johnson v. United States
case,56 and the First Step Act of 201957 have offered resentencing options for

aimed at reducing barriers faced by people with criminal records. MARGARET LOVE & DAVID
SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION
21–47 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-andexpungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U99B-9DRK].
50. 35 States, supra note 49. As described below, California has also passed Propositions
47 and 64 to downgrade crimes. See MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION 45–63 (2020),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pathways-to-Reintegration_Crim
inal-Record-Reforms-in-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/22Y6-F264]; LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra
note 49, at 21–47.
51. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FOUR YEARS OF SECOND CHANCE
REFORMS, 2013–2016, at 2 (2017), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/02/08/round-up-ofrecent-second-chance-legislation-2013-2016/ [https://perma.cc/GV2V-FA6J] (noting that all
states but eight—Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Kansas, and
Nevada—and Washington, D.C. made changes from 2013–2016); LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra
note 50, at 44 (noting that of these eight states, all but one made changes in 2019); LOVE &
SCHLUSSEL, supra note 49, at 31 (noting that the last one, Kansas, made changes in 2018).
52. RAM SUBRAMANIAN, REBECKA MORENO & SOPHIA GEBRESELASSIE, VERA INST. OF
JUST., RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTION, 2009–2014, at 13 (2014), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/reliefin-sight-states-rethink-the-collateral-consequences-of-criminal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy
_downloads/states-rethink-collateral-consequences-report-v4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MCE77R47]; Margaret Love, Marijuana Decriminalization Drives Expungement Reform,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2018), http://ccresourcecenter.org
/2018/10/29/marijuana-decriminalization-drives-expungement-reform/
[https://perma.cc
/YV7T-WNUB] (reporting that thirty-one states have broadened existing second chance laws
or enacted entirely new ones); see also LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 50, at 45–63; LOVE &
SCHLUSSEL, supra note 49, at 2–47.
53. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 101(a), §§ 3631–3635, sec. 404,
132 Stat. 5194, 5195–208, 5222 (2018).
54. See Caryn Devins, Lessons Learned from Retroactive Resentencing After Johnson and
Amendment 782, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 39, 42–50 (2018).
55. See infra Section II.A.1.
56. Devins, supra note 54, at 42–50.
57. An Overview of the First Step Act, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov
/inmates/fsa/overview.jsp [https://perma.cc/H426-WC7G].
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federal inmates. From 1997 to mid-2019, at least twenty-five states expanded
voter eligibility for people with felony records.58
The potential scope and reach of second chance reforms is extensive. For
example, in the context of expungement, nationwide, tens of thousands of
collateral consequences prevent individuals with records from full participation and reintegration into society.59 These consequences are both cumulative—as more people are added each year to the list of persons with criminal
records60—and enduring, as a person’s criminal record, if not cleared, continues to follow them throughout their lives and constrain their options and
liberties. While the number of people incarcerated per year in the United
States is in decline,61 the number of people with criminal records continues
to grow.
Even before release, there are opportunities for second chance relief. As
people get older, they present less of a criminal risk: the 3-year rearrest rate
among aging inmates is 15 percent, versus 41 percent in general.62 Older inmates are more expensive to care for, due in particular to their need for catastrophic medical services to treat, for example, heart and lung conditions.63
While the number of inmates in general is going down, the number of aging
inmates continues to grow. As Casey Ferri has documented,
Elderly prisoners represent the fastest growing segment of both federal and
state prisons, and the number of prisoners over fifty-five is growing at a
rate that is six times that of the normal prison population. Between 1995
and 2010, the number of state and federal prisoners who were fifty-five
years old and older nearly quadrupled (282% increase), while the overall
prison population grew by less than half (42% increase).64

58. JEAN CHUNG, SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER (2019),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/ [https://
perma.cc/5785-UBSP] (tracking changes from 1997 to mid-2019). The most famous recent
example is Florida’s Amendment 4. See Rozsa, supra note 24.
59. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 18, at 1–2 (“[I]ndividuals with criminal histories can face barriers to voting, serving on a jury, holding public office, securing employment, obtaining housing, receiving public assistance, owning a firearm, getting a driver’s
license, qualifying for financial aid and college admission, qualifying for military service, and
deportation (for noncitizens).” (footnotes omitted)).
60. See sources cited supra note 17 (tracking the accumulation of yearly criminal history
records at the state and federal level).
61. SENT’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2020),
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FDW-4UZ4].
62. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 10, at 38–39; see also
id. at 6 (documenting a recidivism rate of 3.5 percent among compassionate-release inmates).
63. See id. at 16.
64. Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Safety Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release for
Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197, 200 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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FIGURE 1: U.S. STATE PRISONERS, ARRESTS, AND CRIMINAL HISTORY FILE
SUBJECTS (1998–2014)65

As such, second chance reforms seek not only to restore what the carceral state takes away—personal liberties, equity, dignity—but to do so in a
way consistent with public safety and fiscal goals. Confinement only furthers
public safety (as compared to, for example, furthering deterrence goals)
when the detainee poses an above-baseline risk. Incarceration is expensive,66
and so is downstream rearrest, reprosecution, and reincarceration. To the
extent that clearing one’s criminal record increases their ability to find appropriate work and housing and decreases the risk of reoffending, second
chance reforms save money.
Second chance reforms are part of the broader “smart on crime”67 and
“justice reinvestment”68 movements that include front-end reforms in areas

65. See E. Ann Carson & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool
(CSAT) - Prisoners, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps (state prisoner
data); Ten-Year Arrest Trends, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-inthe-u.s.-2015/tables/table-33 [https://perma.cc/7TSH-RDUX] (state arrests); BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
2016:
A
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
INFORMATION
POLICY
REPORT
(2018),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf [https://perma.cc/S83P-DGB8] (criminal history file subjects).
66. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF), 84 Fed. Reg.
63,891 (Nov. 19, 2019) (determining that the average cost of incarceration for federal inmates
was $37,449.00 ($102.60 per day) for fiscal year 2018).
67. E.g., Barbara McQuade & Sally Q. Yates, Prosecutors and Voters Are Becoming Smart
on Crime, LITIGATION, Fall 2019, at 22.
68. 35 States, supra note 49, at 1 (describing the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, a public-private partnership that includes the U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance,
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like pretrial and drug-free school zones69 to keep people out of prison, as well
as alternatives to incarceration that reduce the odds of recidivism.70
Launched in 2007, justice reinvestment reforms in thirty-five states have
been credited with an 11 percent decrease in state imprisonment rates without an increase in crime rates, which are in the midst of a long-term decline.71 As such, the momentum of “second chances” reforms sounds not
only in dignity and morality but also in pragmatism and fiscal responsibility.
1.

Avoided Incarceration Costs

It costs approximately $37,500 to incarcerate a person for a year in federal prison.72 State incarceration costs vary substantially, and in 2015 ranged
from less than $15,000 per Alabama prisoner, on average, to close to $65,000
per California prisoner yearly.73 When a person is released early from prison,
the state saves money. Described in detail below, Obama’s Clemency Initiative, for example, resulted in an average sentence reduction of 140 months
per federal inmate that received a commutation.74 Avoiding 140 months of
federal incarceration translates, mechanically, into about $437,000 per inmate in 2018 dollars.75 In July 2019, 1,691 prisoners were released early as
part of the First Step Act’s retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act

the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Council of State Governments Justice Center, the Crime and
Justice Institute, and others and that has worked with thirty-five states “to improve public safety and control taxpayer costs by prioritizing prison space for people convicted of serious offenses and investing some of the savings in alternatives to incarceration that are effective at
reducing recidivism”).
69. Id.
70. NELLIS, supra note 44 (reviewing multiple criminal justice reforms: modifying sentencing laws regarding drug-free school zones to restore judicial discretion to lessen racial disparities; dismantling war-on-drugs laws and redirecting the funds to prevention and drug
intervention programs; and instituting bias training to prevent discriminatory and undue policing from the outset).
71. 35 States, supra note 49, at 1.
72. See supra note 66.
73. Prison Spending in 2015, VERA INST. JUST. tbl.1, https://www.vera.org/publications
/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends
/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spending
[https://perma.cc/3ZY2BGT6].
74. GLENN R. SCHMITT, TIMOTHY DRISKO & CHRISTINA D. STEWART, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2014 CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 17
(2017),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20170901_clemency.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8F4-4T6X].
75. 140 months is equivalent to 11.67 years; 11.67 years at $37,500 per year equals
$437,625. Actual savings would be lower if incremental costs per prisoner are lower. In addition, a total social welfare-cost calculation would also need to take into account the costs associated with reentry (e.g., in terms of public-housing expenditures, offset by higher tax
payments, etc.).
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of 2010,76 which reduced the disparity between crack-cocaine and powdercocaine mandatory-minimum sentences. A report by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission found the average reduction of time to be 73 months,77 which,
again, at the average costs cited earlier, is associated with roughly $228,000
per inmate. California’s Prop 47, which reduced the sentences of individuals
convicted of nonviolent minor felonies, has led to the reallocation of $103
million in prison expenditures to rehabilitative grant programs.78
The costs of caring for aging inmates, who are at an elevated risk of catastrophic medical events, is higher. A surge in state incarceration levels between 1993 and 2013 and the Supreme Court’s decision in 1976 that
prisoners must have access to diagnosis and treatment by a physician without “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” have both contributed
to an estimated tenfold increase in the cost of in-prison medical care from
1993 to 2013.79 Early releases under “compassionate release” provisions at
the federal and state levels are seen as not only humane and safe, providing a
way for low-risk prisoners to spend their remaining days with their loved
ones, but also fiscally responsible.80
2.

Public Safety Impact

While harder to observe directly, the public safety impacts of second
chance reforms are also relevant to their viability. Because many with criminal records eventually reenter the justice system, recidivism—the likelihood
of rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration of an individual, within a
particular amount of time81—is correlated with public safety. While it is im76. Department of Justice Announces the Release of 3,100 Inmates Under First Step Act,
Publishes Risk and Needs Assessment System, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 19, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-underfirst-step-act-publishes-risk-and [https://perma.cc/C4VM-QFNF].
77. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS:
RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 3, 8 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/201900607-First-StepAct-Retro.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB3L-SRNQ] (reporting this average reduction of time in
connection with the first one thousand or so sentence reductions granted under the retroactive
provision).
78. Board Awards $103m in Prop 47 Funds to Innovative Rehabilitative Programs, BSCC
CAL. (June 8, 2017), http://www.bscc.ca.gov/news/board-awards-103m-in-prop-47-funds-toinnovative-rehabilitative-programs/ [https://perma.cc/TC7S-TGPS].
79. MARY PRICE, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, EVERYWHERE AND
NOWHERE: COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN THE STATES 9 (2018), https://famm.org/wpcontent/uploads/Exec-Summary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MBV-E5VF]; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
80. PRICE, supra note 79.
81. KIM STEVEN HUNT & ROBERT DUMVILLE, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RECIDIVISM
AMONG
FEDERAL
OFFENDERS:
A
COMPREHENSIVE
OVERVIEW
7
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications
/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT8Z-XYK9].

December 2020]

The Second Chance Gap

537

possible to generalize about the recidivism impacts of second chances—in
part because each recidivism measure, observed over a distinct period of
time82 and population, is unique—studies considering the individual second
chance programs studied in this report cite promising findings.
For example, studies of California’s Prop 47, which defelonized a number of crimes and reduced the prison population by thirteen thousand people,83 have found that there was no statistically significant increase in crime
overall with the rule change,84 but that larceny and motor vehicle thefts increased moderately.85 A 2018 U.S. Sentencing Commission study of early releases associated with the 2011 Fair Sentencing Guideline Amendment
found no difference in recidivism rates or times between individuals that received reduced and nonreduced sentences.86 In the context of expungement,
a study by Sonja Starr and J.J. Prescott found that recipients of expungement
posed a lower crime risk than the general population of Michigan as a
whole.87
On the other hand, critics continue to claim that the defelonization of
certain crimes under Prop 47 has emboldened criminals and removed the
deterrent effect of being charged with and convicted of a felony.88 In the context of the restoration of drivers’ licenses, a realm adjacent to second chances, studies have suggested that those who have their licenses revoked pose

82. See Measuring Recidivism at the Local Level: A Quick Guide, URB. INST., https://www
.urban.org/sites/default/files/2015/02/11/recidivism-measures_final-for-website.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T6DX-C9D7] (describing recidivism studies on time frames ranging from six
months to three years to be typical).
83. Bradley J. Bartos & Charis E. Kubrin, Can We Downsize Our Prisons and Jails Without Compromising Public Safety? Findings from California’s Prop 47, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 693, 693–94 (2018).
84. Id. at 711; accord MIA BIRD, MAGNUS LOFSTROM, BRANDON MARTIN, STEVEN
RAPHAEL & VIET NGUYEN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 47 ON
CRIME AND RECIDIVISM 3 (2018), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3KU-4A7L] (finding no increase in violent crime but finding an increase in
larceny, particularly motor vehicle crimes). Bird et al. also found a reduction in recidivism
among Prop 47 offenders, driven, predictably, by reductions in Prop 47 crime rates. Id.
85. Though not enough to rule out alternative explanations. Bartos & Kubrin, supra
note 83, at 711.
86. KIM STEVEN HUNT, KEVIN MAASS & TODD KOSTYSHAK, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS RECEIVING RETROACTIVE SENTENCE REDUCTIONS:
THE 2011 FAIR SENTENCING ACT GUIDELINE AMENDMENT 1 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov
/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180328
_Recidivism_FSA-Retroactivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6NQ-BYX6] (comparing outcomes of
offenders who were released early through retroactive application and offenders who had
served their full sentences before the FSA guideline reduction retroactively took effect).
87. Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at 2514.
88. Bill Melugin, Mayor Garcetti Criticizes Prop 47, Laments ‘Broken System’ in Reaction
to FOX 11 Meth Addiction Investigation, FOX 11 L.A. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxla.com
/news/mayor-garcetti-criticizes-prop-47-laments-broken-system-in-reaction-to-fox-11-methaddiction-investigation [https://perma.cc/6HV5-CQ25].

538

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:519

higher than average driving risks, but they have been criticized for failing to
take into account other factors that may explain the difference. 89 On balance,
the available public safety evidence seems generally to support—or at least
not justify slowing—the positive momentum for second chances.
3.

Economic, Dignitary, and Civic Impact

In contrast to administrative-cost savings, which show up in the state
ledger, the broader economic impacts of second chance laws have not been
comprehensively studied. The policies are young, have varying uptake rates,
and are implemented differently in different contexts, making it hard to
make comparisons across settings. But in expungement- and driver’s license–reinstatement contexts, fairness and economic rehabilitation interests
may be compelling enough themselves to spur legislative change.90
Early studies of the economic impact of one type of second chance, records clearing, are encouraging.91 Clearing one’s record appears to set in mo-

89. See John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 456–58 (2005) (stating that nearly all studies of road safety for
drivers with suspended licenses don’t take into account the lack of safety features in older cars
that drivers with suspended licenses are more likely to be utilizing and the effect thereof on
accidents leading to fatalities); see also SUKHVIR S. BRAR, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
ESTIMATION OF FATAL CRASH RATES FOR SUSPENDED/REVOKED AND UNLICENSED DRIVERS IN
CALIFORNIA 17 (2012), https://www.dol.wa.gov/about/docs/UnlicensedDriverStudy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3WW-97Q9] (concluding that a cohort of drivers including drivers using
suspended/revoked (S/R) licenses and unlicensed drivers were more likely to be involved in a
fatal crash, not accounting for confounding variables like age of vehicles in crashes or safety
features of involved vehicles).
90. Take for example the case of drivers unlicensing. Many jobs require having a valid
driver’s license. 30 Percent of Civilian Jobs Require Some Driving in 2016, U.S. BUREAU LAB.
STAT. (June 27, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30-percent-of-civilian-jobs-requiresome-driving-in-2016.htm [https://perma.cc/S4UQ-XWQ6] (indicating that 30 percent of jobs
require driving). A New Jersey study documented, for example, that 42 percent of the time,
license suspension resulted in job loss. JON A. CARNEGIE, DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS,
IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY 56 (2007), https://www.nj.gov/transportation
/business/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y58A-Y7LX].
Among replacement jobs, 88 percent paid less. Id. That license-reinstatement initiatives can
reverse the tide or, at least, stem the stress on vulnerable populations and strain on public services associated with a lost license is plausible, though not proven. See, e.g., L. WILLIAM
SEIDMAN RSCH. INST., THE CITY OF PHOENIX MUNICIPAL COURT’S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, 2016: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 7 (2017), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org
/content/uploads/2018/11/Phoenix-license-restoration-pilot-THE-CITY-OF-PHOENIXMUNICIPAL-COURT%E2%80%99S-COMPLIANCE-ASSISTANCE-PROGRAM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D63A-TGWT] (“[T]he long-term effects of continued economic and financial distress because of a suspended license and accumulated debt could have a detrimental
downward spiral effect on an already economically distressed portion of the population. The
economic downturn of the affected communities may also result in increased demand for public services.”).
91. How these individual gains, at scale, could translate into lasting gains for society in
terms of increased tax revenue and decreased recidivism is hinted at in the following studies:
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tion an internal redemptive process for the formerly “marked,” enhancing
their confidence and social status.92 Small-scale studies of records-clearing
programs in California93 and Michigan94 have documented gains in employability and earnings following records clearing.95 These promising findings
have given impetus to Clean Slate campaigns across the country, although, as
explored in Part IV, whether or not the positive effects will replicate at scale
remains unknown.
Another potential benefit to society of removing collateral consequences
like the disenfranchisement of persons with felony convictions is greater civic participation.96 However, studies have shown that among people with fel-

Jacob Wascalus, Development Programs Help Ex-Offenders Join the Workforce, FED. RSRV.
BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2013/development
-programs-help-exoffenders-join-the-workforce [https://perma.cc/326F-952J] (referring to a
program designed to get ex-offenders ‘gainful employment’ and finding that “[o]ver the past 15
years, for every $1 the state has invested in the program, the return to Minnesota taxpayers
from reduced state subsidies, increased state tax receipts, and lowered recidivism has been
$7.72. That represents a 672 percent ROI over the time period”); Prescott & Starr, supra note
26, at 2512–14 (showing that the crime rate among Michigan residents with expunged records
is lower than the rate in the general population, suggesting there’s at least a strong correlation
between expungement and lower recidivism).
92. Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen & Rosella Chapman, Erasing the Mark of a Criminal
Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 23, 30–33 (2017) (reporting, based on semistructured interviews with forty persons with
past criminal records, that clearance facilitates “cognitive transformation and the affirmation
of a new identity”); Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 57 (2018) (describing ongoing study that suggests the importance of dignity interests to those seeking records
clearance).
93. Selbin et al., supra note 92, at 8 (documenting an increase in employment rates from
about 75 percent to 80–85 percent and average earnings by about one-third, or $6,000 in yearly
salary, following expungement).
94. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 26 (finding the receipt of a set-aside to be associated
with an increase in the probability of employment from employment by a factor of 1.13, and
reported quarterly wages increased by a factor of 1.23).
95. A term that encompasses a variety of remedies to rehabilitate one’s criminal record
including sealing, set-aside, reclassification, expungement, and destruction, terms which, in
turn, can mean different things in different contexts. See, e.g., BRIAN ELDERBROOM & JULIA
DURNAN, URB. INST., RECLASSIFIED: STATE DRUG LAW REFORMS TO REDUCE FELONY
CONVICTIONS AND INCREASE SECOND CHANCES 3–4 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites
/default/files/publication/99077/reclassified_state_drug_law_reforms_to_reduce_felony_convi
ctions_and_increase_second_chances.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4AZ-59GQ]; JAMES B. JACOBS,
THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 113–32 (2015); What is “Expungement?,” A.B.A. (Nov. 20,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legaldocs/what-is-_expungement-/ [https://perma.cc/H7EZ-VW44].
96. See, e.g., MORGAN MCLEOD, SENT’G PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: TWO
DECADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM (2018), https://www.sentencingproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/HK8X-LJ2C] (documenting the success of reenfranchisement initiatives in bringing over 1.4
million ex-felons back into civic participation).
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ony convictions whose right to vote has been automatically restored, turnout
is low, in part because of misinformation about their ability to vote.97
B. The Second Chance Gap and Its Causes
But no matter how significant the promised benefits of a given second
chance are, its impact depends on its delivery. The “second chance gap” is
the difference between the apparent eligibility and delivery of a particular
second chance in accordance with the law. Although the conditions precedent to a person not receiving a particular second chance vary widely, three
contributors—each with a distinct pathology, set of underlying causes, and
features—stand out: structural barriers (like the requirement that court debt
be repaid) that prevent otherwise eligible individuals from getting their second chances, administrative barriers stemming from high information and
transactional costs, and substantive gaps, due, for example, to the perceived
benefits of a given second chance not outweighing the perceived costs (including retraumatization costs)98 or not in fact being eligible.
When a person who has served their time and satisfied all the conditions
precedent to applying for records clearance is barred from doing so because
of unpaid fines and fees, structural barriers are standing in their way. High
informational and transactional costs, on the other hand, are likely the culprit behind, for example, the miscalculations of good-time credits described
at the beginning of this Article and, as later detailed in Section III.A, in many
cases, nonapplication for the expungement of criminal records. Eligible individuals may also refuse relief because, in certain limited contexts, there are
status benefits, not only harms, associated with a reputation for crime and
toughness.99
As detailed in the next Part, the informational and bureaucratic hoops
that one must jump through to get their second chances are often extensive
and costly. While much of the remainder of this Article is devoted to discussing these costs and how they may be reduced, it is worth considering
why second chance regimes are so complex in the first place. In the same
way that the accused remain innocent until proven guilty in the U.S. crimi97. David Scott McCahon, A Legacy of Exclusion: How Felon Disenfranchisement Affects Patterns of Civic Engagement in Ex-Felony Offenders (June 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Riverside) (eScholarship) (documenting lower-than-average turnout
rates among ex-felons but hypothesizing that misinformation about the right to vote is partly
to blame).
98. Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, ATLANTIC (May 1994),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/05/the-code-of-the-streets/306601/
[https://perma.cc/4PBG-4NKC]; Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment,
105 AM. ECON. REV. 3489 (2015).
99. Anderson, supra note 95; see also Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 98 (the socialbenefits literature discusses the analogous and real psychological “stigma” costs associated with
applying for social benefits).

December 2020]

The Second Chance Gap

541

nal justice system,100 many second chance programs require defendants to
“prove” that they deserve second chances before awarding them. As such,
getting one’s second chance through petition-based processes may include
enduring a bureaucratic process, amassing information through a variety of
sources, and being evaluated by an adjudicative or administrative body. The
high cost of doing so in many cases may be insurmountable.
Administrative deficits and low uptake rates, the focus of this Article, are
by no means unique to second chances laws. However, a few characteristics
set the second chance programs discussed in this Article apart from other
application-based social-benefit programs. First, the underlying decisions
that create the need for second chances in the first place—to incarcerate a
person, strip their rights (like driving or voting), or retain a criminal record—are fundamentally state based, unlike the market conditions that lead
to, for example, a lack of money and the need for food stamps. Relatedly,
while welfare programs redistribute, second chance initiatives correct—they
change the state’s initial punishment because it is no longer serving its purpose, rather than, for example, helping those in need. When a person has
served their time and no longer poses an elevated risk, their record of past
crimes becomes irrelevant from a public safety perspective. When, two years
after a license has been revoked for debt purposes, it has still not been reinstated, the punishment has not served its intended purposes of compelling
repayment.101 Another way in which “second chances” differ from government benefits is that, by their nature, they also implicate personal and civic
liberties, whether compromised by incarceration or the inability to vote,
drive legally, or access the opportunities available to people with clean criminal records. Finally, as described above, second chances that shorten people’s sentences can translate into immediate cost savings, in contrast to
social-benefit programs that may generate short-term costs for the state.
C. Measuring the Second Chance Gap
The empirical focus of this Article is on the second chance gaps that are
related to applicant uptake. The uptake or participation rate in government
benefit programs has long been of interest to economists and policymakers.102 This literature recognizes that there are costs to receiving social benefits, including the costs of learning about and applying for a given benefit,

100. E.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (stating “[t]he principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law”).
101. Cf. WHITELEMONS, supra note 43, at 4 (finding, based on study of licenses suspended in Florida for failure to pay fines, that over 75 percent of licenses suspended in 2016 remain
so two years later).
102. For a review, see Currie, supra note 34.
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and that the costs may outweigh the benefits. 103 A newer behavioraleconomics literature acknowledges that factors like incomplete information
about benefits, “present bias,” and program complexity can also contribute
to lower-than-expected uptake rates.104 But while the case for studying uptake may be easy, actually doing so, in imperfect data environments, is hard.
To address these challenges, I describe two ways of approximating the gap in
eligibility and application for second chances: the “uptake gap,” measured
cumulatively over time, and the “current gap,” measured at a single point in
time.
1.

The Uptake Gap

The “uptake gap” can simply be understood as the share of individuals
(or other criminal justice units, such as charges or incidents) eligible for relief over time that has not applied for or received a given second chance. The
nature of the inquiry, and its computation intensity, are best illustrated
through an example.
Consider the fictitious state of Kent, which has a population that includes 10,000 people, 1,000 of whom have criminal records. On Day 1, Kent
passes a law that decriminalizes adult marijuana use and also states that “any
person convicted of a decriminalized act shall be eligible to clear their record
of that crime.” A look at the records of all 1,000 people on Day 1 reveals that
100 are eligible to clear now-decriminalized marijuana charges. If, by Day
100, 20 people have cleared their records, the number of remaining people
that are eligible but have not yet cleared is 80, making for an 80 percent uptake gap. Simple enough. But what happens if calculation of the uptake gap is
attempted on Day 101?105 Because we can’t see the 20 cleared records, we are
unable to calculate the “true” number of people over time that are eligible for
clearance, unless we have access to the number of records cleared or “complete” data. The calculation becomes even more complex when there is a
contingent criterion—for example, that the “applicant not been convicted of
a new crime for 3 years”—growing the number of people eligible for clearance over time.
2.

The Current Gap

The second chance gap can still be approximated in the absence of complete data if one considers the “current gap”: the share of impacted individuals who, as of the time of measurement, appear to be eligible for relief but

103. As well as, in the case of social-welfare programs, stigma costs. Id. at 82–83 (explaining the costs of learning about and applying to social programs, as well as the potential role of
stigma in deterring uptake).
104. For an overview, see Alba, supra note 34, at 3–4.
105. This never happens.
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haven’t received it. In the scenario above, on Day 1, 100 out of 1,000 people
are eligible for the remedy, leading to a 10 percent current gap. But on Day
101, with the 20 people that have cleared their records no longer visible as
eligible, only 80 people appear to be eligible for the gap among the number
of people who have records, which, let’s say, is still 1,000. The current gap, as
of Day 101, is 8 percent. The uptake gap reflects the effectiveness of the delivery of a given second chance and shrinks as more people take the remedy
(assuming that the number of people eligible doesn’t grow, as in this example). The current gap, in contrast, is the product of not only a second chance
law’s administration but also its generosity (with respect to how many people within the impacted population are eligible), as well as factors contributing to the number of people within the target population. Both can be
useful for evaluation and decisionmaking.
3.

Sizing the Gap(s)

Ascertaining eligibility for a government benefit using administrative
data is difficult, due in part to privacy safeguards and the lack of common
identifiers or other links across administrative systems.106 In the case of second chances, it bears emphasizing that being “eligible” for relief does not always mean being “entitled” to relief—for example, presidential
commutations and gubernatorial pardons described below often depend on
the exercise of discretion107 or satisfaction of other criteria that cannot be ascertained with available data. In this Article, “eligible” individuals or charges
are those that substantially meet objective, published criteria. Such factors
may encompass, for example, being charged of a qualifying (usually not too
severe) offense, having one’s case dismissed, or enduring a waiting period—
all of which are generally ascertainable based on public records. But as discussed later, other eligibility criteria, like the person’s character, are much
harder to observe based on the criminal record.
4.

Top-Down, Bottom-Up Approach

There are a few ways of approximating a particular second chance gap.
The most accurate but most labor-intensive way is through a “top-down,

106. See, e.g., Alan Berube, Earned Income Credit Participation—What We (Don’t) Know,
BROOKINGS (2005), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/eitcparticipation
.pdf [https://perma.cc/369X-NK5Y] (discussing the obstacles that complicate providing accurate estimates of eligibility and the geographical distribution of eligible nonparticipants); cf.
Maggie R. Jones, Changes in EITC Eligibility and Participation, 2005–2009 (Ctr. for Admin.
Records
Rsch.
&
Applications,
Working
Paper
No.
2014-04,
2014),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2014/adrm/carra-wp2014-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6D-ZDP9] (describing the challenge posed by the lack of
certain data elements in administrative data for determining EITC eligibility).
107. See infra Section II.A.1 (describing the eligibility criteria for Obama’s Clemency Initiative).
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bottom-up” approach. First, the statutes and rules that provide relief must be
ascertained and the eligibility criteria determined by experts in the jurisdiction. Second, the criteria must be applied to the relevant records, typically
corrections, court, or police records, to identify the eligible (or potentially
eligible) population at an individual charge, incident, and person level.
When calculating the uptake gap, the third step requires determining the
complete universe of individuals, charges, or incidents eligible for relief over
time and whether or not they have been awarded. When the uptake gap can’t
be ascertained for the reasons described above, then the current gap can be
calculated, based on the same step of determining eligibility as well as measuring, at a given moment in time, the relevant population. Individuals that
qualify for relief fall into, and their prevalence in the relevant population
comprise, the current gap.
5.

Observing the Leaky Relief Pipeline

Another way to approximate the gap is by directly observing leaks along
the relief pipeline. For an individual to receive relief through a petitionsbased process requires the prerequisites to relief to be fulfilled, including in
many cases the payment of outstanding fines and fees; an application for relief to be completed and filed; and relief to be awarded through an administrative procedure. As a result, the share of eligible individuals that fails to
apply for relief (for example, because they never start, or because they start
but do not complete the process) provides a lower bound measure of the
gap—for example, one that is due to a lack of awareness or a lack of a completed application despite awareness. Court or administrative backlogs that
delay approval of meritorious cases present another directly observable
component of the gap.
Each of the approaches outlined above presents challenges in the absence of clean data from which eligibility criteria can be applied and evaluated, actual uptake can be estimated, and the two can be compared. As
described in detail in Appendix M, care was taken to select initiatives for
which the sizing steps described above had already been or could to some
degree reliably be carried out. As a result, this Article relies heavily on and
owes a large debt to administrative estimates provided by government agencies or others with specialized access to primary data, by virtue of position or
substantial effort. But it also incorporates the assumptions, missing data, and
other data defects and vulnerabilities of these sources and, therefore, should
be read as supplying estimates conditional upon them.
II.

SIZING SECOND CHANCE GAPS

This Part identifies and calculates the “second chance gap”—the difference between eligibility and delivery—associated with several of the second
chances offered under the law. The first Section estimates resentencing gaps
left behind by the Obama Clemency Initiative and California’s Propositions

The Second Chance Gap

December 2020]

545

64 and 47, each of which allows prisoners to qualify for early releases, and
describes available data on compassionate-release second chance gaps. The
second Section estimates felony reenfranchisement gaps in twelve states using published data. The third Section reports on second chance gaps in the
expungement of convictions in about ten states and estimate second chance
gaps with respect to the clearance of nonconvicted charges in all fifty states
using background check data.
A. Second Chance Gaps in Resentencing and Reclassification
Between 2007 and 2017, at least eighteen states passed laws to reclassify
and/or reduce charges related to nonviolent crimes, several of them with retroactive effect.108 A related set of developments at the federal level, by the
courts, the executive branch, and Congress, has provided federal drugtrafficking inmates opportunities to reduce their sentences.109 Compassionate-release laws, which allow persons to shorten their sentences, have been
on the books for a long time but have been used rarely. This Section estimates the second chance gaps associated with the Obama Clemency Initiative and California’s Propositions 64 and 47 and discusses the
compassionate-release second chance gap.
1.

The Clemency Initiative Second Chance Gap

The Constitution specifies that, “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to
Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except
in Cases of Impeachment.”110 In 2014, the Department of Justice launched
the Clemency Initiative to encourage nonviolent federal drug offenders to
petition President Obama for commutations.111 Applications would be prioritized if the applicant would likely have received a shorter sentence under the
current law and met other eligibility criteria, including serving at least ten
years of their sentence.112 The U.S. Sentencing Commission performed a
comprehensive review of the Clemency Initiative, using a top-down, bottomup approach to determine estimates of the number of offenders eligible for
relief and, among them, how many received it as reported in Table 1.

108. 35 States, supra note 46.
109. See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3632.
110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
111. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 74, at 1–4.
112. Under the Initiative, clemency petitions would be prioritized if the individual was
serving a federal sentence in prison and (1) would have received a “substantially lower sentence” if convicted of same offense today; (2) represented a nonviolent offender without ties to
criminal organizations; (3) had served at least 10 years of their sentence; (4) did not have a significant criminal history; (5) had displayed good behavior; and (6) lacked a record of violent
behavior. However, the decision was within the discretion of the president, who could prioritize among or deviate from the published criteria. Id. at 7–9.
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATES OF THE OBAMA CLEMENCY INITIATIVE SECOND CHANCE
GAP113

Provision

Estimated Total
Number Eligible
for Relief

Estimated
Number of Total
Eligible Receiving Relief

Applications
Unreviewed by
the Conclusion
of the Program

Estimated Percentage of Eligible Offenders
Receiving Relief

Obama Clemency
Initiative

2,687

92

7,881

3%

According to the Commission, 1,025 to 2,687 individuals (the spread
representing inmates that met the time-served criteria at the beginning and
end of the program) “appear[ed] to have met all the factors for clemency under the Initiative.”114 The Initiative resulted in the largest numbers of commutations awarded by a president.115 Still, of the 1,025 to 2,687 individuals
that were deemed by the Commission to have met all of the factors for clemency under the Initiative by its conclusion, only 54 to 92, or 3%–5%, received
relief, for a second chance gap of 95%–97%.116 In addition, by the conclusion
of the program in January 2017, 7,881 petitions for clemency were still pending.117 Those who received a commutation experienced an average sentence
reduction of 140 months, which, as described above, translates mechanically
into about $437,000 (2018 dollars) per commutation.118 If the 2,595 individuals that the Commission identified as eligible that did not have their sentences commuted had received comparable sentence reductions, the total
average sum associated with these reductions based on a mechanical calculation would have been more than $1.1 billion. As discussed later, experts
blamed the noncentralized administration of the program, uneven application of the criteria, and backlog for the gap between expected and delivered
commutations.119

113. Id. at 11, 34 fig.19.
114. Id. at 33–34.
115. Over 1,700 individuals. Id. at 2.
116. Id. at 34.
117. Id. at 10–11. Of the commutations that were granted, the Commission estimates that
only 5.1 percent met all the published standards, id. at 18, leading some to comment that inmates were “inexplicably” being provided with relief, and in some ways leading to a “misapplication,” not just a “second chance” gap. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Obama’s Clemency
Legacy: An Assessment, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 271 (2017).
118. See notes 74–75 and accompanying text (140 months = 11.67 years; at about $37,500
per year = ~$437).
119. See infra Sections III.B–D.
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The Compassionate-Release Second Chance Gap

In almost every state, courts have the right to reduce the sentences of
prisoners, upon application, on the basis of “compassionate release.”120 The
1984 Sentencing Act created a similar authority in the federal system, specifying that releases should take place only under “extraordinary and compelling reasons”121 as designated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.122
Defendants’ medical conditions (i.e., serious illness), age, family circumstances, or other reasons may all qualify. But while the case for compassionate release of elderly, aging, or sick prisoners or prisoners who face family
emergencies is easy, almost intuitive, to understand, it has proven hard to
administer.123
It is impossible to ascertain with certainty how many people are eligible
for compassionate release in part because of the vagueness or plain absence
of the criteria, as described in Part III. However, at the federal level, the elderly are the fastest growing population in federal prison and are estimated
to represent close to 30 percent of the federal prison population,124 which,
assuming a federal prison population of 175,000, is about 50,000.125 But in
the thirteen months before an inspector-general hearing before the Sentencing Commission in 2016 on compassionate release, only 296 elderly inmates,
or less than 0.1 percent of 175,000, applied for release, and of those, only 2
people, or less than 1 percent of applicants, were released.126 While an estimated 21,000 people from Kansas,127 96,000 people from Pennsylvania,128

120. See PRICE, supra note 79 (documenting the compassionate-release laws of forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia); see also supra note 8 (describing the federal compassionate-release authority).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
123. Id.; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NO. 5050.50,
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN SENTENCE: PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G), at 4–12 (2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy
/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf [https:// perma.cc/3D99-DX46].
124. Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, Acting Dir. of Fed. Bureau of Prisons, and Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017.08.03%20Letter%20to%20BOP%20and%
20DAG%20re.%20Compassionate%20Release%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED66-YLC8].
125. See Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics
/population_statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/PW3Z-X5JU] (providing fiscal year 2019 statistics
on federal prison population).
126. Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, supra note 124.
127. Kansas Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles
/KS.html [https://perma.cc/N66Y-UGDR].
128. Pennsylvania Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org
/profiles/PA.html [https://perma.cc/6JA4-QSZS].
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and 39,000 people from New Jersey are behind bars,129 just 7 individuals received compassionate releases from 2009 to 2016, and in Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, the comparable numbers were 9 and 2, according to data collected by Families Against Mandatory Minimums.130
3.

California’s Propositions 47 and 64 Second Chance Gaps

Prior to 2014, the offenses of shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, and forging checks could be charged as felonies in California.131 That changed when voters passed Prop 47, reducing the charges
associated with qualifying crimes from felonies to misdemeanors.132 It applied retroactively, creating a way for offenders still serving time for Prop 47
crimes to reduce their sentences, and for those that had completed their sentences already to reclassify those convictions to misdemeanors,133 but only
upon successful petition. Official statewide estimates for the number of people eligible for and receiving relief are not available. However, in California’s
largest county, Los Angeles, the Public Defender’s Prop 47 Task Force determined that, as of 2016, 513,229 county residents had convictions “potentially eligible” for reduction.134 The Judicial Council of California has
reported, based on self-reported numbers by each county, that by March
2020, Los Angeles had received 36,300 Prop 47 applications for reclassification.135 A single individual can file multiple applications.136 Thus, to approx-

129. New Jersey Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org
/profiles/NJ.html [https://perma.cc/7QFA-ZYBK].
130. PRICE, supra note 79, at 123 (“Pennsylvania, for example, is not required to report
statistics, but a 2015 news article stated that only nine prisoners were granted compassionate
release between 2009 and 2015. In Kansas, which has detailed eligibility criteria and process
rules, just seven individuals received compassionate release between 2009 and 2016. In New
Jersey, medical parole has been granted no more than two times a year since 2010.” (footnotes
omitted)).
131. DEBRA BOWEN, SEC’Y OF STATE OF CALIF., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
34–37 (2014), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7FLK-ZHQP].
132. Including grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, and
check forgery involving $950 or less and drug possession. Id.
133. Unless the person had a prior conviction for identity theft, rape, child molestation,
or other violent crime, or was a sex-offender registrant. Jud. Council’s Crim. Just. Servs. &
Richard Couzens, Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. CTS. (Nov. 2016), https://www.courts
.ca.gov/documents/Prop47FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY7K-UYU6].
134. Prop 47: Los Angeles County, CNTY. L.A. (July 19, 2016), http://file.lacounty
.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/105259.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7TZ-FS9Q]. It is important to
acknowledge that this number may be inflated, because only cases that fall below a certain dollar threshold are Prop 47 eligible and the criteria used by the public defender to determine its
estimate are unclear (and the Task Force did not respond to my request for this information).
135. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., PROPOSITION 47 DATA SUMMARY
REPORT (2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/for-publication_prop-47.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QRM9-2XAX].
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imate the number of individuals associated with the filed applications, I applied a multiplier derived from data collected from twenty-one counties137 to
associate about 28,000 individuals with the 36,300 applications. This estimate of the number of individuals that have filed for relief (28,400) represents about 5 percent of the some 513,000 persons estimated in 2016 by the
Los Angeles Public Defender’s office to be eligible for relief, resulting in a
second chances uptake gap of at least 95 percent, or around 487,000 people,
based on comparing the individuals who were “potentially eligible” for and
applied for relief.138 Los Angeles County residents represent approximately
one-quarter of California’s residents; if the estimated eligibility for Prop 47
relief provided by the Public Defender’s Office of 513,000 people is scaled
accordingly, approximately 2 million Californians are eligible for Prop 47
relief. According to the California Department of Justice only about 381,000
petitions, associated with around 249,000 people using the method above,
have been filed across California,139 implying that as many as 1.8 million Californians remain in the Prop 47 reclassification gap.

136. See How to Reclassify Your Felony Under Prop. 47, MYPROP47,
https://myprop47.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Reclassification-8.5x11-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9E4-XEM8].
137. Brett Kelman & Cheri Carlson, Nearly 200,000 Felonies Erased by Prop 47, but Some
Former Felons Don’t Know, DESERT SUN (Dec. 14, 2016, 8:29 AM), https://www.desertsun.com
/story/news/crime_courts/2016/12/14/prop-47-felony-convictions-erased/94636060/ [https://
perma.cc/ZNQ9-JU28] (describing the collection of data from counties based on official records requests provided to public defenders and state courthouses, resulting in a total of approximately 198 thousand convictions and 155 thousand individuals).
138. Though this number represents the percentage difference between those potentially
eligible and those who applied for relief, the number of both the records actually eligible for
and actually awarded relief are likely smaller. One data point consistent with the latter assertion is that the rate of approved to filed applications in twenty-one counties was 71 percent. Id.
However, because this number does not account for abandonments or pendency, it understates
the approval rate.
139. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 135.
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF SELECT PROP 47 RECLASSIFICATION AND PROP 64
RECLASSIFICATION AND RESENTENCING SECOND CHANCE UPTAKE GAPS140
Provision

Estimated
Number Eligible
for Relief

Prop 47 Resentencing
and Reclassification—
L.A. County

513,229 L.A. county
residents “potentially
eligible” for relief

California Prop 64
Resentencing and
Reclassification

218,094

Number of
Applications for
Relief
60,517 applications,
corresponding to
approximately 47, 374
applicants
6,251

Estimated Uptake

9%

3%

A comparable gap exists in connection with the redesignation or clearing of old marijuana convictions under California’s Prop 64. The measure
legalized adult recreational use of marijuana, reduced or eliminated criminal
penalties for most marijuana offenses, and created a way for persons with
completed Prop 64 sentences to apply to downgrade or clear their convictions.141 In the fall of 2018, a California Senate report, based on data provided by the California Department of Justice, estimated that 218,094 individuindividuals were eligible for resentencing or reclassification. 142 But by March
2018, only 6,251 petitions statewide had been filed, representing less than 3
percent of that total, or a gap of 97 percent. Carrying out their own sizing
exercises, the district attorneys of San Francisco (S.F.) and Alameda identified similar gaps,143 and the San Francisco D.A. estimated that more than

140. Emling, supra note 134; CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 135;
S. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., APPROPRIATIONS FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, 2017–2018 REG.
SESS., at 2 (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793] (“According to DOJ, there
are 218,094 convictions that may be eligible currently for recall or dismissal of sentence, dismissal and sealing, or redesignation as provided by Proposition 64.”); CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD.
COUNCIL
OF
CAL.,
PROPOSITION
64
DATA
SUMMARY
REPORT
(2020),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop64-Filings.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XX9-DL9L].
141. J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, PROPOSITION 64: “ADULT USE OF
MARIJUANA ACT” RESENTENCING PROCEDURES AND OTHER SELECTED PROVISIONS 6 (2017),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/prop64-Memo-20170522.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K29MQSH].
142. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140, at 2.
143. According to estimates published by the S.F. and Alameda District Attorneys, an
estimated 7,978 and 5,900 convictions, respectively, were potentially eligible for relief. See District Attorney George Gascón Applies Proposition 64 Retroactively to Every Marijuana Case
Since 1975, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y (Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Gascón], https://sfdistrictattorney.org
/district-attorney-george-gasc%C3%B3n-applies-proposition-64-retroactively-every-marijuana
-case-1975 [https://perma.cc/82AH-JVXP]; DA O’Malley’s Ongoing Efforts & Policy Regarding
Dismissal of Cannabis-Related Criminal Convictions, OFF. ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y (Feb.
20, 2018), https://www.alcoda.org/newsroom/2018/feb/cannabis_convictions_prop_64_policy
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half (62 percent) of the San Francisco convictions eligible for relief were eligible for resentencing relief.144 The majority of states provide similar, petition-based paths to reducing or clearing previous convictions.145
B. Second Chance Gaps in Reenfranchisement
Although most states deny felons the right to vote when they are incarcerated, eleven states do not automatically restore these rights following
completion of their sentences but instead require ex-offenders to apply for
relief through government pardon, judicial restoration, or other forms of
administrative process.146 Generally, people with felonies that have completed their sentences, paid all outstanding fines or restitution, endured any required waiting period, and have not been disqualified due to the nature of
their offenses can apply.147
Over several decades, Christopher Uggen and his collaborators have
worked to systematically define, measure, and track felony disenfranchisement.148 By examining state prison records and reenfranchisement records,
they have been able to track the number of individuals that have completed
their sentences but have remained disenfranchised. In support of a 2016 report, Uggen and his coauthors filed records requests with and received data
from the appropriate agencies in the twelve states that disenfranchise beyond
sentence completion in order to ascertain the number of restorations granted by each state over the same period.149 Because their numbers do not exclude the small subset of offenses ineligible for reenfranchisement150 and do

[https://perma.cc/6G6D-PXRM] (identifying 5,900 convictions, not broken out by felony and
misdemeanor totals). By the end of 2017, 232 and 609 applications, respectively, had been received. See CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 140; O’Malley, supra. Taken
together, this amounts to a gap of around 90–97 percent.
144. See Gascón, supra note 143. Including 4,940 felony marijuana resentencing candidates and 3,038 misdemeanor candidates sentenced prior to the initiative’s passage. Id.
145. This includes states that allow petition-based relief for misdemeanor and lesser ofSLATE
CLEARINGHOUSE,
fenses.
See
generally
Compare
States,
CLEAN
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/compare-states/.
146. Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming. UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 4; see also Frances Robles, 1.4 Million Floridians with Felonies Win Long-Denied Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html
[https://perma.cc
/82LR-B66V].
147. The raw data comes from UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 13, 15.
148. E.g., id. at 3 (finding that as of the 2016 election, approximately 6.1 million people,
or 2.5 percent of the voting age population, were disenfranchised due to a current or previous
felony conviction, and that 7.4 percent of African Americans were disenfranchised, as compared to 1.8 percent of non-African Americans).
149. Id. at 13.
150. Based on my analysis of each of the twelve states’ felony-disenfranchisement laws,
the subset of individuals “permanently disenfranchised” in each state is narrow and circum-
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not take into account felony-reenfranchisement waiting times, their estimates represent upper-bounds estimates of the number of individuals potentially eligible for reenfranchisement during this period. Based on both the
number of postsentence disenfranchised individuals and the rate of restoration, the state-estimated share of ex-felons that have served their time but
have not regained the franchise appears to range, with the exception of Iowa
TABLE 3: RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN STATES THAT DISENFRANCHISE
RESIDENTS POST-SENTENCE COMPLETION151
Average
Restorations
per Year
(Calculated)

Postsentence
Disenfranchised

Share of
Disenfranchised
Reenfranchised
(Calculated)

State

Restorations

Period of
Restoration
Estimates

Alabama

16,022

2004–2015

1,457

231,896

6%

Arizona

31

2010–2015

6

116,717

0%

Delaware

2,285

1988–2015

85

4,067

36%

Florida152

271,982

1990–2015

10,879

1,487,847

15%

Iowa

115,325

2005–2015

11,533

23,976

83%

Kentucky

10,479

2008–2015

1,497

242,987

4%

Mississippi

335

2000–2015

22

166,494

0%

Nevada

281

1990–2011

13

62,080

0%

Tennessee

11,581

1990–2015

772

323,354

3%

Virginia

21,664

2002–2016

1,547

408,570

5%

Wyoming

107

2003–2015

9

17,414

1%

Total

450,092

(see above
for range)

2,529

3,205,121

12%

scribed, because, for example, in the state of Delaware, they were convicted of murder, bribery,
or a sexual offense. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2.
151. UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 13, 15.
152. These numbers do not reflect developments after the passage of Amendment 4 in
Florida in November 2018, which, though it purported to make felony reenfranchisement automatic, largely failed to do so due to a rule that required outstanding legal financial obligations to be repaid prior to voter restoration. Though challenged and overturned by a lower
court on the grounds of its constitutionality, the requirement remained in effect during the
2020 presidential election. See Mower & Taylor, supra note 27.
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and Delaware, from 85 to 100 percent.153
C. Second Chance Gaps in Records Clearance
When an individual is booked or arrested, a police record is created.154
Formal charges generate court records.155 A charge can be disposed as a conviction (typically the result of a plea);156 a nonconviction;157 some sort of diverted or deferred judgment that, if completed successfully, terminates in a
dismissal; or through another administrative resolution like a transfer. Out
of the nearly 80 million people with criminal records,158 an estimated 19 million have a felony conviction record.159 The remaining majority have misdemeanor convictions and unconvicted charges on their records.160
Due in part to the uniquely American tradition of broad access by citizens to government records, records of both convictions and nonconvictions
are more widely available to background check providers and their customers, including prospective employers, licensing bodies, and other entities, in
the United States than anywhere else in the world.161 Though generated primarily to aid law enforcement, since 2014, background checks have been
processed primarily for non-criminal justice purposes.162 Between 2006 and
2016, “the number of fingerprints processed for noncriminal justice purposes increased by 89.6 percent . . . while the number processed for criminal jus-

153. This finding is consistent with earlier estimates of reenfranchisement rates ranging
from one-tenth of 1 percent in Wyoming and Mississippi to 17 percent in Delaware. JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 89 (2006).
154. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 36.
155. Id. at 54–59.
156. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
157. For example, due to the charge being dismissed, withdrawn, nolle prossed, or abandoned.
158. See sources cited supra note 17.
159. Sarah K.S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with
Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806 (2017).
160. Within the sample of criminal histories studied for this Article, felony conviction
charges comprised around 9 percent of the total, while misdemeanor, minor, and unknown
conviction charges comprised around 50 percent of the total, and the remainder were nonconvicted. See Table A-3.
161. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 58–74, 159–223 (discussing the digitization of and market
for criminal records and U.S. criminal-record exceptionalism).
162. Becki Goggins, New Blog Series Takes Closer Look at Findings of SEARCH/BJS Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2016, SEARCH (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www
.search.org/new-blog-series-takes-closer-look-at-findings-of-search-bjs-survey-of-statecriminal-history-information-systems-2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZN4G-AF2F]. Gun and employment background checks are two of the largest categories of civilian checks. See id.
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tice purposes actually decreased by 6.6 percent.”163 Concerns about employer
liability and advances in information technology have contributed to making
background checks commonplace.164 That only a small minority of criminal
records are “serious” (reflecting felony convictions) supports the view that
“mass criminalization” is as urgent a problem as “mass incarceration.”165 Because a criminal record can substantially limit a person’s opportunity to obtain employment, housing, public benefits, and student loans; to qualify for
certain professions; and to gain entrance into higher education, having a
record has been called “a civil death.”166 Available research suggests that felony convictions carry the most serious collateral consequences, including
being barred from jobs, housing, and social reintegration opportunities.167
However, even nonconvicted records have led to negative employment,168
immigration, housing, and educational outcomes.169

163. Id. (reporting that noncriminal checks grew from 7.7 million to 14.6 million, while
the number processed for criminal justice purposes shrank from 12.1 million to 11.3 million).
164. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 327 (2009).
165. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L.
REV. 321, 326.
166. Adams et al., supra note 92, at 24.
167. For an overview of the literature see, for example, Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at
2468–71, 2500.
168. For an overview of the literature see, for example, Peter Leasure, Misdemeanor Records and Employment Outcomes: An Experimental Study, 65 CRIME & DELINQ. 1850, 1852–54
(2018).
169. E.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810, 821–44 (2015)
[hereinafter Jain, Arrests as Regulation] (describing the use of arrest information by immigration-enforcement officials to screen individuals who may fall within a removal priority (about
20 percent of those deported had no criminal conviction); by employers to monitor off-duty
workers, leading to their suspension or termination; by public-housing officials to identify tenants who may be in breach of their lease and thereby subject to eviction; by social services after
a child’s parent or guardian’s arrest leading to custody disruptions; and by schools to protect
other students or identify those with counseling needs but also leading to stigmatization of
these students); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1207
(2016) (describing, for example, the suspension of a professional license, eviction from public
housing, and ineligibility for public benefits as collateral consequences associated with arrests);
Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment
Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 896 (2014) (finding that mere arrests can be bars to hiring); Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland &
Hilary K. Whitham, The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level
Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637 (2014) (finding a 4 percent difference in callback rates associated with people with arrest records versus people without records); see also Ryan A. Hancock, The Double Bind: Obstacles to Employment and Resources for
Survivors of the Criminal Justice System, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 515, 516 (2012) (finding
that, while in places like Pennsylvania, it is illegal to use nonconviction data to screen out individual job applicants, employers nevertheless adopt blanket policies that reject individuals with
any record, including a nonconviction record).
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These consequences can be avoided by taking advantage of records
clearing, as implemented by states through sealing, vacaturs, expungements,
expunctions, set-asides, and destruction. 170 As described earlier, these efforts
are part of a broader set of policies aimed at reducing the harms associated
with having a criminal record.171 But these policies will only succeed at doing
so to the extent they are taken up. Complexity is a hallmark of many states’
clearance laws, which vary widely regarding the criteria they include, who
they cover, and the type of relief they provide.172 The paragraphs below describe analyses to estimate second chance expungement gaps based on applying state-level rules to criminal histories.
1.

State-Level Second Chance Gaps in the Expungement of Convictions

In the majority of states, qualifying individuals may apply to clear their
criminal convictions by methods other than pardoning.173 The rules vary by
state, and generally provide one or more “general categories” of relief, typically conditioned upon the crime being of lesser severity and the expiration
of a waiting period that depends on the severity of the crime. 174 Many states
also offer limited special eligibility, based, for example, on the decriminalization of the underlying crime, a sexual offender’s status as a human trafficking victim, or the conviction being someone’s first offense.175 In Washington
state, individuals can get general relief, for example, under the rule that misdemeanors and gross-misdemeanor convictions can be vacated three years
after completion of sentence requirements,176 while Class C (less serious) fel-

170. See, e.g., San Jose State Univ. Record Clearance Project, Criminal Record Clearing in
a Nutshell, GOOGLE SLIDES (Jan. 2018), https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1IevvpNpNd4J
GYLgRUY1ADjBgSitH4YVygG1jI-Lie4g/ [https://perma.cc/A8AF-PP3Q].
171. See generally BETH AVERY, MAURICE EMSELLEM & PHIL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT, FAIR CHANCE LICENSING REFORM: OPENING PATHWAYS FOR PEOPLE WITH RECORDS
TO JOIN LICENSED PROFESSIONS (2017), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/ToolkitFair-Chance-Licensing-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9HT-HNC3].
172. See infra Section III.B, Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges.
173. Compare States, supra note 145 (analysis based on selection of expungements of
conviction records on any basis besides “pardon”). But see Virginia: Restoration of Rights &
Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 28, 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/staterestoration-profiles/virginia-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/
[https://
perma.cc/8N6C-YEG2] (“Virginia law makes no provision for expunging adult conviction records, except those that have been vacated pursuant to a writ of actual innocence . . . or those
which were the subject of an absolute pardon (for innocence).” (citations omitted)).
174. Id.; Margaret Colgate Love, supra note 19. For a sample of conviction-clearance eligibility criteria, see also Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges.
175. Compare States, supra note 145.
176. Except in the case of domestic violence convictions, which have a five-year waiting
period. Washington: Adult Record Clearance Overview, CLEAN SLATE CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/states/washington/ [https://perma.cc/J7M6-P2JQ]; WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.96.060 (2020).
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onies are clearable five years after sentence completion, and Class B (more
serious) felonies after ten years. Colorado’s rule that courts must seal records
of “misdemeanor offense[s] for the use or possession of marijuana that
would not have been a criminal offense if the act occurred on or after December 10, 2012”177 is an example of a special eligibility criteria.
Table 4-1 presents uptake-gap estimates sourced from several sources,
several based on applying the eligibility criteria to samples of criminal histories using the basic approach described in the previous Part. While each estimate has its weaknesses, requiring compensation for missing data and not
modeling unascertainable criteria,178 collectively the data show that, across
states, the uptake rates are low, generally on the order of less than 20 percent.
These low uptake rates persist across juvenile and adult clearance criteria
and populations.
TABLE 4-1: ESTIMATES OF SECOND CHANCE GAPS IN THE EXPUNGEMENT OF
CONVICTION RECORDS
Estimated Uptake
Rate179

Estimated Number
of People in the
Convictions
Clearance Gap180

State

Population

Period of
Analysis

Washington181

Adult

1999–2019

<3%

At least ~1 million
people182

California
(Prop 64 and
Prop 47)183

Adult

2016–2018

~5–8%

~2 million
people184
(upper bounds)

177. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-710(1) (2017), repealed by Act of May 28, ch. 295, 2019
Colo. Sess. Laws 2732.
178. E.g., Colleen V. Chien, Zuyan Huang, Jacob Kuykendall & Katie Rabago, The Washington State Second Chance Expungement Gap, SSRN 3 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529777 [https://perma.cc/NAU8-P7X9].
179. Based on twenty years of actual expungements data unless otherwise noted. When a
range was presented, we reproduced the conservative (larger) uptake value.
180 When a range was presented, we reproduced the conservative (smaller) estimate of
people in the gap.
181. Chien et al., supra note 178.
182. Id.
183. See supra Section II.A.3.
184. This number represents the actual statewide Prop 64 gap and the statewide Prop 47
gap estimated based on data from Los Angeles county as described in Section II.A.3, supra.
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New York185

Adult

1992–2018

~<1%

~1.3 million
people

Connecticut186

Adult

~1960–2019

~<4%187

~300 thousand
people

Rhode Island188

Adult

1993–2019

~30%

~380 thousand
people

Iowa189

Adult

1993–2019

~26%190

~360 thousand
people

North Carolina191

Adult

1992–2018

~6%

~190 thousand
people

South Carolina192

Adult

~1980–2019

N/A

~340 thousand
people

Oregon193

Adult

2003–2019

~25%194

~300 thousand
people

Missouri195

Adult

through 2020

<1%196

~380 thousand
people

185. The New York Second Chance Sealing Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/NY.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
186. The Connecticut Second Chance Pardon Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/CT.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
187. Includes convictions and nonconvictions.
188. The Rhode Island Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/RI.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
189. The Iowa Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/IA.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
190. Includes convictions and nonconvictions.
191. The North Carolina Second Chance Expunction Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/NC.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
192. The South Carolina Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/SC.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
193. The Oregon Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/OR.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
194. Includes convictions and nonconvictions.
195. The Missouri Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS
https://paperprisons.org/states/MO.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
196. Includes convictions and nonconvictions.

(2020),
(2020),

(2020),
(2020),

(2020),
(2020),
(2020),

(2020),
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~360 thousand
people

Minnesota197

Adult

2009–2019

Michigan199

Adult

1983–2011

Washington201

Juvenile

1997–2013

0.2%

N/A

Colorado202

Juvenile

2003–2013

2%

N/A

Michigan203

Juvenile

2009–2013

11%

N/A

6.5%200

N/A

Estimates of the Nonconvictions-Expungement Second Chance Gap

While the previous Section reports estimates of the share and number of
Americans with convictions eligible for clearance, a sizeable percentage of
charges are not convicted because the charges are dropped or dismissed, the
accused is acquitted, or the accused agrees to a plea bargain that includes
some convicted and other unconvicted charges.
Every state allows for the clearance of unconvicted charges as a general
matter,204 and, as described below, some even take steps to automatically—
meaning, without any action by the defendant—restrict access by the general
public to such records. This consensus is consistent with the criminal justice

197. The Minnesota Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020),
https://paperprisons.org/states/MN.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
198. Includes convictions and nonconvictions.
199. Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at 1, 14.
200. Id. at 19 (calculating a five-year uptake rate).
201. Daniel Litwok, Essays on the Economics of Juvenile Crime and Education (2015)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (manuscript at 78),
https://d.lib.msu.edu/etd/3615/datastream/OBJ/View/ [https://perma.cc/V6ZM-XD58]; accord
Calero, supra note 26, at 37 (documenting an uptake rate of juvenile sealing in Washington of
less than 10 percent).
202. Litwok, supra note 201.
203. Id.
204. See Appendix B-3, on file with the author, for a summary of the laws of the states.
See also Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 169, at 826, 854. Purging nonconvictions is also
consistent with the presumption of innocence and in theory could prevent the racial skew in
arrests—49 percent and 44 percent of African American and Latino men are arrested by age
twenty-three, as compared to one-third of adults in general—from causing a skew in the wideranging “collateral consequences” associated with having a criminal record. But again, only to
the extent that there is proportional uptake of clearance remedies. Id. at 817.
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system’s foundational presumption of innocence and, arguably, the nature of
nonconviction records as a greater reflection of the arresting or charging officer’s discretionary decisions than of the defendant’s culpability.
Calculating the “uptake gap”—the share of people eligible over time to
receive relief that have actually received it—associated with nonconvictedrecords relief is difficult to do because of the “disappearance” of records
from public view upon expungement. However, using the methods described in the previous Part, one can obtain at any point an estimate of the
“current gap”—the share and number of people currently with a record who
could receive relief. This Part marshals a novel national dataset of criminal
histories to provide a rough estimate of the current gap of expungable nonconviction records in all fifty states, which it then uses as the basis of a national estimate of people in the current gap based on laws governing
nonconvictions.
Doing so required proceeding in several steps, working with law and data-science research assistants at Santa Clara and Columbia Universities as
well as experts in criminal law and criminal procedure to (1) develop criminal history data samples through a partnership with a background check
company and also from states, (2) process and label the data, (3) ascertain
the law of each state, (4) develop a script to apply the law to the data sample
to ascertain each state’s second chance current expungement gap, (5) compare these gap estimates based on the background check-company sample
with gap estimates based on representative data to estimate the direction of
any bias, and (6) based on these comparisons, develop a rough, national estimate of the size of the current nonconvictions records-clearing gap. Each
of these steps is outlined briefly below and in detail in Appendix M.
First, I worked with the background check company Checkr to develop a
novel dataset comprising the anonymized criminal histories of around sixty
thousand people with criminal records, generally more than one thousand
per state,205 chosen randomly at the state level, from across the fifty states.206
The individuals were seekers of primarily on-demand jobs whose background checks took place between January 2017 and October 2018.207 The
team then cleaned, labeled, and grouped the data into criminal incidents.

205. The number of checks in the studied sample per state averaged around 1,400 and,
with the exception of Vermont (N=473) and Kansas (N=754), numbered over 1,000 (Table A2); each sample size should be kept in mind for the purpose of developing point estimates. See
Appendix M for an overview of the data and the methods used to analyze them.
206. There is currently no process for expunging federal charges and convictions, but the
majority of states implement various programs for expungement. See Love, supra note 19.
207. These were carried out by commercial background check company Checkr. While
Checkr performs more than ten million background checks per year for more than ten thousand customers, Carolyn Said, Checkr Adds Ongoing Screening for Gig Economy Workers, S.F.
CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Checkr-addsongoingscreening-for-gig-economy-13131037.php [https://perma.cc/SX45-27M9], it has been
reported that approximately 80 percent of its checks are for on-demand companies. Checkr
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Doing so was a nontrivial task. Table 4-2 provides a sample of data constructed based on actual criminal history records. Although some of the dispositions are straightforward (e.g., “dismissed” and “guilty”) and appear in
“plain English,” others (like “NOLLE PROSEQUI”) take legal knowledge to
decipher and yet others, like “transferred,” “remanded,” and “revoked,”
could not be resolved as a disposition of guilt or nonguilt. The steps we took
to reduce the “unknown” disposition rate, in consultation with experts, are
detailed in Appendix M.
TABLE 4-2: SAMPLE CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA
Court

Charge

Charge Type

Disposition

MAGISTERIAL
DISTRICT COURT

Theft of Leased Property

COMMON PLEAS
COURT

MARIJUANA-SMALL AMOUNT
FOR PERSONAL USE

DISTRICT COURT

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN
CONTROL

GUILTY

COMMON PLEAS
COURT

THEFT OF SERVICES ACQUISITION OF SERVICE

OTHER

DISTRICT COURT

AGGRAVATED BURGLARY

COMMON PLEAS
COURT

DISORDERLY CONDUCT
HAZARDOUS/ PHYSICAL
OFFENSE

Sentence

DISMISSED

misdemeanor

felony

NOT
INDICATED
$100.00 FINE;
$60.00 COSTS;
$35.00 FEES;

DISMISSED
NOLLE
PROSEQUI

Next we ascertained the nonconviction-clearance laws of all fifty states.
As described in Appendix M, we relied heavily on summaries of the law provided by the Collateral Consequences Resource Center’s Restoration of

powers the gig economy. The firm’s on-demand clients include Uber, Lyft, GrubHub, Instacart, Postmates, and DoorDash. Kyle Wiggers, Checkr and Uber Built a Service to Monitor
Workers’ Background Records, VENTUREBEAT (July 13, 2018, 7:09 AM),
https://venturebeat.com/2018/07/13/checkr-and-uber-built-a-service-to-monitor-workersbackground-records/ [https://perma.cc/R3BF-YCTU]; Connie Loizos, Background Checks Pay
for Checkr, Which Just Rang Up $100 Million in New Funding, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2018,
9:24 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/12/background-checks-pay-for-checkr-which-justrang-up-100-million-in-new-funding/ [https://perma.cc/EH3P-LS7T]; TrueBridge Cap., The
Gig Is Up: The Real Value of Gig Economy Startups Isn’t the Model—It’s the Supply, FORBES
(Aug. 10, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/truebridge/2016/08/10/the-realvalue-of-gig-economy-startups/ [https://perma.cc/J9MF-6LLB]. The sample covered records
randomly selected over the time period (except in the case of Vermont, whose records were
sampled over an extended period of time in order to achieve a sufficient sample size).
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Rights Project 50-State Comparison as well as the Council for State Governments Clean Slate Clearinghouse. We also consulted the text of statutes in
effect in 2018 (the period of the records we obtained) to determine the scope
of available relief. To complement our research, we consulted with practicing
attorneys on particularly challenging aspects of interpretation. One aspect of
relief, often unascertainable based on reading the statute, was the extent to
which the state allowed for clearance of unconvicted charges even if other
charges in the incident were convicted.208 To make this determination in
ambiguous cases, we consulted with experts and state attorneys knowledgeable of each state’s laws during the relevant period. When in doubt, we defaulted to the more conservative version of the rule (superstrict over strict
over lenient).
After cleaning the data and ascertaining the rules, we developed a script
to apply the state rules to the cleaned state records in order to approximate
the share of people in the second chance nonconvictions current expungement gap with records eligible for but not receiving clearance. The final steps
were to carry out a robustness check, on a handful of states where we had
“representative” data, in order to quantify the extent of the bias introduced
by relying on our data sample and then to use this information to develop
state-level estimates to develop a national estimate of the number of people
in the second chance expungement gap.
3.

Estimates of State-Level Nonconvictions-Expungement Second Chance
Current Gaps

The aggregate results of our analysis of the nonconvictionsexpungement second chance gap are reported in Table 4-3, discussed below.
However, the state shares, as reported in Table B-1, show considerable variation. Less than 1 percent of Vermont gig workers studied, for example, had a
clearable record, while 76 percent of the gig workers with records in North
Carolina did.
These differences, in turn, flow from the several factors that contribute
to a state’s second chance gap, including the breadth or “generosity” of the
relief offered (with a higher share of individuals eligible for relief in states
with more lenient policies), rates of conviction,209 and clearance mechanisms. A state might have a small gap because its policy is “superstrict” and
stingy, not allowing any nonconvictions records to be cleared, or conversely,

208. For example, within a given criminal incident, a person can be susceptible to multiple charges (e.g., charged with trespassing, public display of intoxication, and loitering) but
convicted of less than all of them (e.g., just loitering).
209. In the gig-jobseeker sample, the ratio of nonconvictions to all charges visible in the
data varied among states between less than 10% and more than 70%. Cf. Data Portal,
MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org/portal (determining “case dismissal” and
“case not prosecuted” rates for seven states and finding a range between 13.7% (in Pennsylvania) and 46% (in North Carolina)).
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as in the case of Vermont, because their methods for clearing out nonconvictions is efficient. As explored below, these factors undercut mechanical comparisons between states based on the size of their gaps. But they are still
important because they illustrate the extent to which individuals in each
state that are ready and willing to contribute to the workforce210 have improvable records.
4.

Toward a National Estimate of the Nonconvictions-Expungement
Second Chance Current Gap

Just how many people nationally fall into the second chance expungement current gap due to nonconvictions alone? Of the multiple challenges
that are associated with coming up with a rough estimate based on gigjobseeker records, perhaps the largest is that gig jobseekers with records
cannot be presumed to be representative of the population of people with
records in general. To estimate the size and direction of the bias, we carried
out the robustness checks described in Appendix M. As detailed there,211 we
found that gig jobseekers have eligibility rates that are roughly comparable to
the eligibility rates among people with records in general. These findings
suggested that the gig-jobseeker shares reported in this study can be used to
provide rough estimates of the national population of people with clearable
records.
Besides this source of imprecision in the analysis, two other “unknowns”
should be kept in mind, one tending to inflate and another tending to both
deflate and inflate the nonconvictions second chance gaps reported in this
Article. First, because the estimates are largely based on court and administrative records, they do not reflect mortality, mobility, and related demographic factors that might reduce one’s motivation or ability to seek relief in
the state of one’s previous criminal activity.212 While taking these factors into
account would reduce the number of “motivated” as well as eligible individuals, perhaps the simpler approach is just to assume that some amount of the
gap is natural and due to the factors cited above and related demographic
shifts. Second, as described in Appendix M, the determination of eligibility
in many cases involved unobservable factors that we could not model in data.213 These factors cut both ways: a prosecutor’s objection or the nonrepayment of debt, in jurisdictions where it matters, could make a charge that we
treated as eligible in fact not eligible. However, good-time credits or the successful completion of diversion programs, which we did not account for,
could have led to undercounting. This Article acknowledges these “unmod-

210. As inferred from a job application leading to their background check.
211. See infra Appendix M, Section 2: Robustness Checks.
212. See Shannon et al., supra note 159, at 1800.
213. As described in Appendix M, Section 1 and Table 5: Clearance Criteria Example and
Challenges.
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eled” limits in data, provides examples of them in Appendix M, and includes
a laundry list in Table 5 of some of the particularly challenging eligibility criteria to implement at scale embedded in expungement laws.
Applying each state’s estimated share in rough proportion to the national population of individuals with criminal records of around 80 million214
yielded a cumulative, lower-bounds national second chance gap among individuals with criminal records of roughly 35 percent, or 28 million individuals,215 a stunning total. Twenty-two percent had fully clearable records.
TABLE 4-3: ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL SECOND CHANCE
NONCONVICTIONS-EXPUNGEMENT CURRENT GAP

Individuals

Estimated Number
Share of
Estimated National
Estimated Average
of People in the
Individuals with
Average Share of
Share of
U.S. Criminal PopRecords Clearable
Individuals with
Individuals Fully
ulation Eligible
(Partially or Fully)
Clearable Records
Clearable
with
Within the Sample
(State Balanced)
Clearable Records

In the sample:
61,158
U.S. criminal
population:
80 million

5.

39%

22%

35%

20–30 million

Explaining Differences in State-Level Nonconvictions-Expungement
Second Chance Current Gaps

What explains the variance among states with respect to the share of
people in the second chance expungement gap? I worked with a research assistant to implement a hierarchical multiple linear regression to assess the
contribution of state and local policies as well as the demographic characteristics of the target population to the current gap (the percentage of cases eligible for clearance) of a given county.216 Three policy factors were initially
considered: the generosity of the state nonconvictions clearance law (whether lenient or strict), the presence of automatic clearing processes as provided

214. Based on each state’s share of arrests from 1995 to the present. For details, see Appendix M.
215. Thirty-five percent of eighty million is twenty-eight million. For reasons elaborated
in Appendix M, this total may understate the number of people with clearable unconvicted
charges, because people with only uncharged arrests are more likely to be eligible for clearance.
216. This analysis was carried out on a prefinal version of the data, and thus is provided
for discussion purposes.
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for in state law,217 and each county’s conviction rate (percentage of charges
that led to convictions). A second model also included three county-level
demographic variables: the average age of people charged, the rural/urban
classification,218 and the population of the county.
The model results, reported in Appendix C, suggested that a large share
of the variance in the second chance gap could be explained based on policy
factors including not only the presence of “automatic” clearing but also the
convictions rate (what share of charges became convictions) and state clearability policy (strict, lenient, superstrict).219 Beyond state policy factors, geographic and demographic factors also appear to be correlated to some degree
with the probability of clearance. The most rural counties (RUC=9) had
about a 5 percent larger gap than the least rural (RUC=1) ones, and younger
people were associated with slightly larger gaps (with a 10-year change in average county age at time of conviction corresponding with a 2.3 percent increase in the gap). Both of these correlations were significant at the 99
percent confidence level,220 indicating that uptake is not equal across all
groups.
III. NARROWING THE SECOND CHANCE GAP
So far, this Article has introduced the concept of “second chance gap”—
the difference between the number of individuals eligible for and receiving
second chance relief—and provided some rough estimates of the gap associated with several second chance provisions. It documents uptake rates of less
than 10 percent among many of the initiatives studied and, for the first time,
provides an estimate in the tens of millions of individuals with records that
could clear them partially or fully based on nonconvictions-clearance policies. These findings are important for understanding the high cost, high volume, and high impact potential of second chance policies. This Part draws
from contrasts in the implementation of second chances programs with relatively larger and smaller gaps to identify the practices associated with narrower gaps.

217. The range in provisions was considerable. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54142a(c)(1) (West 2019) (“Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled . . . if at least
thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the
state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall
be erased . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 703(2)(A) (2020) (“Unless the person remains a
fugitive from justice, summons and arrest information without disposition if an interval of
more than one year has elapsed . . . and no active prosecution of a criminal charge stemming
from the summons or arrest is pending [will be confidential.]”).
218. 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urbanrural/2010-urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/SGN6-9S8B].
219. See text accompanying notes 350–351 (r2 = 0.753, all ps < 0.001).
220. See text accompanying notes 350–351 (r2 = 0.757).
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It is important to acknowledge that the foregoing discussion is not comprehensive and neglects many factors and details that may prove to be critical in the administration of a particular program. Little attention has been
paid in this Article, for example, to what can prove to be big obstacles, like
the fines and fees that must be paid in some cases to qualify for relief.221
However, recognizing that “issues of judicial administration affect substantive case outcomes,”222 the following discussion focuses on solving the parts
of the gap that are attributable to administrative, “red tape” factors, as distinct from substantive or structural denials, through ruthless iteration, burden shifting, and automation.
A. Defending, Not Damning, Second Chance Gaps?
Before doing so, it is important to acknowledge and address a few of the
arguments that might be raised in favor of accepting, rather than trying to
narrow, second chance gaps and their complex rules and administration.
First, some of the gap may simply be due to the fact that the relief offered
may simply not be desired by or “worth it” to the eligible recipient. Second,
one might argue that the gaps between eligibility and delivery signal that
second chance policies are performing valuable screening functions between
those that do and don’t merit second chances and, further, permitting a wider and more generous range of forgiveness policies. Relatedly, it could be
that the procedural and substantive requirements of second chance laws, as
well as the individualized nature of their application—for example, when a
hearing and or private petitions are required—encourage and reward rule
following and other socially productive behaviors, and so reducing these
burdens will likewise reduce these incentives. A third argument, based on
equity, could be that in certain contexts, making the delivery of one’s second
chance easier will degrade the benefits of second chances restoration for
those who have made the effort relative to others. I briefly explore and address the first two defenses of second chance gaps below and take up the
third in Part IV’s discussion of impact and disparities.
One explanation for the low uptake of a given second chance is that the
second chance is simply not valued by the eligible party. Restoring a person’s
right to vote isn’t going to matter much if the person isn’t interested in registering or turning out to vote. Other second chances may not seem worth the

221. See, e.g., Joy Radice, Access-to-Justice Challenges for Expungement in Tennessee, 30
FED. SENT’G REP. 277 (2018). Because individuals with criminal pasts often have depressed
earnings, the application and legal fees required to complete records clearance can be prohibitive. JENNY MONTOYA TANSEY & KATHERINE CARLIN, CODE FOR AM., CLOSING THE DELIVERY
GAP 23 (2018), http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/codeforamerica-cms1/documents/Closing
-the-Delivery-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGG9-C59T] (reporting based on a survey of 569
expungement seekers that almost 40 percent of respondents owing fines reported they were
unable to pay).
222. Devins, supra note 54, at 112.
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candle: the benefit of restoring one’s second chance—for example, in the
case of a person who is able to erase an unconvicted charge only to have remaining on one’s record much more serious convictions—may in fact be
minimal. As the broader nonparticipation literature has found, concrete and
immediate informational and transactional costs can appear to outweigh the
downstream benefits of a social benefit.223
But just as with social-benefit programs, privately rational nondelivery
of second chances may be socially suboptimal. Lower uptake in such programs by vulnerable or at-risk communities (such as, in the case of welfare,
immigrants)224 means that the benefit is not reaching those who need it the
most. The benefits of civic participation, as through voting or participating
on a jury, inure to the community at large. And individuals may fail to appreciate the economic and longer-term social benefits of reintegration.
One might nevertheless defend large second chance gaps and the high
costs that contribute to them on a few grounds: first, that high standards
promote good behavior and rule following, and second, that they serve to
separate the wheat from the chaff, providing a valuable filtering function to
screen out those who don’t merit second chances. While appealing, these defenses are misplaced, in large part because the second chance gap measures
uptake conditional on qualification, such that any incentive for good behavior comes from the substantive, not procedural, requirements associated
with getting one’s second chance. As a result, the individuals that have the
organization and wherewithal to endure second chance application procedures are likely to be those with access to lawyers and resources, exacerbating existing disparities. In the case of invisible yet very real encumbrances
like having a criminal record or having a suspended license, low uptake rates
combined with high apparent eligibility seem to indicate that the administrative and debt hurdles of clearance or restoration are not spurring learning
but instead operating to put second chances out of reach.
In addition, while no government program is expected to have complete
uptake, the reported second chance uptake rates in convictions expungement of, in most cases, less than 20 percent225 described in Part II leave much
room for improvement. The size and consequences of the second chance

223. See, e.g., Alba, supra note 34, at 3 (describing the “present bias” or hyperbolic discounting that can impact the social benefit participation decision).
224. See Currie, supra note 34, at 16 (describing studies that document depressed rates of
enrollment among immigrant children in Medicaid, conditional on their qualifying, and, conditional on being poor, lower rates of enrollment in SSI among Hispanic children).
225. As a point of comparison, the uptake rates of a number of large means-tested social
welfare programs is closer to 50%–80%. See Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and TakeUp: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax Credit, 72 TAX L. REV. 59, 67 n.46 (2018) (describing
an 83% uptake rate among SNAP programs and a similarly high participation level among
Medicaid and CHIP programs but cautioning that differences in methodology complicate direct comparisons; also describing 2014 Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC) participation rates as at 55%).
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gaps identified in this report support putting aside individualized, case-bycase assessments in favor of a different, scalable approach to addressing mass
criminalization. This means reducing the costs—on both the applicant and
the criminal justice system—associated with restoring each second chance.
Two types of code—legal code and computational code—can be leveraged to
do this. As discussed below, legal code that burden shifts and lays out a centralized framework for relief and computer code for automating and implementing these principles can work together to support second chances at
scale.
Finally, while low uptake rates could theoretically make second chance
rules more politically palatable, it is equally plausible that low awareness of
the second chance gap to date has prevented this mechanism from operating
thus far. On the contrary, for the reasons described in Part I, second chance
laws to date have enjoyed a warm bipartisan embrace because they are hoped
to be effective, not because they aren’t delivered.
The third defense of the second chance gap, in the context of records
clearing, is more worrisome—that by automatically clearing everyone’s record, discrimination will increase as factual, individualized information is replaced with group assumptions. I leave a more robust discussion of how the
void left by expunged data may be replaced with statistical discrimination or
other improper inferences to Part IV.
Before turning to the following discussion of ways to narrow the second
chance gap, it is important to acknowledge that it neglects other, perhaps
more important, questions—for example, about the scope of relief provided
and the legitimacy of the underlying deprivation of rights. However, recognizing that “issues of judicial administration affect substantive case outcomes,”226 the following discussion focuses on addressing the parts of the gap
that are attributable to administrative, “red-tape” factors to second-chance
gaps, through ruthless iteration, burden shifting, and automation.
B. Ruthless Iteration
One finding that emerges from reviewing relatively more and less successful second chance initiatives is that implementing them at scale requires
clear, ascertainable, consistently applied criteria. But in context after context,
untested rules that do not take into account the wide variety of scenarios that
may arise or explicitly consider capacity to implement have stymied the delivery of second chances. Given the complexity of the criteria and the data
required to implement them, perfection should not be expected on the first
try, but rather, ruthless iteration, to fulfill the intent and promise of second
chances.

226.

Devins, supra note 54, at 112.
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Attempting to apply records-clearance criteria in an automated way
demonstrates the challenges.227 Data-hygiene issues all too familiar to data
practitioners, including data silos, missing data, and dirty data,228 make it
difficult to apply widely used criteria that are specific to the person, charge,
or disposition status. To know whether or not a conviction is the person’s
“first offense,” she has “stayed clean” for the requisite period of time, or she
has satisfied other qualifying (or disqualifying) conditions229 requires a reliable way to identify that person across statewide criminal records;230 for example, through a unique state ID. But according to the Council for State
Government’s Justice project, only eighteen states have and use a unique
state identification (SID) number for each person consistently.231 Provisions
that are “person specific” are both common and difficult to ascertain at scale
without an authorized identification strategy.232 Table 5 includes a list of expungement provisions that, while operational in a petition-by-petition clearance process, have proven difficult to implement at scale; the reason they are
problematic; and drafting alternatives.
There will still be important reasons to include hard-to-ascertain criteria—individuals with more involved criminal histories or that have served
longer sentences will require more vetting but also may receive more impactful relief when they qualify. However, the extent to which data silos, missing
data, and dirty data reduce the ability of candidates to be cleared efficiently
should at least be taken into consideration and, where possible, minimized.
This requires not a “one and done” approach but an agile, iterative approach
that allows for refinement of the criteria to fit the existing informational infrastructure. Rules that don’t take into account capacity to implement are
not limited to expungement.233 For example, errors in resentencing calculations have been blamed on the inability of “court clerks to record judges’ orders correctly, prison and jail administrators to properly read those

227. Some of which are listed in Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges.
228. See, e.g., Anders Haug & Jan Stentoft Arlbjørn, Barriers to Master Data Quality, 24 J.
ENTER. INFO. MGMT. 288, 292–97 (2011).
229. For examples, see Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges.
230. Rather than, for example, a statewide case-management system.
231. The Council of State Gov’ts Just. Ctr., Action Item 3: Use Measures That Permit
More Timely Analysis in Addition to Cohort-Based Measures, 50-STATE REP. ON PUB. SAFETY,
https://50statespublicsafety.us/part-2/strategy-1/action-item-3/#graphic-3
[https://perma.cc
/D2FH-RSLP].
232. Rhode Island, for example, includes three record-specific criteria that require, respectively, conviction records to be connected to a first misdemeanor or first felony and for the
person to have no subsequent arrests or convictions. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-1.3-2 to .33(b)(1) (2002). However, as of 2017, it did not have or use a common ID across criminal justice
data systems. The Council of State Gov’ts Just. Ctr., supra note 231.
233. See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 225 (discussing the role of complexity in the EITC context, and distinguishing between informational and computational complexity).
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instructions, and facility staff to accurately add and subtract good-time credits.”234
Iteration and consultation with implementers can ensure that second
chance criteria are developed in a way that supports not only their clarity but
consistent application, as is underscored by considering the Clemency Initiative, compassionate release, and “Drugs Minus Two” resentencing programs,
all of which enable inmates to apply for shortened sentences. In her report
Lessons Learned, a comprehensive analysis of several federal resentencing
initiatives, Caryn Devins cites as one of the factors that led to the success of
the Drugs Minus Two initiative—which had a relatively small second chance
gap235—that in most cases eligibility for the program could readily be determined without a complex legal analysis.236 This enabled courts to grant relief
regardless of whether an affected individual filed a motion. It also allowed
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to generate preliminary lists of eligible defendants to district courts upon request.237
In contrast, the Obama Clemency Initiative, by all accounts, suffered
from uneven and inconsistent application of the criteria for commutation. In
its report, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted the high rate of false negatives and positives resulting from the mismatch between published criteria
and outcomes.238 According to former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Love,
this meant that “[r]elief was granted in dozens of cases that evidently did not
satisfy the eligibility criteria announced” while “many prisoners whose cases
did meet the eligibility criteria were inexplicably denied relief.”239

234. Laura Sullivan, Without Reviews, Inmates Can Get Lost in U.S. Prison System, NPR
(Apr. 5, 2013, 4:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/04/05/176302378/without-reviewsinmates-can-get-lost-in-u-s-prison-system [https://perma.cc/3APX-6JZ6].
235. Of about 21 percent based on figures published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2014 DRUG GUIDELINES AMENDMENT RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT
tbls.1 & 3 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications
/retroactivity-analyses/drug-guidelines-amendment/20150624-Drug-Retro-Analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3NL-2G52].
236. Devins, supra note 54, at 73–74.
237. Id. at 91, 117.
238. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 74, at 2 (only 5.1 percent of the offenders who received a
commuted sentence met all the factors, while only 3.4 percent of the sentences of drugtrafficking offenders that met all the factors did).
239. Love, supra note 117, at 271–72 (emphasis added).
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TABLE 5: CLEARANCE CRITERIA EXAMPLES AND CHALLENGES

Criteria
Sentence
completion

Administrability
Challenge
Not tracked in court data
and hard to infer as clean
sentencing data is often
not available; it also is
often unclear whether or
not outstanding fines and
fees must be paid and
whether they have been.

Example

Drafting Alternative

Records relating to a first conviction
voided upon the petitioner’s successful
completion of the sentence will be
sealed by the court. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 218A.275(1), (8), (9) (West
2012).

Disposition date (+ X
Years)

Record can be sealed by the court one
year after sentence completion if the
petitioner has no subsequent convictions. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72706(1)(a), (1)(b)(i), 1(f).

First conviction;
qualifying
conditions

Lack of unique identifier
across precludes determination

Personal
demographic trait
such as age, military status, or
other condition

Information may not be
easily ascertainable/available on the record or charge category
condition

Records relating to an offense committed by current and former military personnel can be dismissed.” CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1170.9 (West 2015). A record
may be destroyed when the person who
is the subject of the record reaches
thirty-eight years of age. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 781(d) (West 2020).

Specify an identification strategy that can
be
implemented at scale
or do not include
demographic traits

Class or grade
condition

Missing class, grade, or
category information

Explicitly specify the
qualifying crimes

Court-ordered
conditions

Require individual review/check for any “courtordered” conditions and
compliance

Records relating to a charge or conviction for a petty offense, municipal ordinance violation, or a Class 2
misdemeanor as the highest charge can
be removed from the public record after
10 years, if all court-ordered conditions
are satisfied. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-3-34 (2016).

Laundry list disposition criteria

Vulnerable to changes to
definitions, requires detailed clean data

Records of arrest are destroyed within
60 days after detention without arrest,
acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or other exoneration. R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-1-12(a), (b).

Bless commercial
identification
approximation technique

Do not include courtordered conditions

Simple description,
e.g., “All records that
do not end in a conviction”
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Prison staff, corrections officials, and final decisionmakers have little
guidance in many cases.240 This results in confusing eligibility criteria that
take so long to evaluate that applicants die in the interim.241 For states like
Illinois and Michigan that have programs in place but “provide no detailed
rules or guidance on implementing them,”242 the present situation is even
more dire.
In the case of federal compassionate release, ruthless iteration and oversight provided by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department
of Justice, watchdog groups, and Congress have helped to, over time, improve implementation of the law. After a 2013 OIG report detailed “significant problems with the management” of the compassionate-release program,
the BOP implemented new provisions meant to increase and clarify the
law.243 But a 2015 report, revised again in 2016, found that the new provisions did not address the problem and reiterated that the BOP’s guidelines
were still inadequate and recommended “revising the requirements that limit
the availability of compassionate release for these inmates.”244 In 2016, the
Sentencing Commission stepped in to provide broader, stronger and more
ascertainable criteria.245 For example, for elderly prisoners with medical conditions, it eliminated the requirements that prisoners over sixty-five years
old be “experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health that substantially diminishes their ability to function in prison” and that “[c]onventional
treatment promise[] no substantial improvement,” as previously required by
the BOP.246

240. Id. at 14.
241. Id. at 7.
242. Id. at 12.
243. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 46.
244. Id. at i–iii.
245. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(stating that the standard of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” can be met on four
grounds: Medical, Age, Family Circumstances, and Other, and defining each); see also S. REP.
NO. 115-139, at 80 (2017) (“In 2016, the U.S. Sentencing Commission [USSC] amended the
criteria for compassionate release and encouraged BOP to file a motion for those prisoners
who meet the criteria the Commission identified.”); id. at 80–81 (where the Senate gave BOP
sixty days to respond to its inquiry with answers as to how it had complied with the new criteria, which criteria it had not implemented, an explanation of why not and a plan to comply, the
number of prisoners granted and denied compassionate release in the five years preceding
along with the number of applicants, the reasons for each denial or grant of release, the duration of time between application submission and determination, and the number of prisoners
who died waiting for determination with the duration of time they had waited); see also Letter
from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, supra note 124 (directing BOP to file all
motions for compassionate release that may meet one of the criteria thereof and demanding
that data on reform implementation be transmitted directly to the Senate).
246. See FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND THE
FIRST STEP ACT: THEN AND NOW 2–3, https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/CompassionateRelease-in-the-First-Step-Act-Explained-FAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/DPX3-QXM9].
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In 2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee, under pressure from
outside groups, directed the BOP to report on its efforts to increase its use of
compassionate release, and to essentially report on the second chance gap
and its root causes, by providing data on the number of requests, their results, the reasons for denials, and the number of people who died waiting for
an answer.247 In the spirit of continual improvement, the First Step Act of
2018 further streamlined eligibility248 and introduced a right of appeal, building oversight on discretion. It also added a notification provision to families
of prisoners that fall into eligibility.249
C. Centralization and Burden Shifting
Centralizing and shifting the burden for delivering second chances to
the state is another strategy for narrowing the second chance gap. For example, one of the major criticisms of the Clemency Initiative was that decisions
were made by a decentralized staff given wide latitude to grant, deny, and
even refashion sentences.250 The lack of a unified approach to reviewing applications introduced inconsistencies and inefficiencies in administration.251
The Drugs Minus Two program (like certain previous presidential pardon
programs252), in contrast, benefited from a uniform and “proactive, relatively
centralized and efficient process.”253
The experiences of California and Pennsylvania with records clearing
are also illustrative. California has fifty-eight counties, each responsible for

247. S. REP. NO. 115-139, at 80 (where the Senate gave BOP a list of categories on which
it must produce data, concluding with “(8) for each year, the number of prisoners who died
while their compassionate release requests were pending and, for each, the amount of time that
had elapsed between the date the request was received by the warden”).
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (supplemented by the First Step Act of 2018, giving
prisoners the opportunity to appeal BOP’s decision not to file a motion for compassionate release).
249. That includes notification to a prisoner’s loved ones seventy-two hours after a terminal diagnosis of the right to submit a compassionate-release request, and requirements that
the BOP must process requests within fourteen days, in addition to providing assistance to
prisons unable to submit release requests on their own. Id. § 3582(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
250. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference
to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
387, 429–32 (2017). The need to decentralize came, in part, from the program’s well-publicized
resource constraints, but drawing upon former prosecutors as reviewing staff introduced another problem: “structural bias.” Id. at 434; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 824 (2015).
251. Barkow & Osler, supra note 250, at 429–32.
252. See, e.g., Love, supra note 117, at 275 n.5 (Clemency Legacy) (describing President
Ford’s Clemency Board, which “reviewed approximately 21,500 applications over a period of
12 months, and submitted a total of 14,514 recommendations for clemency to the President,
most of which were granted”).
253. Devins, supra note 54, at 74.
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deciding how to implement key parts of Propositions 47 and 64.254 A review
of county websites undertaken for this Article yielded no information about
how to clear one’s record under these provisions for twenty-two and twentyeight counties, respectively.255 Putting in place a default centralized,
statewide process would relieve the burden on individual counties to devise
their own programs. During the writing of this Article, California passed
AB-1793, largely implementing this idea by requiring the identification and
automatic clearance of Prop 64 eligible offenses unless objected to by a prosecutor.256 Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Clean Slate Act assigns responsibility for sealing nonconvictions and minor convictions from criminal
records to the state police and statewide Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts.257 Burden shifting in these ways not only supports more efficient,
centralized administration, but also automation and cost-savings, addressed
in the next Subsection.258
But even when the burden is on the state, small differences in how the
law is drafted or implemented can contribute to big differences in the consequences of a criminal record. Two states that have similar rules on paper but
divergent outcomes with respect to what employers see are Alaska and Vermont. Under Alaskan law, records relating to a case where all charges result
in acquittal or dismissal cannot be published on a publicly available website
sixty days after the date of acquittal or dismissal.259 In Vermont, the waiting
time until recently was longer, twelve months, but the court will seal the rec-

254. Including the scope of form of petition and admissible evidence. J. RICHARD
COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, PROPOSITION 47: “THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS
ACT” 43, 54 (2017), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8YHE-DYJ5] (“The statute does not define the scope of evidence admissible to prove
or disprove the petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing” and “[n]o particular form of petition is
specified by the initiative”); accord COUZENS & BIGELOW, supra note 141, at 19, 40.
255. Many of these included the twenty-two counties that lack a formal public defender’s
office. CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUST., SECOND CHANCES AND SYSTEMS CHANGE: HOW
PROPOSITION 47 IS CHANGING CALIFORNIA 56 (2017), https://safeandjust.org/wpcontent/uploads/P47_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7ML-7ZNQ].
256. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.9 (West 2020) (outlining a process under
which the Department of Justice, before July 1, 2019, will “review the records in the state summary criminal history information database and shall identify past convictions” and courts
shall automatically “reduce or dismiss the conviction” if there is no prosecutorial challenge by
July 1, 2020).
257. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2(a)–(b) (2018). In those situations where the courts miss
a case or are missing grading information, a petitioner may still proactively file a sealing petition. § 9122.3(c).
258. State-based identification can support clearance across disparate counties—a survey
of clearance seekers in California found that 43 percent had charges in multiple counties. Clear
My Record, CODE FOR AM., https://www.codeforamerica.org/what/clear-my-record [https://
perma.cc/28KK-EWXJ]. It also can support economies of scale by enabling clearance on multiple bases using a “human-centered” rather the more typical “case-centered” approach.
259. ALASKA STAT. § 22.35.030 (2018).
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ord after dismissal or a finding of no probable cause.260 But while Vermont’s
second chance current gap was close to 0 percent for the studied years, based
on data available to employers, the second chance gap among gig jobseekers
in Alaska did not decline in 2017,261 despite its enactment of its “no website
access” policy in 2016.262 This could be because background check companies can nonetheless access criminal justice data through, for example, a
state data feed or court runner and disseminate this information electronically even in the absence of a state website.263
In Vermont, until 2019, a person’s criminal history record was sealed by
the court twelve months after a finding of no probable cause, dismissal at arraignment, or dismissal without prejudice before trial, unless the prosecuting
attorney objected.264 But arguably just as, if not more, important than this
law is the decision of the Vermont agency that provides information to employers, the Vermont Criminal Information Center (VCIC), to only “report[] information on someone who has been convicted of a crime.”265 This
provides a seal around criminal information that is not present in Alaska.
D. Automating Delivery of Second Chances
Though every second chance program is unique, each petition-based
system requires the same basic steps to be carried out: the applicant must ascertain the criteria, gather court and other records, and work with a lawyer
to apply the criteria to existing records to determine eligibility and apply;
and the state must evaluate the application and grant relief.266 Student re260. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7603(a) (Supp. 2019).
261. In fact, it increased from approximately 30 percent to 37 percent, based on my analysis on sample sizes of 86 and 115 cases, respectively (limiting the precision of point estimates).
262. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., supra note 51, at 4.
263. See, e.g., Kasey Schroer, Background Check FAQs – Criminal and Offense History
Searches, HIRERIGHT: BLOG (Dec. 13, 2008), https://www.hireright.com/blog/backgroundchecks/criminal-background-checks/background-check-faqs-criminal-and-offense-historysearches [https://perma.cc/5RPY-YPVF] (saying companies like HireRight “maintain a network of court runners to facilitate in-person courthouse record searches” where records are
not available online).
264. Tit. 13, § 7603(a) (2018). Note that the timeline was changed to sixty days in the
2019 statutory supplement.
265. Information for Court Diversion Participants About Criminal Records, VT. CT.
DIVERSION,
http://vtcourtdiversion.org/court-diversion/information-on-criminal-records/
[https://perma.cc/4Z2H-6L2E] (“If an employer runs a check on a person against whom charges were filed and subsequently dismissed . . . VCIC staff will inform the employer that there is
‘no record.’ ”).
266. For example, for a person to reclassify her felony under California’s Prop 47 requires
determining eligibility based on conviction records; obtaining a copy of her criminal record (or
records); completing the forms of the Superior Court in which she was convicted for each felony; making copies of the form, one each for the Superior Court and district attorney where she
was convicted; and filing these forms. The D.A., Superior Court, and, in some cases, the public
defender in that district must then verify all the information provided, coordinate among bu-
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searchers at Stanford have estimated the public and private costs of carrying
out petition-based records clearing in California, including the court’s cost,
the cost of preparing the application, and related costs, at $3,757.267
Automation can reduce the costs of clearing first, by implementing steps
in the process to scale. The California Senate Appropriations Committee has
estimated the costs of identification of Prop 64-eligible convictions through
the DOJ’s centralized repository and the cost of the court processing petitions to be about $7.87–$27.87 million per 218,094 convictions, at an average
cost of about $36–$128 per cleared conviction.268
Far more efficient is the “total automation” option that does not require
any action by the second chance recipient or court. Many states automatically restore voting rights,269 for example, and a handful of states specify that
nonconviction records “shall” be expunged.270 Several counties in California,
working with Code for America, have also worked to proactively provide relief without a petition under Propositions 47 and 64.271 Under the terms of
Pennsylvania’s Clean Slate Act, the state automatically sealed nonconviction
and older conviction records,272 at an estimated “one-time” cost to the courts
of $3.4 million.273 An estimated 1.15 million Pennsylvanians received relief
under the bill in the first year.274 This translates into a cost per person receiving relief, based on just the nonconvictions backlog, of approximately $2.96.

reaucracies, and evaluate the claim. Change My Record, MY PROP 47, http://myprop47
.org/change-my-record/ [https://perma.cc/FB2C-A4W3].
267. MEYLI CHAPIN, ALON ELHANAN, MATTHEW RILLERA, AUDREY K. SOLOMON &
TYLER L. WOODS, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RECORD EXPUNGEMENT IN SANTA
CLARA COUNTY 6 (2014). The process of applying for reenfranchisement is generally even
more involved, requiring, for example, an individual to determine and then pay outstanding
fines and fees; wait the mandatory waiting period, if any; determine his criminal history; use
legal analysis to apply the criteria for restoration; fill out the forms and apply to the relevant
tribunal; prepare to answer questions about home life, job status, employment history, and
child support; prepare a record of any encounters with law enforcement; get certified copies of
document relating to criminal offenses; get references; and then proceed to a hearing, followed
by a board recommendation, and then a gubernatorial decision. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra
note 153, at 84–89.
268. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140.
269. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.181 (2018).
270. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.17(1) (West 2016).
271. See, e.g., supra note 143 (noting the proactive initiatives of San Francisco and Alameda).
272. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9121(b), 9122 (2018).
273. Email from Ami Levin, Data Exch. Project Manager, Admin. Off. of Pa. Cts., to author (July 24, 2020, 11:17 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
274. Sharon Dietrich, As COVID-19 Continues, Expanding Clean Slate Legislation Will
Help People in Need, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 1, 2020 9:30 AM), https://www.inquirer.com
/opinion/commentary/clean-slate-legislation-records-sealed-pennsylvania-covid-19-recovery20200701.html [https://perma.cc/E6Q4-EY6C].
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TABLE 6: RECORDS CLEARING COST ESTIMATES
Implementation

Cost

Components

Legal-ClinicAssisted
Petition-Based
Clearance275

$3,757 per person

$59 (probation office costs), $242 (court
costs), $3,412 (legal assistance provided
by the Records Clearance Project), $44
(legal fees of the offender)

Automated
Identification +
Petition Based
Clearance276

$36–$128 per charge

$5–$26 million (court costs), $2.9 million
(DOJ identification costs) (does not include prosecution/PD costs)

“Clean Slate”
Total Automation277

Approximately $2.96 per
$195 thousand (for changes to police
person ($3.4 million to
computerized criminal history systems),
support an initial tranche
$50 thousand (for implementation by the
of around 1.15 million
Administrative Office of PA Courts)
people eligible for relief)

IV. OPEN POLICY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This Article has described and documented the gaps that exist between
available and delivered second chances and highlighted approaches for narrowing these gaps at scale. Yet while the case studies of the previous Section
describing the advantages of automated and automatic methods over petition-based ones counsel their embrace, an appreciation of the broader contexts and dynamics point in the opposite direction, away from a too-narrow
focus on closing the second chance gap through better-written laws and administrative fixes alone. Chief among them is that the very frame of “second
chances” risks legitimizing the underlying criminalization, incarceration,
and deprivation of the right to vote, get a good job and housing, and to be
free in the first place. This Part, at its conclusion, discusses the existence of a
“first chance gap” when the rules of the United States and other countries are
compared.
This Part also identifies open policy and research questions that address
other aspects of the administration and delivery of second chances and,

275.
276.
277.

CHAPIN ET AL., supra note 267, at 6.
FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9121(b), 9122 (2018).
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more importantly, their impact. These include the important role of debt
and data in contributing to “second second chance gaps”; the futility of fully
clearing one’s record in a digital age; our current lack of understanding of
the public and private impacts of second chance relief at scale, particularly in
the absence of notification and in the shadow of statistical discrimination;
and the second chance gap among women and juveniles.
A. Second Second Chance Gaps
Even when automation is embraced, debt-related barriers and dirty data
can lead to incomplete delivery, creating “second second chance gaps” and
the risk of exacerbating, rather than reducing and ultimately eliminating,
“unwarranted racial disparities across the criminal justice system” as called
for by the civil rights community.278 Both are discussed below.
Limits on available administrative data make it difficult to determine the
extent to which debt is deterring applications for second chances. But debt
obligations pose distinct barriers to the delivery of second chances and currently stand in the way of records expungement,279 license reinstatement,280
and enfranchisement281 second chances. The inability to fulfill these prerequisites creates wealth-based barriers to second chances, creating a real risk of
their regressive impact. While automation holds the ability to “level the playing field” as to awareness and application burden, in the absence of debt relief it can further exacerbate, rather than narrow, existing disparities.282 The
debt can include fines, fees, and restitution, each with a distinct purpose and

278. LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT”
INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 2–3 (2018) (Principle 1).
279. E.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an Extraordinary Harm, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 169, 186 (2017) (citing IND. CODE § 35-38-92(e)(2), (3) (2017) (specifying that only if the court finds that the defendant has “paid all fines,
fees, and court costs, and satisfied any restitution obligation placed on the person as part of the
sentence” and met other requirements, it “shall” expunge the conviction record)); see also
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(1) (2019) (requiring satisfaction of all sentence elements, including “any and all legal financial obligations,” as part of sentence completion prerequisite to
expungement).
280. E.g., April D. Fernandes, Michele Cadigan, Frank Edwards & Alexes Harris, Monetary Sanctions: A Review of Revenue Generation, Legal Challenges, and Reform, 15 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 397, 407 (2019) (describing Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019),
in which Johnson’s license was reinstated only after plaintiff paid outstanding fees associated
with traffic tickets); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-395 (2017) (stating that a license shall remain suspended until all fines and fees are paid in full, or installment payment plan approved).
281. E.g., Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in
the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R–C.L. L. REV. 189, 224 (2016) (“Felons
who have failed to pay fines, fees, restitution, and court costs in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, and Delaware cannot be re-enfranchised until their [legal financial obligations]
are paid.”).
282. See LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS.,, supra note 278.
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rationale.283 For example, a defendant may get a speeding ticket and be issued a fine.284 Or if they are found guilty of theft, they may be ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of the stolen amount to the plaintiff.285 But increasingly, defendants are also being charged by the court for fees associated with
operating the legal system, even tangential aspects not directly related to the
disposition of cases.286 In contrast to fines, which are usually limited in
amount and intended to deter,287 and restitution, which is meant to compensate victims in criminal cases,288 court and correction fees can apply to all
cases and can quickly run into the thousands and outweigh fines and restitution.289 Saddling a defendant with “use costs,”290 fees can be motivated by a
municipality’s desire to raise revenue.291
For poor defendants, repayment requirements can present insurmountable structural barriers to second chances. Like the other burdens associated
with records clearance, financial costs operate in a regressive manner, putting expungement out of the reach of those who arguably need it the most.
While current American Bar Association guidelines call for the courts to

283. Thomas Capretta, Highway Robbery: Due Process, Equal Protection, and Punishing
Poverty with Driver’s License Suspensions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1213, 1217 n.41 (2018)
(describing the multiple purposes as articulated by the Virginia Supreme Court of the state’s
statutory court-collection process including: “to facilitate the payment of fines, court costs,
penalties . . . to collect the monies due . . . as a result of these convictions, and []to assure payment of court-ordered restitution to victims of crime”).
284. Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 409.
285. Cf. id.
286. Edelman, supra note 43, at 215 (“Governments jacked up fines and added mountainous fees that had no connection with the violation—for example, a portion of a $500 fee
went toward the cost of running the courthouse gym in one county in Michigan.”(footnote
omitted)).
287. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 397, 418 (2019) (describing how “a reduced fine or public service can adequately
serve the state’s interest in accomplishing deterrence and punishment” (footnote omitted)).
288. Atkinson, supra note 281, at 190 n.4 (“Restitution is payment from an offender to a
victim for losses suffered as a result of the crime. It is authorized in every state.”).
289. WHITELEMONS, supra note 43, at 8, 12–13 (describing former inmates returning to
society with debts totaling in the thousands of dollars and listing examples of common fees
that add up to over $1,200).
290. Atkinson, supra note 281, at 190–91 (“Defendants in criminal cases began having to
pay restitution, court costs, room and board, and even public defender fees. As time went on,
fees spiraled into new areas: DNA testing, medical examinations, even jury selection.” (footnotes omitted)).
291. Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1024 (2016) (describing the municipal budgetary constraints, including following the Great
Recession, that have led city criminal justice municipalities to impose fines, fees, court costs,
and interest); see also Edelman, supra note 43, at 215 (describing the diversion of “court fees”
in one county of Michigan being collected and applied to finance a county-employee fitness
gym).
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have the ability to waive fines and fees after individualized assessments,292
and some jurisdictions have moved in this direction,293 this trend is not universal and waiver is often only available after years of timely payments.294
Those who can’t pay may find themselves barred from the employment that
they need to become able to do so. As it has in debtor’s prison and related
contexts,295 this aspect of the criminal justice system punishes the poor,296
potentially long after their time has been served.
Another “second second chance gap” in expungement has been created
by the poor quality of criminal justice data and, in particular, ambiguous
dispositions (described below in Section IV.C) and charge-grade (e.g., “felony B,” “misdemeanor 2”) information. The lack of grade or severity data is
problematic because many states’ eligibility criteria use charge grades as a
way to distinguish between clearable and nonclearable offenses.297 In the first
year of implementation of the Pennsylvania Clean Slate Act, many people

292. Malia Brink, ABA Guidelines on Fines and Fees Used to Promote Critical Reforms,
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2019, at 54, 54 (“Further the Guidelines state that neither a fine nor a fee
should ever ‘be greater than an individual’s ability to pay,’ noting that judges must have the
‘ability to waive or reduce’ any fine or fee (Guidelines 1 and 2). The Guidelines further state
that a hearing on ability to pay should be held before the imposition of any fine or fee (Guideline 4).” (quoting ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON BUILDING TR. IN THE AM. JUST. SYS.,
TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES 1–2 (2018))), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_ind_10_guidelines
_court_fines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MUZ-ZEQM]).
293. See, e.g., Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 409 (describing Washington state’s new
policy allowing for waiver of multiple forms of legal financial obligations upon a finding of
indigency).
294. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 983a (2003 & Supp. 2019) (“On or after November 1, 2016, the court shall have the authority to waive all outstanding fines, court costs
and fees in a criminal case for any person who . . . [h]as made installment payments on outstanding fines, court costs, fees and restitution ordered by the court on a timely basis every
month for the previous twenty-four (24) months following release from the custody of the Department of Corrections.”).
295. Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 405 (describing the practice of “pay or stay, or
incarcerating people for inability to pay fines and fees” that commonly arises in the context of
“those who have outstanding debt owing to traffic violations or misdemeanor offenses [and]
are threatened with jail because they do not have the means to pay at the time of assessment.
Courts generally specify a per-day amount that is compensated toward the remaining debt,
usually between $10 and $30 per day in jail. The widespread use of this practice to compel
payment of outstanding legal debt has prompted scholars, civil rights attorneys, and advocates
to declare these modern-day debtors’ prisons”).
296. See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009) (arguing that, in the post-civil rights era, the
criminal justice system has been used as a tool to curb social insecurity by penalizing poverty).
297. See, e.g., infra Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges; accord Michael
Hollander, Dir. of Analytics, DATA Lab, Phila. Dist. Att’y’s Off., Presentation: The Hidden
Problems Behind Clean Slate: Legacy Data Problems in Automated Record Clearing (Nov. 14,
2019) (discussing the issue of missing grades in the application of Pennsylvania state law to
Pennsylvania criminal records).
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with convictions have been unable to get relief due to missing grade data,
falling into the “second second chance gap.”298 In drafting California’s
AB1076, which was passed in the fall of 2019 and provides for automated
clearance of some convictions, lawmakers punted on data issues, stating that
relief would only be granted if “relevant information is present.”299 While
this makes the law implementable without huge costs, it also means that
many who likely deserve relief won’t get it.
In addition to grade data, personal information pertaining, for example,
to the individual’s military status, age, sexual trafficking-victim status, or to
the amount of money at stake, or that implicates discretion or other out-ofrecord criteria is also nearly impossible to implement at scale.300 Criteria
based on the date of sentence completion are also surprisingly difficult to
implement, due to indeterminate sentencing and the complexities of what
can happen after a person is sentenced,301 and because it is much harder to
pinpoint a completion date than, for example, disposition date. The good
news is that policy interventions can be used to address each such issue ex
ante by, for example, blessing the use of standard commercial namematching techniques; pegging waiting times to disposition dates, rather than
sentence completion date;302 and more generally taking into account implementation in policy development. Table 5 lists problematic phrases and
drafting alternatives, but perfection on the first try should not be expected;
rather, ruthless iteration as discussed in Part III is required.
B. The Impossibility of Forgetting
In the vein of thinking about reentry more broadly, even if an individual
clears her official criminal record, the growth in the number and accessibility
of electronic criminal records303 increases the risk that expunged information

298. Hollander, supra note 297.
299. Assemb. B. 1076, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
300. For example, one aspect of California Prop 47, its $950 ceiling with respect to property crimes, has been relatively hard to implement at scale because it requires analysis of the
police record. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. Conversely, two of the factors that
made computational determination of the expungable population in Maryland possible were
that the laws were very objective and that all the information needed to determine eligibility
was on the state website. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, IT Dir. & Staff Att’y, Md. Volunteer
Laws. Serv., to author (Mar. 2, 2018, 6:25 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
301. An example might be, “probation: 5 YEARS; restitution: 1760; other: 90 DAYS
WORK; RELEASE ** 11/05/2014 SENTENCE MODIFICATION-PROBATION REVOKED; 6
YEARS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 241 DAYS CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED,
$1906.08 RESTITUTION.”
302. For a list of problematic phrases and drafting alternatives, see Table 5: Clearance
Criteria Examples and Challenges.
303. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 164, at 328.
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will remain accessible to employers and others.304 Although credit-reporting
agencies that are subject to the Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA) have a
duty to report accurate information and to provide means of redress when
errors are made, unofficial “people search” websites are not bound by these
requirements.305
Audits of commercial-screening companies have revealed that they are
at risk of reporting sealed records, misclassification (for example, reporting a
misdemeanor as a felony), or inappropriately disclosing information protected by consumer and privacy laws.306 When records providers don’t have
in place protocols for updating data or do not receive updated data in an easily ingestible fashion, the risk of outdated, inaccurate information is high.307
The “futility of expungement,”308 or impossibility of erasure, not to mention
its fundamental conflict with the First Amendment and tradition of government-records transparency and accessibility, has led a number of prominent
advocates to oppose expungement as a priority strategy.309
Individuals can take several steps to protect themselves from outdated
criminal-profile data,310 but at a systemic level, laws that effectively regulate
background screening and “mugshot” services,311 and that make it easy (for
example, by requiring regular publication of the “change file”) to update databases of information, and that comply with and punish the dissemination
of outdated information, can help.312 In Europe, the “right to be forgotten”
has been used to require Google to delist references to a businessman’s criminal history,313 and the novel idea of using the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) to require commercial providers to “take down” mugshots has

304. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 1705, 1725–26 (2003).
305. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, 1681i, 1681k.
306. PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., BROKEN RECORDS:
HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND
BUSINESSES
3–4
(2012),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-recordsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ6V-487F].
307. Roberts, supra note 165, at 345–46.
308. E.g., JACOBS, supra note 95, at 308 (describing clearing remedies as “largely futile”).
309. See, e.g., id. at 130 (describing former Pardon Attorney Margaret Love’s opposition
to expungement); id. at 121–23 (describing the “insurmountable” obstacles the First Amendment places on prohibiting media disclosure of expunged information).
310. Sharon M. Dietrich, Ants Under the Refrigerator? Removing Expunged Cases from
Commercial Background Checks, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 26, 28–29.
311. Roberts, supra note 165, at 345–46.
312. Dietrich, supra note 310, at 29.
313. Jason Tashea, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Apply to Criminals: UK High Court Rules
Against Google, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article
/right_to_be_forgotten_can_apply_to_criminal_records_rules [https://perma.cc/F6QD-JSZT].
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also been suggested314—at some cost, it must be acknowledged, to the First
Amendment. The exercise of such rights would supplement the authority of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Fair Credit Reporting Act to police the accuracy of criminal
background checks prepared by commercial screeners.315
The redaction of records also raises significant challenges for researchers, criminal defense attorneys, journalists, and others seeking complete records with which to, inter alia, hold the prosecutor and the judiciary
accountable for their decisions. In addition, given that many expungement
laws contemplate that records will remain available to law enforcement,316
chances that one can get completely away from one’s past record seems vanishingly small. These realities raise questions about the relative costs and
benefits of closing second chance gaps as opposed to enacting other types of
reform, including “forgiving” remedies. Licensure reform317 and Ban the Box
policies, 318 for example, are less burdened by the tradeoff between records
expungement and access to complete and full government records raised by
Clean Slate policies.
C. Punishing Innocence with Dirty Data
A collateral finding of this research is that criminal justice data information about nonconvictions—arrests or charges that have been dropped,
acquitted, or diverted or are pending or otherwise not accompanied by a determination of guilt—is widely available through background checks. A person with a severe felony charge—even if the charge is dropped—will still be
harmed by it. Among the over half a million charges reviewed in the analysis
of background checks reported in Part III, only about 40 percent included a
definitive record of conviction (Table A-2)—the sort of information that an
employer should care most about.
What’s worse, the disposition was often unclear. As described in Appendix M, for the analysis reported in Part III, our team of law and tech stu-

314. Jason Tashea, Use Copyright Law to Battle Mugshot Extortion, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 27,
2018, 9:23 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/use_copyright_law_to_battle
_against_mugshot_extortion [https://perma.cc/PFT4-HUTZ].
315. Dietrich, supra note 310, at 28 (“[T]he background screening industry is regulated
by two federal agencies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the relatively new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).”); May Background Screeners Lawfully Report Expunged Records?, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/02/06/may-background-screeners-lawfully-report-expunged
-records/ [https://perma.cc/HXQ3-J8NY].
316. Love, supra note 19.
317. E.g., Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/activism/legislation/model-legislation/model-collateral-consequences-reductionact/ [https://perma.cc/G96S-9MRC].
318. See infra notes 335–336 and accompanying text.
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dents spent hundreds of hours cleaning ambiguous disposition data. A large
share of the records included terms like “nolle pro sequi” and “nolo contendere” (legalese for “dismissed” and “guilty (no contest)”), which mean little
to the average prospective landlord, employer, or person evaluating a candidate, but also terms like “no true bill,” “forfeit,” and “adjudication withheld,”
which were difficult even for seasoned attorneys to place into “guilty” or “not
guilty” categories. If you were an employer, a job applicant’s aggravated assault charge from a previous year might give pause, even if the disposition
didn’t indicate that person was guilty. Out of the over half a million dispositions we initially considered, many had to be discarded because of ambiguities in the data, and only 59 percent, we estimate, included a “plain English”
disposition.319
Fine distinctions risk meaning even less to the computers that are ingesting criminal data en masse, often with little oversight, to make decisions
on a wide range of official and civil contexts.320 Criminal background checks
purport to protect the workplace and other environments from convicted
criminals. But civil punishments based on nonconvictions, in areas as diverse as housing, 321 employment,322 and immigration,323 are being meted out.
Crucially, the criminalization of innocence risks disproportionate impact on
the nearly 50 percent of African American men and more than 40 percent of
Latino men arrested by the age of twenty-three, as compared to about 22
percent among white males. 324
The Model Law on Non-Conviction Records developed by the Collateral
Consequences Resource Center and a team of advisors including myself recommends automatic expungement of most arrests and charges that do not
result in conviction, a laudable goal consistent with the foundational pre-

319. Disposition includes “dismiss,” “not guilty,” “acquit,” “guilty,” “convicted,” “admit,”
“admission”; not, for example, “nolle.” See infra Appendix M.
320. See Goggins, supra note 162.
321. MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY L., WHEN
DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL RECORDS BARRIERS TO
FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 16–20 (2015), https://www.povertylaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D7J-5AWZ]; Colin Lecher,
Automated Background Checks Are Deciding Who’s Fit for a Home, VERGE (Feb. 1, 2019, 8:00
AM), https://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2019/2/1/18205174/automation-backgroundcheck-criminal-records-corelogic [https://perma.cc/W9DT-Q93N].
322. See Goggins, supra note 162.
323. Christie Thompson, How ICE Uses Secret Police Databases to Arrest Immigrants,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/28
/how-ice-uses-secret-police-databases-to-arrest-immigrants [https://perma.cc/578E-KBPB].
324. Robert Brame, Shawn D. Bushway, Ray Paternoster & Michael G. Turner, Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471,
478 (2014).

584

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 119:519

sumption of innocence.325 But to even determine whether the many charges
with ambiguous dispositions should be considered nonconvicted or not will
often require judgement calls, a way to resolve stale charges, and a number of
other data-compensation steps.
D. Understanding the Impact of Second Chance Relief
Unlocking better outcomes and removing unfair barriers, not just mechanically delivering second chances, should be viewed as the ultimate goal
and yardstick of second chance relief. In this regard, it is important to
acknowledge that there may be tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of
second chance relief. What is easy (e.g., clearing recent nonconvictions without notice) is not necessarily what is meaningful (e.g., destruction of old felony conviction records with the knowledge and redemption of the person).
Currently, little is known about how records clearing can be carried out
at scale and with the greatest social benefit. That is because existing studies
documenting the positive impact of clearing have been of petition-based
clearing, which introduces significant selection bias and implicates a qualitatively different process than automated clearing. Completing the clearance
process provides an individual with increased confidence,326 the knowledge
of how to characterize one’s newly cleared past, and in some cases, wraparound services,327 each of which may contribute to improved outcomes. To
that end, two factors are hypothesized to be required for an individual to
benefit from records clearance: (1) that the clearance is effective at preventing background checks from discovering the information, and (2) that the
individual has and exercises her right to be allowed to deny a record’s existence.328 But just as a person unaware of the restored right to vote probably
won’t register or go to the polls, not knowing one’s past record has been
cleared can lead to inadvertent and unnecessary disclosures of past history.329
The experience of automated felony reenfranchisement holds a number of
cautionary tales for automated expungement. In the reenfranchisement context, researchers have found that “a high percentage of individuals with past
criminal involvement hold uncertain or incorrect beliefs about their right to
vote” and that this “reduce[s] voter turnout.”330 The hypothesized mecha-

325. Model Law on Non-Conviction Records, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/model-law-on-non-conviction-records-3/
[https://perma.cc
/4WND-FKC5].
326. Adams et al., supra note 92, at 27, 43.
327. As recommended by, for example, CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note
255, at 57.
328. I thank Serena Holthe for making this point to me.
329. Kelman & Carlson, supra note 137.
330. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting
Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 43 (2015).
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nisms are important and turn on several factors that are likely to operate, potentially even on a heightened scale, to automated expungements.
First, misinformation and uncertainty about one’s rights are present because policies are set at the state level and vary widely by state, making it difficult to determine which specific policies apply to a particular ex-felon, who
also may have charges across states. The policies differ in subtle ways, “with
distinctions based on the specific crime or the length of time since discharge,” and they are also “particularly fluid” with frequent changes and updates.331 Second, when the cost of mistakenly asserting a second chance that
one doesn’t have is high—casting a vote when ineligible is a felony,332 and
not disclosing a prior criminal record can also have significant consequences—the uncertainty about whether one has a second chance is even more
likely to chill its use. In this regard, it is notable that Pennsylvania’s Clean
Slate Act, which automatically seals nonconviction records—records associated with summary convictions and misdemeanors within ten years, as long
as the individual’s record is clear—does not require notification.333 Neither
does California’s AB1793, which significantly automates the process of clearing marijuana convictions.334
Beyond the notification question, however, the impact of records clearing more broadly, particularly on those with and without records, deserves
attention. Studies have found that Ban the Box strategies that prohibit employers from asking job applicants about their criminal histories or performing background checks until the point of hiring, on the theory that delaying
criminal history information will diminish its importance, have inadvertently led to statistical discrimination against low-skilled Black men without a
record while not necessarily improving outcomes for young, low-skilled
Black men with records.335 Records clearing at scale could have similar unintended consequences.
In her review of studies of the impact of Ban the Box, Jennifer Doleac,
the author of several of the studies, concluded that because Ban the Box removes the ability of young, low-skilled Black male applicants without records to signal their clean records, employers rely on their own judgments
and “assume there is a high likelihood that they have a record and do not in-

331. Id. at 47.
332. Id. at 43.
333. H.B. 1419, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018).
334. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140.
335. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt
Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal
Histories Are Hidden 24–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22469, 2016),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22469/w22469.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/GD8N-2XQP] (finding that “Ban the Box” strategy reduces the probability of employment for
young Black and Hispanic men without a college degree by 3.4 and 2.3 percentage points respectively).
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terview them.”336 However, Clean Slate is distinguishable from Ban the Box
in at least three ways. First, because information will be removed selectively
from qualifying records, employers won’t necessarily be aware that any information they were previously able to access is missing from a particular
record. Nor will employers, as in Ban the Box, be specifically prohibited
from accessing information in a way that plausibly prompts an awareness of
the absence of criminal information and the need to address it through speculation. If employers “don’t know what they are missing” under Clean Slate,
they are less likely to replace individualized judgments with general statistical discrimination. Second, Clean Slate rehabilitates only the subset of records that meet the eligibility criteria, as compared to Ban the Box, which
applies to all criminal histories. Third, it can be implemented in multiple
ways—for example, by removing expunged information entirely from the
system or by retaining it, but with an indicator that the information is no
longer available. These factors belie facile conclusions about Clean Slate
based on Ban the Box but do not undercut the need for data to address them.
E. What About the (Women and) Children?
Further research is also needed to understand the different experiences
of particular subgroups and how policy attention can be prioritized, including with respect to juveniles. Clean Slate efforts to date have been focused on
adults, but catching individuals earlier in their lives may have a greater impact on not only the individual but also society.337 Though sealing remedies
were originally “pioneered in the juvenile justice system,”338 and separate juvenile courts developed to protect the privacy of minors, the spectre of juvenile “super predators” and related developments led to a gradual loosening
of restrictions.339 But while more attention has been paid recently to the expansion of access to juvenile records, little of it has focused on the methods
available to shrink this access, whether automated or petition based. But juvenile sealing rates, as reported in Table 4-1, also reflect a low (less than 10

336. The Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs Act: Hearing on H.R. 1076 Before the Subcomm.
C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong., at III, 10 (2019) (written
statement of Jennifer Doleac, Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University, submitted by
Rep. Roy).
337. This is consistent, for example, with the Heckman curve, which hypothesizes that
“[s]kill remediation programs . . . are much less efficient compared to early intervention programs” for individuals with educational disadvantages, indicating diminishing returns to investments in human capital over an individual’s lifetime. James J. Heckman, Policies to Foster
Human Capital 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7288, 1999), https://www
.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w7288/w7288.pdf [https://perma.cc/X36M-J2AP].
338. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 114.
339. Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L.J. 365, 382, 418 (2018).
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percent) uptake gap.340 Yet given the potentially significant consequences on
a young adult’s trajectory from their criminal record, the uptake gap among
juveniles may be as much if not more of a critical policy priority than the
adult second chance gap, and it has started to receive policy attention.341
The disparate impacts of records and records clearance on other populations is also notable. For example, several studies have found that women
represent almost 50 percent of those seeking records clearance,342 as compared to approximately 25 percent of those arrested,343 due potentially in
part to the desire of women to enter “caregiving” fields such as nursing and
geriatric care, whose licensing requirements often bar individuals with criminal records.344 This suggests that criminal records act as a particular impediment to women, with implications for how expungement awareness
campaigns are targeted and the urgency of licensure reforms. Likewise, the
immigration consequences for noncitizens of clearable criminal records,
which in the case of deportation345 arguably dwarf other collateral consequences, also deserve further attention. Understanding the particular ways in
which criminal records impact distinct populations can support tailored solutions to providing appropriate relief from a criminal history.
F. The First Chance Gap
Finally, a focus on the second chance gap should not draw attention
away from another, perhaps more important gap: the gap between the United States and other Western countries in what is taken away, and therefore
requires restoration in the first place, when an individual becomes system
involved. In the same way that the U.S. Constitution, open government tradition, and data industry conspire in the United States to make forgetting
impossible, in Europe, prohibitions on disclosure, judicial anonymization of

340. Calero, supra note 26, at 37 (finding that more than 90 percent of juveniles qualified
for but had not taken advantage of available remedies).
341. See, e.g., Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations, BIDEN HARRIS 8, 61,
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMEND
ATIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/34S9-KWV8] (stating that “children who do enter the juvenile
justice system should be given a true second chance, including by automatically sealing and
expunging juvenile records” and specifying that the receipt of federal funds be conditioned on
“the automatic expungement and sealing of juvenile records”).
342. See, e.g., TANSEY & CARLIN, supra note 221, at 12 (finding that 48 percent of records-clearance applicants were female); Prescott & Starr, supra note 26 (finding 46 percent of
studied set-aside recipients to be female).
343. Ten-Year Arrest Trends, supra note 65 (showing that female arrests comprised 23 to
27 percent of all arrests from 2006 to 2015).
344. Elsa Y. Chen & Ericka B. Adams, “I’ve Risen Up from the Ashes that I Created”: Record Clearance and Gendered Narratives of Self-Reinvention and Reintegration, 14 FEMINIST
CRIMINOLOGY 143, 150–54 (2019).
345. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–64 (2010) (describing the deportation risks that accompany criminal pleas).
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defendant names, and a strong tradition of privacy as well as various continent-wide regulations and courts work to make finding an individual’s criminal history in the first place difficult.346 Likewise, felon reenfranchisement is
unnecessary in the large number of European countries that don’t take away
the rights of incarcerated individuals to vote in the first place.347 In this context, closing the second chance gap feels more like a last resort than a firstorder option for ensuring that everyone has a fair shot from the start.
Prosecutors play crucial roles in the creation of the need for second
chances. In the regression models described earlier, among the three policy
factors, choice of clearance method explained some of the variance: counties
that had adopted to some degree an “automatic” clearance approach had a
4.1 percent lower second chance current gap.348 Also highly relevant to the
size of the gap was, naturally, the generosity of the state’s policy (did the state
allow for clearance of any nonconvictions or all nonconvictions?)—as this
difference in policy defines whether and to what degree nonconvictions
charges can be cleared. But also, perhaps less expected, the convictions rate,
or how many charges turned into convictions, were highly relevant: a 10 percent increase in the share of charges that were never convicted was associated with a 10 percent increase in the second chance gap. The share of charges
in the sample that were actually convictions ranged dramatically state by
state, as shown in Table-A2.
Yet uncharged and unconvicted arrests and charges, when not cleared,
stay on people’s records and in criminal-records databases that are used by
employers, lenders, licensing agencies, and social-service agencies to feed into algorithmic and other determinations.349 In this vein, efforts to support
contact with the system without creating a record, as pursued by the progressive D.A. movement, are worthy of further piloting, evaluation, and
adoption.

346. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 159–61.
347. Id. at 250.
348. One might ask, why doesn’t introducing automated methods of clearance account
for more of the difference in gap sizes? There are several possible explanations. First, methods
that appear automated on the books do not always result in effective clearance in implementation, as in the case of Alaska. States that likewise do not have policies of automation can nonetheless, because of policy choices, be more effective at shielding records due to a variety of
factors. In addition, our model currently has the flaw that it does not account for time effects,
in part because of the uncertainty around the retroactivity of clearance efforts, which distorts
the analysis pertaining to states that adopted automatic clearance provisions only. Finally, because so few states have adopted automatic clearing, and they do so in such different ways, the
explanatory power of this variable, relative to the others where there is a greater range of values, is small.
349. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 4; Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 169, at 824–25; see
also James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced the concept of the second chance gap as an
important metric for measuring the effectiveness of the growing wave of second chance laws. Though automating second chances in the ways discussed
in this Article may be viewed as in tension with a justice system that requires
individualized attention, it provides a way to scale relief in a way that traditional models cannot. Regardless of the specific implementations jurisdictions choose, only by attending to the details of administration and
measurement will the potential of second chance opportunities to save taxpayer money, restore dignity, and further economic integration, to break the
cycle of mass criminalization, be fulfilled.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A-1: BASIC STATISTICS
Average age range at time of charge

29.6
(mode = 21)

Number of states represented

50

Average number of checks per state*

1,395

Unique individuals studied

61,658

Incidents studied

204197

Charge Types

Count

Share

Misdemeanor

310,802

66.99%

Not classified

1,785

0.38%

Felony

97053

20.92%

Minor

54,334

11.71%

Total charges

463,974

Total misdemeanor + felony charges

407,855

Charge Disposition

Count

Share

179,655

38.72%

5,443

1.17%

Conviction

246043

53.03%

Pending/ transferred

23,699

5.11%

Unknown

9,134

1.97%

Total charge dispositions

463,974

100%

Total diversion or deferral + pending/ transferred

29,142

Nonconvicted: acquitted, dismissed or other
Diversion or deferral

*One person may have records in multiple states
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TABLE A-2: STATE-LEVEL BASIC STATISTICS
DiverNot
Charge NonconPending/ Unsion or
Classi- Convic- viction
Trans- known
Deferral
fied % tion %
%
ferred %
%
%
Total 463,974 66.99% 20.92% 11.71% 0.38% 53.03% 38.72% 1.17%
5.11% 1.97%

MisdeFelony
Charge
State
meanor
%
Count
%

Minor
%

AK

3322

70.59% 14.18% 15.23%

0.00%

82.27%

16.98%

0.12%

0.57%

0.06%

AL

4386

55.38% 35.64% 8.98%

0.00%

57.82%

37.25%

1.07%

3.85%

0.00%

AR

5240

75.27% 19.50% 5.17%

0.06%

68.80%

23.45%

1.34%

4.39%

2.02%

AZ

12865

44.89% 29.00% 21.27%

4.84%

53.74%

42.09%

0.18%

2.17%

1.82%

CA

7219

64.86% 26.96% 8.19%

0.00%

74.35%

23.59%

0.39%

0.80%

0.87%

CO

15343

47.94% 16.33% 35.50%

0.23%

41.05%

57.60%

0.34%

0.04%

0.97%

CT

3411

72.59% 27.00% 0.41%

0.00%

82.35%

17.38%

0.06%

0.03%

0.18%

DE

6896

73.36% 22.32% 4.31%

0.01%

31.28%

66.84%

0.46%

0.44%

0.99%

FL

29906

54.17% 17.80% 27.90%

0.13%

40.50%

50.22%

1.14%

2.21%

5.92%

GA

8787

70.73% 29.11% 0.14%

0.02%

48.50%

36.11%

0.08%

10.70%

4.61%

HI

2968

66.41% 25.00% 8.52%

0.07%

58.93%

38.11%

2.63%

0.17%

0.17%

IA

12822

93.60%

5.20%

1.18%

0.02%

74.33%

23.53%

1.41%

0.19%

0.55%

ID

14895

48.66%

7.87% 43.47%

0.00%

69.71%

24.95%

1.26%

3.29%

0.79%

IL

8286

52.82% 25.34% 21.61%

0.22%

40.08%

47.61%

0.49%

8.18%

3.63%

IN

10530

62.73% 14.30% 22.85%

0.12%

61.86%

36.57%

0.72%

0.44%

0.41%

KS

2150

67.95% 30.70% 1.35%

0.00%

54.56%

41.35%

3.53%

0.23%

0.33%

KY

5500

69.35% 17.02% 13.64%

0.00%

60.44%

30.42%

1.91%

5.78%

1.45%

LA

3975

55.57% 34.04% 10.39%

0.00%

58.74%

38.99%

0.40%

1.38%

0.48%

MA

3971

60.72% 35.58% 3.65%

0.05%

25.99%

70.39%

0.98%

2.29%

0.35%

MD

21218

72.74% 15.87% 10.84%

0.55%

16.73%

62.57%

0.00%

20.14%

0.56%

ME

3568

80.41% 19.06% 0.53%

0.00%

74.83%

23.49%

0.25%

0.64%

0.78%

MI

3524

62.32% 36.92% 0.77%

0.00%

60.98%

34.36%

0.06%

4.20%

0.40%

MN

11107

94.63%

0.19%

0.12%

84.18%

14.49%

0.14%

0.98%

0.21%

MO

6231

63.06% 32.47% 3.90%

0.58%

92.20%

3.61%

0.00%

0.08%

4.11%

MS

2509

61.62% 38.10% 0.28%

0.00%

63.45%

25.11%

0.36%

9.29%

1.79%

MT

3142

71.23% 28.71% 0.06%

0.00%

62.57%

28.80%

4.77%

3.25%

0.60%

NC

26191

39.83% 17.86% 42.30%

0.00%

38.09%

59.28%

0.00%

1.73%

0.91%

ND

5428

86.31%

3.70%

0.13%

88.84%

5.27%

0.09%

0.35%

5.45%

NE

5553

80.82% 10.39% 8.77%

0.02%

69.98%

27.07%

0.11%

2.76%

0.09%

5.07%

9.86%
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NH

4033

29.78% 69.40% 0.72%

0.10%

60.97%

37.86%

0.00%

1.12%

0.05%

NJ

5085

20.04% 57.09% 16.89%

5.98%

42.05%

50.97%

0.53%

5.57%

0.88%

NM

11361

76.03% 23.15% 0.44%

0.38%

27.02%

60.74%

5.62%

6.57%

0.04%

NV

54305

76.22% 23.70% 0.06%

0.01%

51.99%

38.70%

0.71%

7.24%

1.36%

NY

2909

42.52% 53.28% 4.16%

0.03%

71.47%

7.29%

0.00%

19.35%

1.89%

OH

9575

86.91% 12.68% 0.34%

0.06%

62.83%

27.89%

0.15%

3.57%

5.57%

OK

7358

80.39% 17.74% 1.77%

0.11%

60.34%

23.10%

16.24%

0.03%

0.29%

OR

7556

40.85% 25.94% 33.07%

0.13%

61.39%

36.83%

0.79%

0.94%

0.04%

PA

27164

71.23% 26.23% 1.78%

0.76%

34.38%

37.94%

0.03%

22.18%

5.47%

RI

3908

72.85% 26.43% 0.69%

0.03%

60.67%

34.34%

0.15%

4.20%

0.64%

SC

14781

87.71% 11.91% 0.31%

0.07%

76.97%

21.11%

0.00%

1.79%

0.13%

SD

4286

86.79% 10.43% 2.75%

0.02%

59.50%

38.71%

0.02%

1.00%

0.77%

TN

9399

77.06% 18.30% 3.71%

0.93%

39.59%

45.72%

2.32%

8.25%

4.13%

TX

11638

73.90% 20.63% 4.45%

1.01%

47.59%

36.04%

7.97%

1.03%

7.38%

UT

6570

90.14%

3.03%

0.00%

64.28%

34.79%

0.03%

0.88%

0.02%

VA

10668

57.80% 23.03% 18.94%

0.23%

58.08%

36.50%

0.25%

3.08%

2.08%

VT

1045

87.66% 12.34% 0.00%

0.00%

98.37%

0.19%

1.24%

0.10%

0.10%

WA

4643

80.10% 19.71% 0.19%

0.00%

59.27%

37.86%

2.33%

0.13%

0.41%

WI

9483

63.07% 22.07% 14.45%

0.41%

67.08%

30.55%

0.75%

0.32%

1.31%

WV

4098

72.79% 26.74% 0.46%

0.00%

41.51%

51.42%

0.98%

5.81%

0.29%

WY

3166

84.43% 15.29% 0.28%

0.00%

61.75%

32.79%

3.00%

1.30%

1.17%

6.83%
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TABLE A-3: DISPOSITION STATISTICS

State

Charge
Count

Misdemeanor
Conviction
Count

Total

463,974

174,431

Minor
Felony
and Not
Pending/
ConvicClassified Noncon- Diversion Trans- Unknown
tion DisConvicviction
Count
ferred
Count
position
tion
Count
Count
Count
42,552
56,226
160,426
6,254
17,170
6,915

Share of
Total
Count
AK

-

37.6%

9.2%

12.1%

34.6%

1.3%

3.7%

1.5%

3322

2,030

293

410

564

4

19

2

AL

4386

1,549

763

224

1,634

47

169

0

AR

5240

2,774

666

165

1,229

70

230

106

AZ

12865

3,317

1,544

2,053

5,415

23

279

234

CA

7219

3,669

1,369

329

1,703

28

58

63

CO

15343

3,025

927

2,346

8,838

52

6

149

CT

3411

1,931

868

10

593

2

1

6

DE

6896

1,598

514

44

4,609

32

30

68

FL

29906

7,042

1,910

3,163

15,019

341

661

1,770

GA

8787

3,102

1,156

4

3,173

7

940

405

HI

2968

1,047

507

195

1,131

78

5

5

IA

12822

9,088

326

115

3,017

181

24

71

ID

14895

4,902

475

5,006

3,716

188

490

118

IL

8286

1,292

1,029

1,001

3,945

41

678

301

IN

10530

3,907

760

1,847

3,851

76

46

43

KS

2150

794

372

7

889

76

5

7

KY

5500

2,508

429

387

1,673

105

318

80

LA

3975

1,291

851

193

1,550

16

55

19

MA

3971

431

501

100

2,795

39

91

14

MD

21218

2,743

541

266

13,276

0

4,273

119

ME

3568

2,221

438

11

838

9

23

28

MI

3524

1,394

741

14

1,211

2

148

14

MN

11107

8,942

384

24

1,609

16

109

23

MO

6231

3,764

1,713

268

225

0

5

256

MS

2509

1,013

572

7

630

9

233

45
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MT

3142

1,527

439

0

905

150

102

19

NC

26191

4,300

1,752

3,922

15,526

0

453

238

ND

5428

4,231

399

192

286

5

19

296

NE

5553

3,314

215

356

1,503

6

153

5

NH

4033

849

1,592

18

1,527

0

45

2

NJ

5085

474

1,069

595

2,592

27

283

45

NM

11361

2,406

599

66

6,901

638

746

5

NV

54305

24,122

4,107

4

21,016

386

3,932

739

NY

2909

901

1,140

38

212

0

563

55

OH

9575

5,401

601

13

2,670

14

342

533

OK

7358

3,639

711

90

1,700

1,195

2

21

OR

7556

1,617

1,076

1,946

2,783

60

71

3

PA

27164

7,059

1,964

316

10,306

8

6,025

1,486

RI

3908

1,843

513

15

1,342

6

164

25

SC

14781

10,509

831

37

3,120

0

265

19

SD

4286

2,300

171

79

1,659

1

43

33

TN

9399

2,824

771

125

4,297

218

775

388

TX

11638

4,230

1,044

263

4,194

928

120

859

UT

6570

3,846

254

123

2,286

2

58

1

VA

10668

3,632

1,190

1,375

3,894

27

329

222

VT

1045

903

125

0

2

13

1

1

WA

4643

2,085

659

8

1,758

108

6

19

WI

9483

3,876

1,215

1,269

2,897

71

30

124

WV

4098

1,451

236

14

2,107

40

238

12

WY

3166

1,718

230

7

1,038

95

41

37
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APPENDIX B
TABLE B-1

Number
Nonconof PeoConvic- viction- Waiting
ple with
tion
Clear- Period?
ClearaRate
ance
(Days)
ble RecPolicy
ords

State

Incidents

Charges

Unique
People

Total

204,197 372,673

61,658

80%

-

26,826

Share of
PerPeople
centage
that
of PeoCould
ple with
Clear
ClearaTheir
ble RecRecord
ords
Entirely
Within
Within
Sample
Sample
39%

22%

AK

1,998

2,803

1,169

95%

Strict

60

70

6%

5%

AL

2,180

3,789

1,199

70%

Lenient

730

482

40%

24%

AR

2,876

4,582

1,245

89%

Strict

384

31%

26%

85%

Superstrict

0

0%

0%

18%

15%

AZ

4,609

9,112

1,682

CA

4,210

6,497

2,032

94%

Strict

365

CO

4,198

9,678

1,566

73%

Strict

962

61%

40%

CT

2,380

3,392

1,221

91%

Lenient

291

24%

18%

DE

2,796

6,473

1,243

62%

Strict

800

64%

51%

Superstrict

0

0%

0%

FL

395

10,511

19,681

2,685

55%

GA

3,486

7,423

1,748

77%

Strict

368

21%

15%

HI

1,696

2,625

1,054

66%

Lenient

547

52%

42%

IA

8,221

12,411

1,581

95%

Strict

180

636

40%

27%

ID

4,829

8,011

1,288

86%

Strict

365

568

44%

32%

IL

3,776

5,697

1,679

60%

Strict

1,080

64%

56%

1460

IN

3,866

7,973

1,408

81%

Lenient

815

58%

30%

KS

1,194

2,034

754

75%

Strict

297

39%

34%

KY

2,863

4,297

1,256

86%

Lenient

565

45%

33%

365

LA

2,278

3,485

1,280

75%

Strict

529

41%

37%

MA

1,998

3,681

1,249

22%

Lenient

1825

340

27%

11%

MD

5,586

14,957

1,645

58%

Strict

1095

952

58%

33%

ME

2,175

3,492

1,266

90%

Strict

252

20%

17%

MI

2,376

3,335

1,334

81%

Strict

470

35%

30%

276

15%

10%

0

0%

0%

305

25%

25%

MN

7,669

10,925

1,861

97%

Strict

MO

3,053

5,695

1,498

97%

Strict

MS

1,768

2,215

1,210

80%

Strict

1095
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MT

1,821

2,871

1,162

84%

Strict

356

31%

27%

NC

6,373

14,441

1,848

65%

Lenient

1,406

76%

53%

ND

3,374

4,909

1,366

99%

Strict

98

7%

6%

NE

3,211

4,913

1,346

89%

Strict

395

29%

24%

NH

1,827

3,955

1,192

85%

Strict

416

35%

27%

NJ

1,715

3,661

1,060

73%

Strict

460

43%

38%

NM

4,275

9,881

1,401

62%

Strict

1,026

73%

58%

NV

27,102

49,232

1,669

88%

Strict

1,118

67%

38%

NY

1,654

2,227

1,156

100%

Strict

OH

5,225

8,652

1,877

93%

Strict

OK

2,964

6,019

1,214

84%

Lenient

OR

2,524

4,918

1,252

80%

PA

5,796

19,050

1,905

87%

RI

2,474

3,685

1,273

77%

SC

7,931

14,444

1,658

SD

2,628

4,100

1,259

TN

3,931

7,667

1,482

TX

6,562

9,183

UT

3,723

VA
VT
WA

22

2%

2%

528

28%

19%

510

42%

26%

Lenient

726

58%

37%

Lenient

1,133

59%

29%

Strict

536

42%

36%

95%

Lenient

687

41%

27%

90%

Strict

350

28%

20%

68%

Lenient

1,062

72%

49%

2,121

71%

Strict

365

1,095

52%

43%

6,310

1,416

85%

Strict

180

588

42%

31%

4,663

8,132

2,098

81%

Strict

955

46%

37%

747

1,030

473

100%

Lenient

365

1

0%

0%

3,200

4,502

1,549

67%

Strict

730

601

39%

31%

365
365

WI

3,369

7,853

1,391

93%

Strict

303

22%

14%

WV

2,280

3,789

1,243

72%

Strict

60

638

51%

40%

WY

2,236

2,986

1,233

82%

Strict

180

462

37%

32%
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TABLE B-2
NumPer-

Number

Share

ber of

centage of Peo-

of Peo-

People

of

State

ple that ple that

People

Could

Could

with

Clear

Clear

Clear-

Their

Their

able

Record

Record

Records Entirely Entirely

Number
of
People
with a
Felony
Charge

with a
Felony
Charge
that
Could
Remove

Within

Within

Within

Checkr

Checkr

Checkr

Felony

Sample

Sample Sample

Char-

any

ges

Percentage
of Peo-

Per-

ple with centage
a

of

Felony

People

Charge

Nation-

that

ally with

Could

Rec-

Remove

ords

any

(SEARC

Felony

H)

Charg-

Crim
Popula- Number
tion-

of Peo-

Bal-

ple Es-

anced

timated

Share

to Have

of Peo-

Cleara-

ple with

ble

Cleara- Records
ble

(M)

Records

Number
of People Estimated
to Have
Records
Clearable of
Felonies

es

Total

39%

13,689

22%

23,200

7,476

32%

100.0%

35.4%

25.50

AK

6%

54

5%

242

28

12%

0.3%

0.0%

0.01

13.92
0.006

AL

40%

290

24%

553

142

26%

2.1%

0.8%

0.61

0.297

AR

31%

323

26%

332

90

27%

0.7%

0.2%

0.15

0.043

AZ

0%

0

0%

801

0

0%

1.7%

0.0%

0.00

0.000

CA

18%

310

15%

630

121

19%

9.8%

1.8%

1.27

0.497

CO

61%

619

40%

545

209

38%

1.6%

1.0%

0.71

0.239

CT

24%

215

18%

494

34

7%

1.1%

0.3%

0.19

0.029

DE

64%

633

51%

428

183

43%

2.2%

1.4%

1.04

0.301

FL

0%

0

0%

1,067

0

0%

5.9%

0.0%

0.00

0.000

GA

21%

257

15%

651

121

19%

3.8%

0.8%

0.57

0.271

HI

52%

447

42%

245

90

37%

0.5%

0.3%

0.19

0.038

IA

40%

422

27%

223

80

36%

0.7%

0.3%

0.20

0.038

ID

44%

407

32%

252

116

46%

0.4%

0.2%

0.12

0.034

IL

64%

942

56%

677

252

37%

6.5%

4.2%

2.99

0.800

IN

58%

425

30%

444

213

48%

1.6%

0.9%

0.68

0.340

KS

39%

256

34%

280

91

33%

1.4%

0.5%

0.39

0.140

KY

45%

420

33%

282

140

50%

1.3%

0.6%

0.42

0.141

LA

41%

478

37%

575

201

35%

1.5%

0.6%

0.46

0.193
0.018

MA

27%

139

11%

502

9

2%

1.4%

0.4%

0.28

MD

58%

546

33%

620

328

53%

1.5%

0.9%

0.62

0.371

ME

20%

214

17%

311

65

21%

0.5%

0.1%

0.07

0.023

MI

35%

400

30%

489

103

21%

2.9%

1.0%

0.72

0.187

MN

15%

180

10%

201

31

15%

1.0%

0.2%

0.11

0.019

MO

0%

0

0%

530

0

0%

1.5%

0.0%

0.00

0.000

MS

25%

300

25%

508

68

13%

0.9%

0.2%

0.17

0.039
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MT

31%

319

27%

363

142

39%

0.2%

0.1%

0.05

0.022

NC

76%

981

53%

495

402

81%

1.6%

1.2%

0.86

0.354

ND

7%

83

6%

175

16

9%

0.2%

0.0%

0.01

0.002
0.024

NE

29%

326

24%

211

95

45%

0.4%

0.1%

0.08

NH

35%

322

27%

1,012

361

36%

0.4%

0.1%

0.11

0.121

NJ

43%

398

38%

767

338

44%

2.1%

0.9%

0.66

0.564

NM

73%

807

58%

392

266

68%

0.6%

0.4%

0.30

0.100

NV

67%

639

38%

621

424

68%

0.8%

0.5%

0.39

0.256

NY

2%

21

2%

805

15

2%

9.0%

0.2%

0.12

0.089

OH

28%

361

19%

352

145

41%

2.2%

0.6%

0.45

0.182

OK

42%

319

26%

409

28

7%

0.9%

0.4%

0.29

0.025

OR

58%

463

37%

557

299

54%

1.2%

0.7%

0.48

0.311

PA

59%

559

29%

682

453

66%

2.6%

1.5%

1.10

0.894

RI

42%

460

36%

355

146

41%

0.9%

0.4%

0.28

0.087

SC

41%

452

27%

535

359

67%

1.6%

0.7%

0.47

0.373

SD

28%

246

20%

202

73

36%

0.3%

0.1%

0.06

0.016

TN

72%

731

49%

398

246

62%

2.1%

1.5%

1.09

0.367

TX

52%

905

43%

620

213

34%

13.0%

6.7%

4.83

1.138

UT

42%

446

31%

161

51

32%

0.7%

0.3%

0.21

0.024

VA

46%

786

37%

542

260

48%

2.1%

1.0%

0.70

0.231

VT

0%

0

0%

74

0

0%

0.2%

0.0%

0.00

0.025

WA

39%

480

31%

392

70

18%

1.6%

0.6%

0.46

0.067

WI

22%

192

14%

608

93

15%

1.4%

0.3%

0.22

0.104

WV

51%

492

40%

376

193

51%

0.6%

0.3%

0.24

0.093

WY

37%

0.1%

0.05

0.009

397

32%

214

73

34%

0.2%
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APPENDIX C: MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS
Step

Variables

Model 1

Model 2

R2

Step 1

Automatic clearance

-0.294**

-0.041**

0.12

Step 2

Generosity

0.181**

0.112**

0.20

Step 3

Conviction rate

-1.02**

-1.022**

0.75

Step 4

RUCC_2013 [T.2.0]

0.015

0.76

RUCC_2013 [T.3.0]

0.018

RUCC_2013 [T.4.0]

0.021

RUCC_2013 [T.5.0]

0.021

RUCC_2013 [T.6.0]

0.058**

RUCC_2013 [T.7.0]

0.028

RUCC_2013 [T.8.0]

0.026

RUCC_2013 [T.9.0]

0.051*

Average age

-0.002**

lnpopulation

0.017*

N= 2253, **=p<.001, *=p<.01

I worked with a research assistant to conduct a hierarchical multiple linear regression to predict the current records-clearing gap based on state and
local policies and the demographics characteristics of the target population.
The current record clearing gap was calculated as the percentage of cases eligible for clearance at the county level. Relevant policies included the generosity of the state’s clearance rules (lenient or strict, with superstrict counties
omitted due to the lack of any clearance), the presence of any “automatic”
clearing provisions in state law,350 and the county’s conviction rate (percentage of charges that led to convictions).

350. The range in provisions was considerable. Compare, for example, Maine’s provision,
under which records of an arrest or court proceeding that did not lead to a conviction become
confidential immediately, 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 703(2) (2020), and Connecticut’s
more restricted rule, under which records from the police, court, and state’s attorney that relate
to a case for which a nolle prosequi was entered are erased within thirteen months. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c) (2019).
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Model 1: Gap size = Auto-Clearance + Generosity + ConvictionRate
Model 2: Gap size = Auto-Clearance + Generosity + ConvictionRate +
Age + Lnpopulation + Rural-Urban Code
These three variables were included in the initial regression (r2=0.753,
all ps < 0.001). Each successive variable explained additional variance (all Fs
> 4.2, all ps < 0.01). A second regression model was then run to add demographic variables: the average age of people charged, the rural/urban classification351 and ln(population) of the county (r2=0.757, all ps except
ln(population) < 0.001).

351.
218.

2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, supra note
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APPENDIX M
This Appendix contains two Sections. Section 1 describes the data collected and the methods and assumptions used to develop an estimate of the
second chance nonconvictions-expungements gap, at the state and national
levels. Section 2 describes the robustness checks carried out, to test the
strength of one key assumption in the development of a national estimated
second chance gap: that the eligibility of gig workers for nonconvictionsexpungement relief was similar enough to the eligibility of people with records in general that it could serve as the basis for a national estimate. The data reported is provided in Appendices A and B.
SECTION 1
Step 1: Estimating the Second Chance Nonconvictions Expungement Gap
To approximately size the national second chance nonconvictionsexpungement gap, I worked with the background check company Checkr,
which generously shared data with this project, to develop fifty state-level
samples of background checks, collectively the “National Gig Jobseeker Database” (or “gig-jobseeker sample”). Checkr in turn obtained the raw data
primarily from court sources. The state samples comprised the checks of individuals seeking primarily on-demand jobs between January 2017 and October 2018,352 and, as shown in Table A-1, numbered about 1,400 per state
and, as shown in Table B-1, included over 1,000 checks in all states except
Vermont and Kansas. Collectively the total number of checks was around
60,000.353
People seeking gig-economy jobs are not necessarily representative of
people with background checks in general. To apply for a gig-economy job
requires, for example, that the person not be incarcerated, live in an area
where gig-economy jobs are available, and be capable of doing gig-economy
jobs such as driving or delivery. For these reasons we might expect the gigjobseeker sample to skew younger and more urban but also to exclude incarcerated people with longer sentences. In order to compare our results based
on our gig-jobseeker sample with the results of the same analysis carried out
on a representative sample, we collected representative data from several
states, as shown in Table M-3, and used it to carry out parallel eligibility
analyses, as described in Section 2.

352.
353.

See supra note 207.
See supra Table A-1.
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Step 2: Data Cleaning and Processing
In the Section that follows, we describe the steps undertaken to reduce
the share of unknown dispositions and charge types, remove outliers, and
group the charges into incidents.
1.

Dispositions Cleaning

When a person is charged of a crime, that charge can resolve in any of a
number of ways, including through a determination of guilt or innocence, a
dismissal, or a transfer, and the expungability of the charge depends on its
disposition. To prepare our data for analysis, we developed a taxonomy, in
consultation with two criminal law attorneys and one criminal law professor,354 to classify each disposition into one of four major categories (nonconviction, conviction, pending/transferred, and unknown) as shown in the
table below.
TABLE M-1: DISPOSITION CATEGORIES
Major Category

Subcategory

Nonconviction

Acquit, not guilty

Nonconviction

Dismiss with prejudice

Nonconviction

Dismiss without prejudice

Nonconviction

Nonconviction withheld

Nonconviction

Nonconviction first offender

Nonconviction

Nonconviction other

Nonconviction

Prejudgment probation

Conviction

Plea

Conviction

Probation

Conviction

Guilty other

Conviction

Adjudication

Pending/ transferred

Pending

354. I am deeply indebted to Professor Ellen Kreitzberg and legal services attorneys Michael Hollander and Matthew Stubenberg for their help in developing rules to clean and normalize case dispositions into guilty, nonguilty/dismissed, pending, transferred, and diversion/
deferred categories.
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Pending/ transferred

Transferred

Unknown

Not classified

Unknown

Not enough information

NonConvictionDivDif

Deferral

NonConvictionDivDif

Diversion
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States vary in how they view, treat, and characterize certain dispositions,
and so in cases of ambiguity, we relied upon state-specific internet research
to try to classify major categories of dispositions. Doing so necessarily introduced imprecision, however, given the varied bases of disposition, so to approximate the extent of this imprecision we asked a third criminal law
attorney to independently review the labels. This exercise resulted in an initial agreement rate of 94%, which we then resolved through iteration.355 After the dispositions were implemented, a subsequent manual review of about
50 thousand codings took place, finding ambiguity with about 584 codings,
or about 1.2%.356
Based on the efforts outlined above, we placed 96.9% of dispositions
overall into one of the three definitive categories of conviction, nonconviction, and pending/transferred, with the distribution shown in Table A-1. The
“unknown” disposition rate was below 10% for all states and below 5% for all
but five states.357
2.

Charge-Type Cleaning

In many cases, the eligibility of a record for clearance depended on the
severity of the underlying charge, meaning whether a charge is a felony, misdemeanor, or a minor (traffic, infraction, or summary) charge.358 To prepare
the data for processing, missing values for charge-severity labels were inferred from (1) exact matches and (2) fuzzy matches (i.e., where the same
charge or offending statute was identified). These two steps yielded a labeling rate of 92% across all states. We further improved upon these results by
using general keyword classification (e.g., that “murder” is a felony) based on

355. An example of an ambiguous disposition was “appealed,” which could be characterized as “pending” or “guilty,” as most appeals follow guilty verdicts. We coded such terms as
indicating that the charge was “pending.”
356. Some of these included “no action,” “warrant quashed,” and “adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,” which we coded as a nonguilty disposition, but which could also indicate that the case was still pending; when a case was indicated as “retired” we indicated it was
“pending,” but it could also be closed without a guilty resolution.
357. See supra Table A-2.
358. For example, in Texas, misdemeanors can be expunged after one year, while felonies
have a three-year waiting period. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a) (West 2019).
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trends in the data and internet research. As shown in Table A-2, these efforts
resulted in known-charge-severity labels for about 99% of charges, and
above 94% across states.
3.

Data Processing

From the sample, we marked unresolved charges for exclusion (charges
with pending/transferred or unknown dispositions, about 3% of the total);
we also excluded minor charges and records of individuals whose age was
under 16 or over 80, records from Washington D.C., records where the years
since charge was less than 0, records that were missing a key data element
(ID, disposition date, disposition, or state), and records where the disposition date was not between 1992 and 2018 (inclusive). We confirmed that the
exclusion of minor charges (e.g., parking tickets) did not cause attrition
among people in the sample.
From the charge-level data, we grouped each charge involving the same
person, on the same day, and in the same jurisdiction into an incident, leaving approximately 373 thousand charges over 204 thousand incidents.359
Step 3: Ascertaining the Scope of Relief Offered by Each State’s Nonconvictions
Laws
The next step was to ascertain the nonconviction-clearance laws of all
fifty states in force during the time of the sample. To determine the rules of
each state, we took the following steps. As described below, we relied heavily
on and owe an enormous debt to the meticulous work of the Collateral Consequences Resources Center’s (CCRC) Restoration of Rights Project (RRP)
headed by Margaret Love,360 as well as to the Council of State Government’s
(CSG) Clean Slate Clearinghouse Project, for putting us in touch with many
in-state attorneys when aspects of the law could not be determined from
reading and researching the statute. Because records-relief criteria are often
extremely complex and intricate, we consulted and compared closely the
summaries provided by the RRP and CSG and consulted practicing attorneys where possible. However, to the extent that these summaries and the
practice experience of the attorneys we consulted were in error, those errors
are also reflected in our analysis.

359. See Table B-1.
360. RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/restoration [https://
perma.cc/4TKQ-U3UD].
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Internet Research of the Scope of State Nonconvictions-Clearance
Laws

To ascertain the scope of records relief for nonconvicted charges, we
worked with a criminal law professor and several teams of students to review
the detailed summaries of the law governing the records remediation of
adult nonconvictions as of around 2018, the time of our sample, provided by
the RRP,361 and where there was ambiguity, state statutes. In 2018 and again
in 2019, I worked with a team of students to review the CSG’s Clean Slate
Clearinghouse 2017 summary of the laws.362 We did a final independent
check based on the sources described above in the summer of 2020.
Based on these sources, we coded each state’s laws along several major
dimensions for inclusion in our eligibility model.


Coverage: We coded whether the statute appeared to make relief
available for (1) unconvicted arrest records only, or (2) nonconvicted court records, in particular acquitted and dismissed charges.363 When a state’s law specified that nonconvicted records were
to be made confidential automatically or otherwise not disclosed
without the need for a petition, we did not exclude the state from
our analysis, on the assumption that charges that were not effectively cleared through the specified mechanism were still eligible
for relief. When relief was available for nonconvicted court records, we further researched whether nonconvicted charges in incidents that had convictions (“partial nonconvictions”) could be
cleared, as described below. We also noted (but did not model)
when other kinds of nonconvictions besides acquittals and dismissals (e.g., diversions or deferrals) were eligible for relief.



Waiting Period: From the statute, we noted waiting periods that
were associated with relief for nonconvicted court charges as well
as with pending or transferred cases that lacked a definitive conviction or nonconviction disposition. To reduce complexity, in

361. We accessed summaries of the law from previous years using the Internet Archive
Wayback Machine. Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/web/ [https://
perma.cc/2CHQ-WG5D].
362. Learn
About
Your
State,
CLEAN
SLATE
CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/states/.
363. We noted states that restricted relief for dismissals—for example, California, which,
under SB393, made dismissed unconvicted charges sealable only if dismissed with prejudice.
S.B. 393, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). In Arizona, for example, the law allows individuals
to petition for relief when they have been “wrongfully arrested, indicted or otherwise charged
for any crime,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051(A) (2012), which we interpreted as allowing
for relief from acquitted and dismissed charges. In Mississippi, “[a]ny person who is arrested,
issued a citation, or held for any misdemeanor and not formally charged . . . or upon dismissal
of the charge, may apply to the court . . . for the charges to be expunged.” MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 99-15-59 (2019). We assumed that in this case dismissals due to acquittals were also expungable.
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cases where there were different waiting periods for different
types of nonconvictions, we defaulted to the longer waiting period
where we could not model the two periods. For example, in Arkansas over the time studied, nolle dismissals entered by the prosecutor have a one-year waiting period whereas all other
nonconvictions are eligible at the time of disposition with no
waiting period. In such a case, we assumed that all nonconvictions
had to wait for one year. Likewise, Texas imposes waiting periods
of between one and three years depending on the charge type (one
year for misdemeanors and up to three for felonies and misdemeanors charged in felony cases); we applied the three-years period for all clearable nonconvictions.


Waiting Period Trigger: When there was a waiting period, we
tracked its trigger—for example, disposition or arrest. Because we
did not have the date of arrest in our data, in all cases, we started
the waiting period at the date of disposition.



Other Eligibility-Narrowing Conditions: We tracked and modeled
conditions that narrowed eligibility, including having a pending
charge in the same case or a previous conviction, or where relief
varied based on charge type (e.g., excluding felony nonconvictions).



Unmodeled Criteria: We noted but, because of data limitations or
because the criteria only impacted a small number of states, did
not model several criteria that operate to both expand and reduce
eligibility.

Leading to overcounting: We left out of our model the following eligibility criteria that would limit relief: consent of the prosecuting attorney,364 outstanding legal debt,365 the running of the statute of limitations,366 not having
certain specific charges (e.g., DUIs), and discretion.367 If these criteria were
left in the model, it could lead to overcounting.
Leading to undercounting: We also left out of our model eligibility criteria that would have extended relief to, for example, acquitted and dismissed

364. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27 (2020) (allowing for expungement of court
records “[a]fter one year from the date the prosecuting attorney formally dismisses the entire
criminal case on the record”).
365. IOWA CODE § 901C.2(a)(2) (2020) (requiring as a prerequisite to relief that “court
costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk” in particular criminal cases sought to be expunged must be paid, including the cost of indigent counsel).
366. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.255 (2020) (requiring, for cases where prosecution
was declined, that “the applicable statute of limitations has run”).
367. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C (2020) (stating that sealing is available if
“it appears to the court that substantial justice would best be served”).
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charges levied against individuals who otherwise did not have a record,368
deferred or diverted charges,369 charges where the disposition was withheld,370 first-time-offender charges,371 charges where the disposition was
probation before adjudication,372 and stale charges (where a waiting period
had passed).373
These omissions led to underestimating eligibility.
2.

Research on Partial Nonconvictions

Within a given criminal incident, a person can be accused of multiple
charges but convicted of less than all of them. One important dimension of
relief pertains to the extent to which a state allows for clearance of unconvicted charges even if other charges in the incident were convicted.
To make the determination of this aspect of the scope of relief, we read
the RRP and CSG summaries of the law in order to classify the charges,
roughly, into one of three main buckets: “strict” (only allowing for clearance
of nonconvictions if no charges associated with an incident resulted in a
guilty outcome), “lenient” (allowing for clearance of court records associated
with any charge that did not lead to a conviction), or “superstrict” (including
no provisions for the clearance of court records).374
In a number of cases, the law appeared to make plain whether or not relief was possible. For example, New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-6(a)(3) states
that “[a]n expungement . . . shall not be ordered where the dismissal, acquittal, or discharge resulted from a plea bargaining agreement involving the
368. We modeled Florida as “superstrict” because although sealing and expunction were
technically available, they were available only to individuals that had no prior record. Florida
Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (June 28, 2020),
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/florida-restoration-of-rights-pardonexpungement-sealing [https://perma.cc/5R67-RYYD].
369. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3.2(a)(5) (2020) (stating that expungement is available in deferred adjudication cases after a one-year waiting period).
370. For example, in Florida, “[w]here adjudication has been withheld, there is no conviction for purposes of impeachment, but the record may be sealed only if all other eligibility
requirements for sealing are met.” Florida Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, supra note 368.
371. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4373-74 (2020) (stating expungement is mandatory where charges involve first-time misdemeanor, but discretionary in other cases).
372. For example, “[u]nder Fla. Stat. § 948.01(2), trial courts may withhold adjudication
of guilt after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been rendered and place
the defendant on probation . . . . Upon successful completion of probation, charges may be
dismissed . . . . Records . . . may be expunged after ten years.” Florida Restoration of Rights &
Record Relief, supra note 368.
373. Because we could not discern when action had last been taken in the case.
374. During the relevant period, for example, under Wisconsin law, expungement was
not available for nonconvicted court records, DIR. OF STATE CTS. OFF., EXPUNGING COURT
RECORDS: HELPFUL INFORMATION AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Apr. 2015), www
.co.kenosha.wi.us/DocumentCenter/View/1108 [https://perma.cc/HXX6-Z9SV], leading us to
code the state as “superstrict.”
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conviction of other charges,”375 implying that nonconvicted charges could
not be expunged if other charges in the incident were convicted, or that New
Jersey was a “strict” jurisdiction.
In other cases, however, whether or not the partial nonconvictions could
be cleared could not be ascertained readily based on the record. To determine the laws in these cases, we worked with an attorney at the CSG’s Clean
Slate Clearinghouse Project to consult over email with in-state expungement
attorneys knowledgeable of each state’s laws during the relevant period.376
This information sometimes required judgment calls on the part of the attorneys we consulted; for example, in the case of two states, Ohio and South
Dakota, the law could not be determined with certainty (in the case of South
Dakota, the assistant attorney general stated that the clearability of partial
nonconvictions raised an “unanswered question”),377 leading us to assume,
conservatively, that each state followed a “strict” records-clearance policy. In
some cases we could not get a definitive answer. When in doubt, we defaulted to the more conservative version of the rule (superstrict over strict over
lenient).378 Because of our heavy reliance on the RPP, we did a final review of
the superstrict categories with the RPP and conformed our assumptions accordingly.
The assumptions we used, and the sources we relied upon to reach them,
are shown in Appendix B-3 (Strict-Superstrict-Lenient coding notes),379 as is
the source we relied upon to make up to two determinations for each state:
first, did the state offer records relief for nonconvicted court records under
the law (if not, it was “superstrict”), and second, when the state offered relief,
did it allow for the clearance of nonconvicted charges in an incident where
other charges were convicted (was it “lenient” or “strict” in its treatment of
nonconvicted charges?). The table below contains the assumptions we applied to model waiting periods and charge severity restrictions.

375. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-6(a)(3) (2020).
376. See, e.g., Email from Alex Lesman, Pol’y Analyst, Council of State Govs. Just. Ctr., to
author (Feb. 25, 2019, 11:00 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). More correspondence between the author and Alex Lesman on a state-by-state basis is on file with the Michigan
Law Review.
377. Id.; see also Email from Alex Lesman, Pol’y Analyst, Council of State Govs. Just. Ctr.,
to author (Nov. 12, 2018, 6:22 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
378. For example, though Georgia and Louisiana both offer partial redaction in certain
limited cases, making them “lenient,” we conservatively coded each state as “strict.”
379. For the specific statute or source we relied upon to make these assumptions, see Appendix B-3 (on file with author) (“Strict-Superstrict-Lenient coding notes” Column F).
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TABLE M-2: WAITING PERIOD ASSUMPTIONS
State
If Any, Waiting
Abbreviation Period for Acquittal
(disposition =
R_NG_not_guilty_
adjudication) of
Felonies

If Any, Waiting Period
(days) for Dismissals
(R_NG_Dismissed_w
_Prejudice
R_NG_Dismissed_wo
_Prejudice) of Felonies

If Any, Waiting
Period for Acquittal or Dismissal of
Misdemeanors

MA

3650

3650

1825

OK

3650

3650

365

AL

1825

1825

730

GA

1460

1460

1460

MD

1095

1095

1095

MO

1095

1095

1095

TX

1095

1095

365

WA

730

730

730

395

395

CT
ID

365

365

365

IN

365

365

365

NY

365

365

365

VT

365

365

365

IA

180

180

180

UT

180

180

180

WY

180

180

180

AK

60

60

60

WV

60

60

60

Exclusions of
Felony
Nonconvictions

1

Step 4: Calculating the Share of Charges by State Eligible for Clearance
To the gig-jobseeker background check database obtained in Step 1 and
processed in Step 2, we applied the nonconviction-clearance laws as ascertained in Step 3 in order to get an estimate of the share of individuals in the
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sample, per state, with criminal records eligible for nonconviction relief, partially or fully. The results are shown in Table B-1. About 40% of individuals
in our sample had records that could be cleared partially or fully.
Step 5: Developing a National Estimate Based on State Eligibility Shares
To develop a national nonconvictions-eligibility estimate based on the
state eligibility shares derived in Step 4, we took several steps. First, we assumed that state eligibility shares from nonconvictions from the Checkr
sample were comparable enough to state eligibility shares from convictions
estimated from representative criminal history repositories that we could use
them as the basis for a national estimate. Section 2 presents several checks we
used to test this assumption. Next, to generate a cumulative estimated national eligibility share based on state shares, we created weights using people
who appear in state repositories, as reported by SEARCH, the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, in 2016.380 This yielded a national eligibility share, weighted by the record-holding population by state,
of about 35% of people nationally with records who could clear them partially or fully. To convert this share to a numerical national total, our next step
was to multiply these weights by the population of people with records,
around 80 million, yielding a total of about 28 million individuals.
35% clearance rate * 80 million with records = 28 million
This 80 million figure includes people who have been arrested but never
charged, which, based on an analysis prepared for this report based on the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, comprise about 20% of the total.381
Like unconvicted charges, uncharged arrests are generally clearable under
state law382 with a petition, but unlike unconvicted charges, there are usually
few constraints on their clearance. The application of the eligibility rate derived based on nonconvicted court records may therefore depress the reported total of 28 million individuals.

380. BECKI R. GOGGINS & DENNIS A. DEBACCO, SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST.
INFO. & STAT., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2016: A
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT tbl.2 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ4U-4NZJ].
381. This analysis was prepared by Robert Apel of Rutgers University for this study,
based on the NLSY97, an ongoing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey tracking 8,984 people
starting in their teens. He found that approximately 20 percent of people arrested are never
charged. See Memorandum from Robert Apel, Professor, Rutgers Sch. of Crim. Just., to author
(June 5, 2020) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS, https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97
[https://perma.cc/6P5Y-EBE9].
382. Including Alaska, North Dakota, and Iowa. I developed this analysis in consultation
with in-state attorneys in collaboration with the Council of State Governments. See Appendix
B-3 (on file with author).
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SECTION 2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To test the strength of one key assumption in our development of a national estimated second chance gap, that the eligibility of gig workers for
nonconvictions-expungement relief was similar enough to the eligibility of
people with records in general for nonconvictions-expungement relief that it
could serve as the basis for a national estimate, we obtained representative
data from several states. To each of the representative sources shown below,
we applied the relevant eligibility criteria to get an eligible share, and also
generated a comparable eligible share based on Checkr data matched to the
representative data. In the case of Maryland383 and Pennsylvania384 we relied
upon analyses carried out by legal services attorneys and expungement experts. The results are shown below.
Comparing state-level “actuals” gaps as reflected in these records with
the gaps observed within the gig-jobseeker sample (matching for geography
and time period), we found gig jobseekers to have roughly comparable eligibility rates to those in more representative data. If anything, the Checkr
sample appears to slightly underestimate eligibility. These findings suggest

383. To identify cases eligible for expungement, in connection with developing a tool to
aid in the provision of legal services, Matthew Stubenberg analyzed court records from the
years 1995–2015 from four Maryland jurisdictions: Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Anne
Arundel County, and Frederick County. See Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra note 300;
MDEXPUNGEMENT, https://www.mdexpungement.com [https://perma.cc/C4V9-DPDD]. At
the time, Maryland allowed nonconviction records and records associated with a few convictions to be expunged from court records upon petition. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105
(West 2015). The share of cases identified as expungable but not expunged in each jurisdiction
varied, but across the four jurisdictions, out of 1.41 million cases with final dispositions,
around 997 thousand were identified as including expungable offenses that were not expunged,
for a gap of about 71 percent. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra (documenting collaboration with author).
384. Former Pennsylvania Community Legal Services staff attorney Michael Hollander,
in the fall of 2018, undertook an analysis of court records and cases in the Pennsylvania Common Pleas and Municipal Courts, which process the bulk of felony and misdemeanor criminal
cases in Pennsylvania, using a tool created to make it easier to expunge criminal records in
Pennsylvania. Excluded from the analysis were summary cases in Philadelphia (submisdemeanor), cases from minor courts outside of Philadelphia, and MDJ cases. See Email from Michael Hollander, Dir. of Analytics, Off. of Dist. Att’y, to Rebecca Vallas, Vice President,
Poverty to Prosperity Program, Ctr. for Am. Progress, and author (Nov. 9, 2018, 6:12 AM) (on
file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Rana Fayez, Meet the Disruptor: Michael Hollander, PHILA. CITIZEN (May 3, 2016), https://www.thephiladelphiacitizen.org/disruptor-michaelhollander-expungement-generator/ [https://perma.cc/M9PA-2STG]. Hollander applied a
slightly simplified version of the eligibility criteria based on the law at the time and assumed
that diversionary programs had been completed and excluded other eligibility criteria (for example, that anyone who turns 70 and has been arrest free for 10 years can have all of their cases
expunged). Email from Michael Hollander, supra. Based on applying the criteria to court records, Hollander found that out of 2,030,595 people with disposed criminal records from 2003–
2017, 1,570,694, or 77.3% of them, were eligible for clearing. Id. Approximately 91%–94% of
the eligible but not expunged cases were based on nonconvictions, rather diversionary charges,
making for an approximate total nonconvictions current gap rate of 73% (77% ∙ 94%).
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that the gig-jobseeker shares of this study can be used to provide rough estimates.
TABLE M-3: ACTUAL VS. GIG-JOBSEEKER NONCONVICTIONS CURRENT GAPS

State

MD

PA

AK

SC

Description of Representative Sample

Current Gap (Eligible Share) in Representative Data

Current Gap
(Eligible Share) in
Jobseeker Sample
(matched sample)

Complete records from
1995–2015 for Baltimore
City and Baltimore, Anne
Arundel, and Frederick
Counties

71%385

53%

Complete records from
2003–2017 for Pennsylvania Common Pleas and
Municipal Courts

73%386

66%

A sample of 9,758 criminal
cases from the state AOC
from 1980–2018

24%

18%

A sample of around 4,000
criminal histories from the
South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division

63%

41%

385. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra note 300. The overwhelming majority of
these potential expungements were based on nonconvictions. Id.
386. Id.

